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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998, Venezuela has undergone considerable 
constitutional and legislative reforms to establish a more participatory form of 
democracy. Two of Chavismo’s mechanisms for citizen participation form the units 
of analysis of the thesis: consejos locales de planificación publica (CLPPs) and 
consejos comunales (CCs). These sought to bring citizen participation into public 
policy and planning at the municipal and neighbourhood levels, respectively. 
 
The thesis draws from democratic and planning theories, engaging with debates in 
the literature regarding participation and the issues of bringing democratic 
innovations into representative democratic systems and planning practices and 
processes. The thesis responds to a gap in the literature regarding how actors 
involved in CLPPs and CCs understand these instances of participation. The thesis 
adopted a constructivist approach involving components drawn from new 
institutionalism (Lowndes and Roberts 2013) and Bevir and Rhodes’ (2012) strand 
of interpretivism into an analytical model that Hay (2011) coins ‘interpretive 
institutionalism’.  
 
The thesis elicited the meanings and understandings of citizen participation in local 
policy making and planning processes held by participants of CLPPs and CCs. 
Such accounts enabled an analysis of what participatory democracy meant to those 
active in the processes seeking to establish it. Data collection involved 10 months of 
fieldwork in two municipalities (Chacao and Libertador) in Caracas including semi-
structured interviews with CLPP and CC participants; observation of CLPP and CC 
participants; and review of corresponding municipal documents, academic literature, 
and news articles. 
 
The findings show that participation was widely advocated by CLPP and CC 
participants. Ideological/ political beliefs and traditions shaped a) the different ways 
CLPP members (politician versus community members) conceived participation, 
and b) CC participants’ understanding of state-civil society relationships. The thesis 
provides a contribution to democratic theory by providing further insights about the 
challenges in designing, implementing and embedding mechanisms involving 
citizen participation, particularly the tensions between representative and 
participatory forms of democracy. Secondly, by operationalizing Hay’s (2011) 
 ii
interpretive institutionalist model in the Latin American socio-economic context, the 
thesis showed that marrying constructivist approaches to institutionalism and 
bringing institutionalist dimensions to interpretivism provide valuable analytical and 
theoretical insights. Furthermore, the findings enabled an additional link between 
the interpretive and institutionalist dimensions of Hay’s model to be identified. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: THESIS OVERVIEW 
 
The thesis studies two mechanisms (local public planning councils [CLPPs] and 
community councils [CCs]) that were introduced in Venezuela to increase citizen 
participation in public policy and planning at neighbourhood and municipal levels. 
The thesis aims to elicit how participants understand how these mechanisms 
operate, their agency within them and how this relates to national government’s 
overarching goal of establishing participatory democracy. The research questions of 
the thesis (see section 5.3) seek to establish: what participatory democracy and 
citizen participation means to CLPP and CC participants; how participants 
understand CLPP and CC processes; whether these new mechanisms enable 
participants to influence local planning and policy making; and whether CLPP and 
CCs have impacted local governance structures and institutions. The thesis draws 
on democratic, planning, interpretive and new institutionalist theories. An analytical 
framework based on Hay’s (2011) interpretive institutionalist model is adopted. The 
remainder of the chapter describes the context and structure of the thesis.  
 
1.1  CONTEXT OF THE THESIS 
 
Held (2006) highlights the most common ‘model’ of democracy is based on liberal, 
constitutional principles underpinned by representation. These principles include 
free and fair elections and a competitive political process - generally regarded as 
pluralism. The ideas of the Enlightenment and later the Industrial Revolution have 
greatly shaped the society in which we live. Held (2006) argues the classical, liberal 
approaches to democracy emerged from an era of battles between citizens and 
various outright, monarchical or ecclesiastical, authorities. In time, constraints were 
designed into representative democratic systems in order to ensure that political 
representatives would act in the interests of, and be accountable to, the electorate 
(Manin 1997). These included characteristics such as establishing: 
 A constitution: a legal code which would set out the framework and limits 
within which representatives and citizens could act. 
 Rule of Law: in addition to the constitution, further legislation would set 
further parameters with the way society could function. Again with the aim of 
protecting individual rights. 
 Federalism – vertical separation of powers with the aim of distributing power 
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at different scales within the territory and avoiding over-centralisation.  
 Regular elections of representatives. 
In the mid-20th Century, scholars of the New Left (Pateman 1970; Macpherson 
1977) began to critique the liberal, representative democratic models which they 
considered had become far too entrenched with capitalist values and mass 
consumerism, and served no particular greater good except for the individual. Since 
the 1970s, despite New Left critiques, neoliberalism prevailed as a dominant 
(political economic) model, seeking to minimise government intervention on the 
economy as well as ‘stripping back/hollowing out the state’ (Barber 2003; de Sousa 
Santos 2005; Held 2006; Purcell 2013). The influence and effects of neoliberal 
policies shaped the course of Venezuelan politics from the late 1980s onwards (see 
below, and chapter 2 for detail).  
 
Fast forward to the late 2000s, and the West suffered its worst economic crisis in a 
century. Several citizen-based social movements sought alternatives to the major 
problems that had become increasingly prevalent since neoliberalism took course 
(Purcell 2013). Although not rooted in the financial crisis, but rather responding to 
very poor state-civil society (repressive) relationships, the Arab Spring emerged in 
2010 as a major citizen social movement. Between 2010-2012, Greek citizens took 
to the streets to protest against government(s) who sought to impose increasing 
levels of austerity following bailouts to try and tackle the country’s debt. 
Subsequently, the left-wing anti-austerity coalition party Syriza emerged as leader in 
the general election in January 2015 (Traynor and Smith 2015). In May 2011, the 
Spanish government and media’s lack of interest and coverage of citizen protests 
against austerity, bankruptcy and several cases of political corruption led to the 15-
M/ indignados movement. This movement took to the streets, occupied squares and 
established a network-orientated, assembly based movement throughout Spain. 
Although this diffused somewhat, it can be said to be a contributing factor to the 
emergence of a new political party, PODEMOS, in 2014. In October 2011, the 
Occupy movement emerged in the US, and sparked similar ‘occupations’ in cities 
throughout the world. The common themes among these instances of citizens 
taking to the streets was a) they did not consider their political representatives to be 
acting in the common interest b) the political interests were married with neoliberal, 
economic policies which had failed (given the economic crisis in 2008).  
Consequently, members in these movements sought to explore alternatives to 
established practices, whether economic or political representation. While these 
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movements in the global North are considered new, and continue to emerge, Latin 
America has been engaged in similar movements and processes which pre-date 
those in the global North and the Middle East.  
 
Since the late 1980s, a number of experiences (participatory budgeting, community 
councils, public policy councils) in different countries of Latin America sought to 
expand upon liberal models of democracy and establish new state-civil society 
dynamics (Baiocchi et al 2011; Goldfrank 2011a; Pogrebinschi 2012; Pearce 2010) 
Initially, Latin America’s ‘left-turn’ or ‘pink tide’ in the 2000s was understood to be a 
form of addressing the continent’s legacy of dictatorships and neoliberal reforms; 
participatory democracy initiatives were seen to be a corrective mechanism and a 
way in which citizens could shape from below matters which affected them rather 
than these being decreed from above by authorities (Baiocchi et al 2011; Irázabal 
2005; Irázabal and Foley 2010; Lievesley and Ludlum 2009).  
 
Venezuela is another example of a country whose citizens retaliated against 
neoliberal policies. Like many countries in Latin America, Venezuela implemented 
policies of austerity and structural adjustment policies during the 1980s and 1990s. 
The political landscape meant there were few, if any, true opposition political parties 
to oppose such policies. As a result, civil society, social movements or ‘anti-system’ 
politicians filled this gap (Levitsky and Roberts 2011 pg 18). Throughout Latin 
America this manifested as a breakdown of party systems leading to an acute 
political crisis. In Venezuela, this resulted in the 1989 Caracazo – a series of 
protests and riots - and two failed military coups in 1992 (Levitsky and Roberts 2011 
pg 19). Wilpert (2007 pg 17) describes that Carlos Andrés Pérez, the then 
President, lost legitimacy due to the economic and political crises, in addition to a 
repressive police and military response to protestors. By 1993 Carlos Andrés Pérez 
lost legitimacy as he was removed from office over a corruption scandal (Lander 
2005; Wilpert, 2011). Hugo Chávez emerged as a household name. Despite leading 
a failed coup, his brief TV apology resonated with the wider Venezuelan public for 
his apparent sincerity (Lopéz Maya 2011; Wilpert 2007). Chávez won the 1998 
presidential elections with a mandate to tackle the economic and political crises in 
the country caused by previous governments, as well as to engage the 
disenfranchised (Lander 2005; Lopéz Maya 2011; Wilpert 2007; 2011). Chavismo, 
once in power, very quickly sought to re-write the constitution and embark on 
subsequent legislative reforms to increase citizen participation.  
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The thesis is therefore situated within the context of a widespread desire for citizens 
to be part of, or have influence, within political decision making. The research seeks 
to address a gap in scholarship on participatory democratic mechanisms in 
Venezuela; to date scholarship has centred on whether these participatory 
mechanisms have ‘deepened’ democracy (García Guadilla 2005; Goldfrank 2005; 
2011a), but little focus has been given to participants’ understandings of these 
mechanisms and whether this influences the way such mechanisms operate. The 
research is also considered to provide additional lessons regarding new ‘democratic 
innovations’ (Smith 2009) which will be of interest to participatory democratic 
activists and scholars. This contextual introduction is purposively brief. The main 
themes identified above namely “participation”, the differences between 
participatory and representative democracy, and the specific mechanisms 
implemented in Venezuela are discussed in the relevant chapters in the thesis. The 
following provides an outline of the content of the chapters that comprise the thesis. 
 
1.2  THESIS OUTLINE 
 
The thesis comprises 10 chapters, including this chapter. In broad outline chapters 
2-4 provide the literature review and theoretical framework; chapter 5 discusses the 
research strategy, design and methods. The research aims, objectives and 
questions are included in this chapter. Chapter 6 presents descriptions of the case 
locations; chapter 7 presents the findings regarding the first unit of analysis, CLPPs; 
chapter 8 presents findings of the second unit of analysis, CCs. Analysis of the 
theoretical framework and findings is discussed in chapter 9. Chapter 10 closes the 
thesis with overall conclusions and a discussion of the theoretical contributions.  
 
1.2.1 Thesis chapters and content 
 
Chapter 2 provides the historical and contextual background of the thesis. It 
describes Venezuela’s transition from a bipartisan-led democratic regime 1958-
1998 to the current post-1998 period that seeks to implement a new participatory 
form of democracy. The chapter establishes decades of political and economic 
crises, and a general feeling of exclusion among ordinary citizens to influence 
political decision-making, generated the momentum for seeking change. The 
chapter describes the constitutional and legislative changes that have occurred 
since 1998 with the aim of building a participatory democracy in Venezuela. Two of 
the mechanisms for increasing participation, CLPPs and CCs – the units of analysis 
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– are discussed in depth. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the theory and concepts regarding representation, participation 
and democracy. It seeks to identify and discuss the tensions that exist between 
representative and participatory democracy. It draws on democratic theory and 
explores how these relate to the process of transition towards a participatory 
democracy in Venezuela initiated in 1999. Consequently, the chapter discusses the 
key typologies, arguments and tensions that exist between participatory and 
representative forms of democracy. The chapter defines how Chavismo conceives 
expressions of democracy, as well as seeking to establish how citizens can be 
incorporated into public planning practices and processes. 
 
Chapter 4 establishes the thesis’ theoretical framework drawing from strands of new 
institutionalism and interpretivism. The chapter discusses the nature of institutions 
and how variants of new institutionalism understand ‘institutions’, and institutional 
creation and change. Discussion of Bevir and Rhodes’ strand of interpretive theory 
follows, which is considered an alternative to institutionalist approaches. However, 
Hay (2011) argued that there has been a convergence between constructivist forms 
of institutionalist theory and interpretivism in recent years. The chapter concludes by 
establishing the theoretical framework of the thesis based on Hay’s model. The 
framework comprises the components/ concepts ‘beliefs’, ‘traditions’ and ‘dilemmas’ 
of actors drawn from interpretivism and ‘rules of the game’, ‘rules in use’ and ‘rules 
in form’ drawn from new institutionalism (see table 4.2 for definitions). Justification is 
given why such an analytical and methodological framework is useful for studying 
the Venezuelan context. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the research strategy and design of the thesis. The chapter sets 
out how the interpretive institutionalist framework established in chapter 4 informed 
the research design in conjunction with the research aims, objectives and questions 
which are also presented in this chapter (section 5.3). This chapter provides further 
discussion of the ontological and epistemological position of the thesis. Discussion 
follows regarding the selection process of the case studies, and the pilot study 
undertaken at the start of the fieldwork period. Sections on data generation and 
data analysis follow. The chapter concludes with a section discussing ethical 
considerations. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the geographical, demographic, political, social and economic 
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characteristics for the municipalities of Chacao and Libertador, the two case 
locations of the CLPPs and CCs studied. It provides further contextual background 
for the CLPP and CC cases discussed in chapters 7 and 8. 
 
Chapter 7 presents the findings of participants’ experiences of their involvement in 
the CLPPs in Chacao and Libertador, respectively. The chapter describes that 
legislative reforms provided different challenges for CLPP members. Using the 
theoretical framework, the concept of dilemma is used to describe these challenges 
and how participants’ actions are rooted in their individual beliefs and traditions. The 
chapter highlights that dilemmas were generated from the 2010 reforms that 
affected internal composition within CLPPs, failure to maintain adequate electoral 
processes, and conflicts among the roles and remit of different CLPP members.  
 
Chapter 8 presents the findings regarding CCs in Chacao and Libertador. The 
chapter applies the concepts of traditions, beliefs and dilemmas (Bevir and Rhodes 
2003; 2006; 2010) to elicit how CC participants - from 14 CCs in Chacao and 11 in 
La Silsa, Libertador - understood and acted within their respective CCs. The chapter 
describes the origins of CCs in Chacao and Libertador from participants’ 
perspectives. Given the political context in which CCs emerged, participants’ 
understandings are presented in the context of whether they embrace, accept or 
reject the ideology of Chavismo. The theoretical framework is used to elicit whether 
citizens accept or reject certain ideas or ways of interpreting CCs, depending on 
their respective traditions and beliefs. The chapter also analyses how CCs operate 
in practice and whether this deviates from how they were intended to function 
according to the national law. Finally, the chapter establishes how participants see 
and understand state-civil society relations.  
 
Chapter 9 provides further analysis of the empirical findings presented in chapters 7 
and 8. The first section of the chapter provides an analysis of the key findings 
regarding the components of the analytical framework provided in chapter 4. The 
second section of the chapter links the experience of CLPP and CC practices in 
Chacao and Libertador with the debates in democratic theory regarding 
participatory democracy versus representative democracy, and democratic 
innovations concerning citizen participation. The chapter builds upon Hay’s (2011) 
interpretive institutionalist model by providing a critique of the model.  
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Chapter 10 sets out what the thesis achieved. It provides the theoretical 
contributions of the thesis (see sections 10.3 and 10.4) and a discussion of future 
research agenda.  
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CHAPTER 2 DEVELOPING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN 
VENEZUELA 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the implementation of the 1999 Constitution, Venezuelan democracy is stated 
to be not only ‘elective’ (i.e. representative) but ‘participatory and protagonistic’. The 
last 15 years have seen a number of laws enacted which seek to re-shape the 
country’s society, culture, politics and institutions to conform to the constitution. A 
number of these laws set out mechanisms by which state structures will be more 
inclusive of citizens’ participation; in other cases, laws seek to create new entities 
and mechanisms which are citizen-orientated and managed. The result is a 
complex arena of governance. 
 
The first section of the chapter provides a brief historical account of the key factors 
which brought about considerable political change, i.e. the end of a forty year 
democratic regime at the end of the 1990s to introduce a new president who, over 
his fourteen years in government – until his death in March 2013 - increasingly 
attempted to move towards a more socially just Venezuelan society. Since 2013 the 
subsequent president (Nicolás Maduro) has attempted to continue this political 
movement. The nature of what a just Venezuela looks like is highly contested 
among general citizens and political actors of pro-government and opposition 
factions. 
 
This chapter aims to provide the background for the remainder of the thesis. It will 
serve as the contextual reference which will enable subsequent theoretical and 
case study chapters to be understood.  
 
2.1  A BRIEF HISTORY OF VENEZUELA’S TRANSITION TOWARDS A 
‘PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY’  
 
Prior to the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998, Venezuela’s politics was 
characterised by a political regime following the ‘Pact of Punto Fijo’ in 1958 (this is 
also known and hereon referred to as puntofijismo). The pact was made between 
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three political parties following the return to democracy after the fall of the Marcos 
Pérez Jiménez dictatorship. The pact sought to establish political stability (Smilde 
2011 pg 3; Wilpert 2007 pg 12). The pact, however, excluded a number of political 
parties, most noticeably from the radical left (Smilde 2011 pg 3; Wilpert 2007 pg 12). 
It also created a structure of representative democracy where citizens voted for a 
president and party. It was the party and president who then chose the remaining 
government members at all levels of government (Smilde 2011 pg 3). Given this 
structure, the political parties were able to prioritise political and economic interests 
within a narrow agenda, now considered to give a disproportionate lack of voice to 
lower classes (Smilde 2011; Wilpert 2007). During the period of puntofijismo (1958-
1998) period, lower classes were targeted via clientelistic practices at the grassroots 
in order to secure legitimacy (Smilde 2011). 
 
Economically, Venezuela has undergone periods of growth and crisis from 1958 to 
the Chávez era. Wilpert (2007 pg 10) considers that the ‘country’s ups and downs 
[can be traced] to the ups and downs of the oil economy’.  In the first twenty years 
of puntofijismo, there was an economic boom due to the high price of oil and the 
state’s revenues as a result (Wilpert 2007 pg 11). During the early 1970s Venezuela 
also implemented an Import Substitution Industralization (ISI) model (López Maya 
2011). López Maya (2011) argues that during the initial ISI model period there was 
considerable social and economic growth and that this helped to consolidate the 
puntofijismo democratic model in a country that had been marred by dictatorships 
for most of the early 20th Century. 
 
Venezuela’s boom ended in 1979, as a result of increasing oil production costs, 
declining oil prices and rising debt (Wilpert 2007 pg 13; Smilde 2011 pg 4). The first 
milestone in the beginning of a twenty year social and economic decline in 
Venezuela was the social unrest created by the ‘Black Friday’ currency devaluation 
in 1983 (López Maya 2011). The continued fiscal resources decline in the 1980s, 
gave way to IMF structural adjustment packages in 1989, culminated in another 
milestone (López Maya 2011; Smilde 2011): rioting on the streets of Caracas that 
was met by a heavy police and military response resulting in ‘anywhere between 
300 and 3000 dead’ (Wilpert 2007 pg 17). The Caracazo, as the event was called, 
is considered by Venezuelans a pivotal moment in recent history (Wilpert 2007; 
López Maya 2011). 
 
In 1983, a small group, EBR-200, was formed in a military academy; one of the 
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founders was Hugo Chávez (Wilpert 2007). The group was named using an 
acronym which served two purposes: 1. the shortening of Ejercito Bolivariano 
Revolucionario, and 2. The acronym comprised letters from Ezequiel Zamora, 
Simón Bolívar and Simon Rodriguez, key historical figures related to Venezuela’s 
independence from Spain. The number referred to the 200 years since Simón 
Bolívar’s birth in 1783 (Wilpert 2007 pg 16). The group was disenchanted with 
puntofijismo politics but had no initial aims except to be inspired by the key historical 
figures and envision a revolutionary Bolivarianism. Wilpert (2007 pg 16) describes 
Bolivarianism as ‘an emphasis on the importance of education, the creation of 
civilian-military unity, Latin American integration, social justice, and national 
sovereignty’. Later, as a result of the group’s links with civilians, the group was 
renamed MBR – the M standing for movement (Wilpert 2007). 
 
Smilde (2011 pg 5) states that ‘the economic decline of the 1980s and 1990s, 
however, had consequences that went beyond class polarization. It spurred 
realignment in social-class identity and political cleavages’. The MBR-200, now 
even more dissatisfied with the social and political disparities in Venezuela, led an 
attempted coup in February 1992. Chávez was imprisoned as a leader of the coup. 
A second coup was attempted in November of 1992 but this was also unsuccessful. 
Wilpert (2007) argues that the group was unprepared at the time of the Caracazo to 
take advantage of the situation to overthrow the government.  
 
Rather than by coup or revolution, the end of puntofijismo began because President 
Carlos Andrés Pérez was impeached on corruption charges (Wilpert 2007; López 
Maya 2011). In 1994, Rafael Caldera became Venezuela’s new president. He was, 
for the first time since 1958, part of a non-puntofijismo aligned party (Smilde 2011). 
One of Caldera’s election promises in 1994, that he fulfilled, was to pardon Chávez 
– on the condition that Chávez would retire from the military (Wilpert 2007; López 
Maya 2011). 
 
Awareness of Chávez, and the Bolivarian movement, had grown substantially in the 
two years of his imprisonment (López Maya 2011). Wilpert (2007 pg 17) argues that 
the country’s political and social inequalities, including the repression of the left for 
25 years, legitimised the actions of the attempted coup for millions of Venezuelans, 
particularly the poor. With the new support of millions around the country, Chávez, 
and other left leaders, now saw an opportunity for Bolivarianism to be carried out 
not by revolution but through election to government (Wilpert 2007; López Maya 
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2011). Once Chávez had entered into the political arena as a civilian, a political 
party founded on similar principles to the MBR-200 - the Movimiento V República 
(MVR) was established (López Maya 2011). The nuance is the V and B in Spanish 
sound similar and the V also referred to the latin letter for 5 which symbolised the 
movement’s intention of establishing a fifth republic (Wilpert 2007). 
 
By 1997, the extent of Venezuela’s economic decline was at its worst: 
unemployment almost doubled between 1981 and 1997 (Smilde 2011); the 
numbers of workers employed in the formal and informal sectors were almost equal 
in 1997 compared with the 1970s when formal sector workers doubled the numbers 
of informal sector workers (Smilde 2011); real wages had declined 37% (Smilde 
2011); the richest 10 percent received a greater proportion of the GDP (Smilde 
2011); poverty increased from 17% in 1981 to 65% in 1996 (Wilpert 2007); and 
rising insecurity (López Maya 2011). The IMF reforms implemented in 1989 were 
supplemented by a new package in 1996, leading to further disillusionment with 
neoliberalism and the lack of political alternatives offered by puntofijismo (Lacabana 
2009; López Maya 2011; Smilde 2011; Wilpert 2007). 
 
By the time of the 1998 presidential election, Venezuela’s citizens were ready for 
change (Buxton 2005). For Venezuela’s poor, the Bolivarian liberation discourse 
appealed. López Maya (2011 pg 216) describes Chávez appealed because ‘his 
image – that of a young man uncontaminated by politics and willing to accept 
responsibility for his actions [reference to taking responsibility for the failed coup] – 
moved Venezuelans who were disgusted by irresponsible, insensitive, and corrupt 
politicians’. Wilpert (2007 pg 18) similarly argues that Venezuela’s middle-class 
were also attracted to Chávez as they saw him as ‘someone who would completely 
overhaul Venezuela’s hopelessly corrupt and inefficient political system that they 
held responsible for their 20 year long slide into poverty’. 
 
Venezuela’s citizens, seeking an alternative to the puntofijismo politics and 
neoliberal economic policies, which had seen the country slide into crisis, voted 
Chávez the new president with a majority of 56.2% (Smilde 2011; Wilpert 2007; 
López Maya 2011). He was voted for despite his rather vague plans for a new 
democratic model which sought a new way of doing politics and rejection of 
neoliberalism (Buxton 2005; Smilde 2011; Wilpert 2007; López Maya 2011). As it 
turns out, the appeal to the middle class was critical: it was the middle-class who 
voted Chávez into government, because at the time the numbers of poor voters 
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were proportionally smaller than that of the middle and upper classes (Wilpert 2007 
pg 18-19). 
 
The political and economic crises which led to increasing social inequalities and 
class polarization meant that citizens sought a political system in which they would 
have more contribution to the processes and public policy that affected them – 
something that was missing in the puntofijismo regime. The Chávez government 
sought to increase citizen participation and, due to his election campaign, had a 
mandate to do so (Smilde 2011). 
 
One of Chávez’s first actions in office was to write a new constitution (Lacabana 
2009). In doing so, Chávez’s government, comprised entirely of members of the 
Venezuelan left, organised a referendum to ask whether a constitutional assembly 
should be organised – 92% voted yes (Wilpert 2007; Smilde 2011). Following this, 
referendum elections to form the assembly meant that 125 of the assembly’s 131 
seats were Chávez supporters. The majority was overwhelmingly pro-Chávez 
because assembly members were elected as individuals not by party lines (Wilpert 
2007 pg 21). The constitution was debated for four months and received final 
approval in December 1999 (Wilpert 2007 pg 29). The composition of the assembly 
is likely to have helped the new constitution to be written in such a short period, 
including a number of key instruments which aim to increase democratic 
participation and government responsiveness (Smilde 2011). 
 
For the first two years, Chávez’s government received high levels of approval and 
broad consensus with the move towards deepening political democracy (Smilde 
2011; Wilpert 2007). This soon changed. As Smilde (2011 pg 9) notes ‘the two-and-
a-half-year period from December 2001 to August 2004 saw intense and protracted 
struggle between the Chávez government and oppositional political and economic 
forces. This period contained a package of 49 reform laws at the end of 2001, an oil 
strike in April 2002 leading to an attempted and failed coup by the opposition, an oil 
industry deadlock situation which effectively shut down the industry in December 
2002 and a recall referendum for Chávez in August 2004 (Smilde 2011; Wilpert 
2007). 
 
Chávez won the revocation referendum with 58% in his favour (Wilpert 2007 pg 26). 
Following the recall referendum victory Chávez saw an opportunity, and had the 
confidence, to expand the Bolivarian movement and ‘seek to build “socialism of the 
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21st Century” (Wilpert 2007 pg 27). This new programme would ‘push for greater 
state involvement in the economy, more self-management in the form of 
cooperatives and co-managed factories, more land reform, and more direct 
democracy at the local level’ (Wilpert 2007 pg 27). 
 
Chávez subsequently won the presidential election in 2006 with 62.9% to 37.9% - 
the largest electoral victory in Venezuelan history (Wilpert 2007). Wilpert (2007 pg 
28) argues that Chávez’s win, given the tumultuous period 2001-2004, showed that 
his mechanisms for increasing citizen participation and other related social justice 
programmes were becoming accepted and legitimised in Venezuelan society. 
Furthermore, he contends that, although impossible to say for certain, because of 
the opposition’s tactics, Chavismo became increasingly radicalised after each 
challenge it encountered which might not have been the case if the opposition had 
accepted Chávez in 1998 (Wilpert 2007 pg 28). A number of pro- Chávez political 
parties formed the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) in 2007 as part of 
the move towards consolidating the goals of Chávez’s second term programme. 
 
The second term programme, Líneas Generales del Plan de Desarrollo Económico 
y Social de La Nación 2007-2013 (MINCI 2008), outlined the government’s intention 
to enhance citizen’s participation via a process termed ‘democratic revolutionary 
protagonism’ (ibid pgs 29-41). This is seen as one of seven strategies in delivering 
Venezuela’s transition towards ‘21st Century socialism’ (ibid pg 5-7). 
 
In 2010, the National Assembly approved the next wave of legislative reforms in the 
form of ‘Popular Power’ laws (poder popular), which concur with Wilpert’s (2007) 
view that Chavismo’s policies were becoming more radical following the 2006 
election win. Nonetheless, Chavez’s second term was fraught with difficulties. 
Wilpert (2011) argues that ‘one must recognize that there are significant 
shortcomings that have either persisted throughout Chavez’s presidency or in some 
cases are new. This helps to explain why the Chávez government’s popularity 
seems to have peaked with Chavez’s 2006 reelection…and has gradually declined 
since.’ Wilpert (2011) identified the following shortcomings:  
 A politicised judicial system. It was considerably pro-Chávez in outlook 
despite its independence from the national executive; it has received a lot of 
accusations of human rights violations from international organisations and 
the opposition. 
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 The public administration remained extremely bureaucratic 
 A two year recession 2009-2010 
 The country’s continued dependency on oil revenues 
 Increasing insecurity and violent crime, despite heavy investment into social 
and welfare programmes 
 A persistent housing shortage 
The reasons Wilpert (2011) gives for the above problems, many of which are not 
specifically a cause of the Chávez administration but have not been resolved or 
tackled either, include: dependency on Chávez’s leadership; clientelistic practices 
have not changed much at all; Chávez’s hierarchical, top-down, military-style 
management; and many uncertainties of the PSUV’s future direction in terms of 
policy or goals. In addition, Venezuela’s politics remains highly contested and 
demonstrates considerable struggles between elites and non-elites’ economic and 
political interests and motivations (Cannon 2004; García Guadilla 2005).  
 
Following this historical outline, the next section focuses on the government 
structure of Venezuela. It provides an outline of the representative state which has 
been in place throughout the 20th Century and the puntofijísmo. The sections will 
also discuss where relevant changes have been made since Chávez’s election in 
1998 and the enactment of the 1999 constitution.  
 
2.2  GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE IN VENEZUELA 
 
Venezuela is defined in its current constitution as a decentralised federal state. The 
constitution also establishes that Venezuela is a republic that will be organised 
politically into states, the Capital District, federal dependencies and territories, with 
further division of these political territories into municipalities. As such, Venezuela 
comprises 23 states, the capital district and 335 municipalities. 
 
Accordingly, the federal structure (poder público) is distributed among national, 
state and municipal levels. National level government is split into the three 
traditional separation of powers: legislative, executive power and judicial. However, 
since the 1999 constitution Venezuela has added two further divisions of power. 
These are ‘electoral power’ and ‘citizen power’. As such the national public authority 
comprises: 
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 Legislative power formed from a unicameral National Assembly of 165 
deputies elected by popular vote. The National Assembly has the remit of 
forming, discussing and sanctioning federal laws. It should be noted that the 
1999 constitution changed to a unicameral system from the previous 
bicameral system. 
 Executive power is comprised of the President, Vice-president, Ministers and 
civil servants. The President is elected by popular vote every 6 years1. 
 Judicial power is constituted by the Supreme Court of Justice. 
 Citizen power is comprised of a number of organisms including the 
Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo), Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio 
Público) and Comptroller General (Contraloría General de la República).  
 Electoral power is constituted by the decentralised National Electoral Council 
(CNE).  
The national executive’s public policy and planning body is the Federal Government 
Council (CFG). The CFG is presided by the Vice-president of the country. The rest 
of the council comprises cabinet ministers, state governors, one municipal mayor 
per state and twenty spokespeople from popular power entities (such as community 
councils). 
 
As noted above, Venezuela is split into 23 states and the capital district (GDC) in 
Caracas. States comprise a governor; executive cabinet, government secretariat, 
attorney office, legislative council, and police. Each state has a State Public Policy 
and Planning Council (Consejo Estatal de Planificación y Coordinación de Políticas 
Públicas). This is comprised of the state governor, mayors from each municipality in 
the state, and members from municipal level public policy and planning councils.  
 
Each state is divided into municipalities which comprise a mayor, executive cabinet, 
municipal police and the municipal council (Concejo Municipal). In addition, since 
the 1999 constitution each municipality should also implement a municipal level 
public policy and planning council (CLPP). Each state and municipality is divided 
into the five main divisions of power at their respective levels. 
 
In addition to the executive (mayor and administration), another key component is 
the municipal-level legislative branch, the Concejo Municipal (CM), which is 
                                                
1 Under Chávez, the Presidential term went up from four years to six years. 
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comprised of councillors. Population determines the number of councillors in a 
given municipality; the number ranges from 5 in rural areas to a maximum of 13 in 
urban areas. Councillors are salaried elected representatives who have a legislative 
role in the CM. Councillors within the CM are assigned to a commission in which 
they develop appropriate projects and strategies which may become municipal by-
laws if approved by the CM. Each councillor commission has a team of public 
servants, which includes research staff and legal advisors.  
 
Until 2010, the country had parish councils (JPs) at the sub-municipal level. JPs 
emerged in 1992 as part of decentralisation reforms. Prior to Chavismo, 
governments in Venezuela had implemented several reforms in order to establish 
fiscal and political decentralisation in the country (Castillo Stark 2006; Lander 2005). 
The Organic Municipal Regime law of 1989 brought quite significant changes. The 
first was the introduction of elected mayors for municipalities. Secondly, the law also 
redefined municipalities in the country with the aim of securing decentralisation. As 
a result, in Caracas (which is where the case studies are located - see chapter 5), 
three new municipalities emerged in 1989 from the old Sucre District. These were El 
Hatillo, Baruta and the District of Sucre. Following petition to the State of Miranda, 
Chacao secured its autonomy from the District of Sucre to become its own 
municipality in 1992. Chacao is one of the case study locations along with the 
Municipality of Libertador. At the time of the 1989 decentralisation, Libertador did 
not undergo any changes. Parishes and their corresponding JPs were also created 
to ‘decentralise municipal administration, promote citizen participation and improve 
public service provision’ (Organic Municipality Law 1989).  
 
Elections for JPs had traditionally been held at the same time as mayoral and state 
elections. As will be uncovered in more depth later in the thesis, the revocation of 
JPs has been particularly controversial. One of the key reasons for the controversy 
is rooted in the intention to substitute JPs with Communal Parish Councils (JPC). 
JPCs are intended to form part of the “communal state” as part of Chavismo’s 
transition towards “21st Century Socialism” (see figure 2.1). At the time of fieldwork, 
there were few JPCs in existence. The controversy of removing JPs is a matter that 
the thesis will return to in chapter 7 as it also affects the composition of CLPPs.  
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2.3  LEGISLATING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN VENEZUELA 
 
Since 1998 national government implemented a wide range of mechanisms to 
increase citizen participation in public affairs. This section aims to provide an 
overview of the 1999 constitution and subsequent legislation which provided 
opportunities to involve more citizen participation in political processes.  
 
The preamble of the 1999 constitution explains where the new constitution departs 
from the previous constitution of 1961. It states that the ‘Republic will establish a 
participatory and protagonistic [sic], multi-ethnic, pluri-cultural democratic society in 
a just, federal and decentralised State’2. As such, the country is described in article 
6 as: 
The government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and of the political 
organs comprising the same, is and shall always be democratic, 
participatory, elective, decentralized, alternative, responsible and pluralist, 
with revocable mandates.3 (Constitución 1999) [my emphasis] 
whereas the 1961 constitution (article 3) stated that: 
The government of the Republic of Venezuela is and always will be 
democratic, representative, responsible and alternate.4 (Constitución 1961) 
[my emphasis] 
The 1999 constitution also sets out in numerous articles different means by which 
citizens have the right to take part in public affairs. In summary, the 1999 
constitution enables citizen participation in public affairs; gives citizens the duty to 
participate; enables decentralisation to communities, where possible; and the 
establishment of Consejos Locales de Planificación Pública (CLPPs). 
 
Venezuela’s 1999 constitution made concerted efforts to direct the country away 
from the general inability of citizens to participate in public affairs common during 
the puntofijismo period to one where the rights were established for citizens to get 
                                                
2 ‘Con el fin supremo de refundar la República para establecer una sociedad democrática, participativa 
y protagónica, multiétnica y pluricultural en un Estado de justicia, federal y descentralizado’ 
3 Artículo 6. El gobierno de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela y de las entidades políticas que la 
componen es y será siempre democrático, participativo, electivo, descentralizado, alternativo, 
responsable, pluralista y de mandatos revocables.  (Constitución 1999)  
4 El gobierno de la República de Venezuela es y será siempre democrático, representativo, 
responsable y alternativo (Constitución 1961, artículo 3) 
 
18 
 
involved in public matters. The effectiveness of the constitution, however, depends 
on how these formal rights are implemented and adopted in practice. Though 
Chapter 4 provides further detail and conceptualises how there may be a difference 
between conferred rights and rules and how these are interpreted and enacted in 
practice, Wilpert (2007) makes a very important point in this regard: 
Ultimately, what makes the difference between a constitution that is actually 
implemented and one that is merely a formality on paper is the country’s 
political culture. If the institutions, citizens, political leaders, and state 
officials generally abide by the letter and spirit of the constitution, as part of 
the population’s world view and political culture, the constitution will be very 
significant…However, if there is a political culture in which the law is 
regularly subverted and interpreted in ways that violate its spirit, as was the 
case in state socialism, then the constitution will be mostly meaningless. 
(Wilpert 2007 pg 42) 
For clarification, ‘state socialism’ is considered by Wilpert to mean the form adopted 
by many examples of the 20th Century (USSR, China, Cuba etc) where a small elite 
formulated and coordinated economy and policy via central planning. The inference 
that Wilpert makes here is that in comparison to Venezuela, citizens in other 
countries – and previous attempts at socialism - had very little input within this 
system (Wilpert 2007 pgs 245-250). 
The 1999 constitution paved the way for later legislation to elaborate and provide 
more detail on the mechanisms and means through which participation would be 
incorporated into the political landscape. The focus of the thesis has been on those 
mechanisms which create the means for citizens to get involved in policymaking 
and decision making. However, the summary of other mechanisms of varying 
degrees of citizen participation, see below, highlight that CLPPs and CCs 
(discussed in full in sections 2.4 and 2.5 below) are not isolated and exist within a 
panorama of other instances of state-civil society engagement and participation. 
Twelve engagement mechanisms are outlined in the municipal powers law 
(LOPPM) which describes how local authorities can cooperate and inform citizens in 
public affairs using these –or other - means: 
 Open Councils (Cabildos abiertos): an open session in the municipal 
chamber organised with the aim to finding solutions to problems which affect 
the community. 
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 Citizen assemblies: enable citizens to deliberate on specific local matters. 
Decisions are stated to be binding. 
 Public Consultation: citizens, communities, organisations and collectives are 
given the right to formulate observations regarding proposed law and policy, 
particularly those related to urban development and environmental 
conservation. 
 Community initiatives (Iniciativa popular): Article 70 of the constitution 
enables organised community and collectives to undertake autonomous 
decisions to achieve certain objectives which will improve their quality of life. 
 Participatory budgeting: enables citizens to participate in the municipal 
budget as a means of improving distribution of public resources. 
 Accountability (Control social): Enables citizens to contribute to the scrutiny 
of public authorities 
 Referendums: enables citizens to request referendums for specific topics, or 
for the revocation of elected members, after a determined period set out in 
legislation. 
 Legislative initiatives: enables citizens (greater than 0.1%) of a municipality 
to present proposals relating to law and policy to the municipal council for 
consideration. 
 Alternative (community based) news and media: enables neighbourhoods, 
communities and organisations to develop their own non profit media. 
 Instances of citizen attention: poorly defined, but understood to be where 
municipal governments provide kiosks or ‘one stop shops’ where citizens 
can seek information. 
 Self and co-management: enables communities and citizens to manage 
public services or manage social programmes as expressions of shared 
responsibility, decentralisation and democracy, where possible.  
Depending on the municipality, the different means of citizen participation adopted 
will vary. Of the above, the most common that have been used include 
consultations, open councils, assemblies (although not necessarily binding) and 
participatory budgeting.  
Nothwithstanding the above, there are three other mechanisms of participation 
which were introduced by Chavismo. These include Urban Land Committees (CTU), 
Water Committees, and “Bolivarian Circles” (Círculos Bolvarianos).  
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Bolivarian Circles were created by a President Chávez decree with the purpose of 
creating an organisational and political base to promote Chavismo (García Guadilla 
2007; 2008a;b). Bolivarian Circles had the purpose of enabling political activism and 
promoting Chavismo’s social and welfare programmes, and establishing a closer 
link between government and President Chávez (Araujo 2010 pg 252). According to 
Araujo, other scholars have argued that due to their structure, culture of exclusivity, 
lack of clear rules, and potential for partisan bias meant that the initiative was short-
lived (ibid pgs 252-253). 
 
CTUs were decreed by President Chávez as a means of solving problems related to 
housing (García Guadilla 2007). In terms of function and remit, they were similar in 
many respects to Bolivarian Circles and old neighbourhood associations (ibid). The 
CTUs were supplemented by other technical roles where citizens could identify 
problems related to other sectors such as water and energy (ibid). García Guadilla 
(2008a;b) notes that CCs which were introduced in 2006 (see section 2.5) have 
incorporated many of the functions included in CTUs and Water committees. It 
should be noted, however, that in certain areas technical committees may still exist 
independently of CCs. 
 
The next two sections will focus on introducing the units of analysis of the thesis: 
CLPPs and CCs. 
 
2.4  CONSEJOS LOCALES DE PLANIFICACIÓN PÚBLICA 
 
The Local Public Planning Council, Consejo Local de Planificación Pública (CLPP), 
is formed at a municipal level comprising members of the municipal government and 
community members from the ‘organised community’. CLPPs were one of the first 
major mechanisms aiming to bring citizen participation into Venezuelan policy and 
decision making processes. CLPPs were modelled on the structure of Porto 
Alegre’s participatory budgeting (Wilpert 2007), a mechanism of participation 
regarded as particularly successful (Cabannes 2004; de Sousa Santos 2005; 
Pateman 2012). Wilpert (2007) also notes that the CLPP structure is very similar to 
some of the planning councils (e.g. in Massachussetts) in the US. Where they differ, 
however, is that CLPPs are guaranteed by law and the constitution – the US and 
Brazilian examples are not (ibid).  
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The CLPP initiative was first introduced in the 1999 constitution and first outlined in 
detail in the corresponding CLPP law in 2002. Two later reforms of the CLPP laws 
were enacted in 2006 and 2010. The CLPP is defined as the entity responsible for 
local government planning, in accordance with article 55 of the Ley Orgánica de 
Planificación, to develop a Municipal Development Plan. The CLPP was designed 
with the aim to bring in members from organised community and neighbourhood 
groups to be involved in municipal policy and decentralisation through ‘participation 
and protagonism’. According to the law, each municipality is obliged to establish a 
CLPP. 
 
At the time of the 2002 law, each CLPP comprised a president (municipal mayor); 
municipal councillors; presidents of local parish councils (Juntas Parroquiales); 
representatives of parish neighbourhood associations, organised community 
representatives. Indigenous representatives should also have been included in 
areas of the country where these communities were present. In 2010 the abolition of 
parish councils by national government meant that these representatives within the 
CLPP no longer existed. These members were to be replaced by “communal parish 
council” members, derived from a new mechanism linked to Chavismo’s emerging 
“communal state” (see chapter 3). This posed a challenge for the structure of 
CLPPs, as discussed further in chapter 7. 
 
CLPP members that hold political office (mayors and councillors) have a term length 
of 4 years; community members 2 years. There are differences in how councillors 
and mayors (traditional elected representatives) are elected compared to 
community members. Traditional elected representatives are elected via nationally 
run elections organised by the National Electoral Council (CNE). Elections are held 
in polling stations following the CNE’s procedures and using Venezuela’s electronic 
voting machines. On the other hand, the community CLPP members have been 
nominated and elected by local community organisations. Positions are advertised 
locally and use a paper ballot system. Colloquially, participants often referred the 
elections administered by the CNE as ‘first grade’ elections and those undertaken 
within the community are ‘second grade’ elections. Additionally, mayors and 
councillors are sometimes referred to as ‘natural’ members of CLPPs because their 
elections are not made specifically to be part of the CLPP; instead they are elected 
to office and become automatic CLPP members for the duration of their period in 
office. One additional difference among elected members and community members 
in the CLPP is that councillors and mayors are salaried; community members are 
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volunteers who are only paid for travel and sustenance expenses. 
 
The CLPP law sets out 22 functions for which CLPPs are responsible. These are 
orientated around the Municipal Development Plan which CLPPs are required to 
create and implement. As such, CLPPs are required to, among other things, 
organise and prioritize community organisation proposals; align municipal budgets 
with the objectives of the Municipal Development Plan, prioritise the areas of the 
municipality with the greatest need; facilitate cooperation with other public and 
private sector entities, and undertake needs and technical assessments within the 
municipality to inform the plan and budget prioritization. In order for CLPPs to 
develop Municipal Development Plans and carry out their functions, the law 
stipulates that CLPPs should create, and be supported by technical experts (Sala 
Técnica).  
 
The 2006 partial reform brought in a requirement for mayors to make budget 
forecasts to ensure compliance with the duties of CLPPs and to incorporate them 
into municipal governments’ budgets. Budgets are required to include community 
priorities and projects channelled through the CLPP. Municipal governments have 
responsibility deliver these projects. In order to comply with this part of the budget, 
many municipalities adopted a form of participatory budgeting to do this. The 2006 
changes also required CLPPs to include a vice-president who would be elected 
from the community. This was in part a response to community members’ critique 
that mayors did not attend CLPP meetings. By creating the position of vice-
president, mayors would be absolved of regular attendance while CLPPs would 
have a formal way of presiding meetings.  
 
Further revisions to the CLPP Law, introduced in December 2010, provided a 
number of overall goals to ensure consistency with several other new laws or 
reforms collectively named ‘Popular Power’ laws. These laws were established to 
deliver the new national public planning system (Sistema Nacional de Planificación 
Pública) which was a further element in national government’s intention of creating 
21st Century Socialism and its corresponding “communal state” (MINCI 2008). 
 
In addition to the abolition of parish councils, the 2010 reform provided further 
stipulations about the composition of community CLPP members. The ‘organised 
community’ was to be comprised of a member of each of the following civil society 
organisations: peasants, workers, youth, intellectual, fishers, sportspeople, women 
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and indigenous peoples who lived within the municipality. Furthermore, in 
accordance with the new structure emerging from the 2010 Popular Power Laws 
and National Planning System members from Communal Planning Councils 
(Consejo de Planificación Comunal) should also form part of the CLPP. In 
municipalities where Communal Planning Councils do not exist, CLPP members 
should be formed by nominated community council representatives instead. In order 
to be eligible to form part of the CLPP, CCs need to be officially registered with the 
corresponding national ministry (Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Comunas).  
 
CLPPs’ retained its main 22 functions, where the priority to create a Municipal 
Development Plan and orientate activities around development were key. However, 
the 2010 reform created more onus for CLPPs to adhere to the National Plan and 
other national executive entities. Figure 2.1 illustrates how citizens and the 
municipal government should interact via the CLPP to formulate, deliver and 
monitor plans. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. CLPP, Municipality and community planning and interfaces, adapted from 
González Marregot (2010b pg 49) 
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2.4.1 CLPPs in practice: reviewing the literature 
 
CLPPs had notoriously poor uptake in many municipalities (Wilpert 2007; Esteva 
2008). Political events (i.e. attempted coup, strikes), a great amount of 
misinformation surrounding CLPP development, poor formulation of the law, and 
resistance from elected officials have been considered the key reasons for CLPPs’ 
lack of uptake and implementation (Wilpert 2007; González Marregot 2010b; 
Rangel Guerrero 2010; Weky 2007). Additionally, political polarization has made 
exercising participation rights within CLPPs difficult (González Marregot 2010a;b; 
Rangel Guerrero 2010). Due to the political and social polarisation in the country, 
critics argue that CLPPs provide a form of subordination to the national executive’s 
centralised planning and party politics (Maingon 2004, cited in Rangel Guerrero 
2010 pg 76).  
 
Venezuelan scholars have also identified that a culture of clientelism persists in 
public management processes. Clientelism is attributed as one of the main 
challenges to the uptake of participatory mechanisms in Venezuela (García Guadilla 
2005; González Marregot 2010a).  
 
On a more critical level, Ortega and Rodríguez (2011) and Maingon (2004, cited in 
Rangel 2010 pg 76) argue that CLPPs provide an almost non-existent participation 
for organised civil society. González Marregot (2010b pg 50) considers this may be 
linked to two factors: in many local governments there has been low operational and 
managerial capacity and, secondly, civil society has shown inexperience and/or 
disinterest in participating in CLPPs.  
 
Several scholars identified that CLPPs and their corresponding processes lack clear 
laws, rules, and norms (Esteva 2008; Wilpert 2007; Gonzalez Marregot 2010a;b). 
Furthermore, for Esteva (2008 pg 168), this has meant that regulating participation 
processes in public policy planning is inefficient and create too many uncertainties.  
 
Mirroring the general academic literature reviewed above, documentary review of 
Venezuelan theses focusing on CLPPs shows the flaws, issues and challenges 
identified above. Lacruz Rengel (2008) offers the most positive account. Lacruz 
Rengel (2008 pg 142) found in her case study that: members of the mayors’ 
administration acknowledged a considerable increase in the number of project 
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demands submitted by organised civil society; there was an increase in fiscal 
resource distribution equity as a result of citizen participation; there was an intention 
by the local municipality to meet project objectives submitted by the community. As 
a result, the municipal government members interviewed indicated that CCs and the 
CLPP have created a platform which contributed to attending to the community’s 
needs and requirements (ibid).  
 
Other theses provide a number of negative findings including: CLPPs’ failure to 
exercise all of their functions adequately (Rubio 2005; Husbely 2009); CLPPs had 
not incorporated community participation in the proposal, planning, execution, 
control and evaluation of community-orientated projects (Rubio 2005; Husbely 
2009; Rondón Quintero 2006); the community had not been given any training to 
participate in local governance processes (Rubio 2005; Husbely 2009; Rondón 
Quintero 2006); CLPPs failed to meet as frequently as the law stipulates and is an 
ad-hoc process (Husbely 2009); CLPPs did not engage enough with the private 
sector or wider community (Husbely 2009); CLPP budgets were open to 
manipulation and funds spent on other non-CLPP matters (Husbely 2009); CLPPs 
were subject to a number of weaknesses including excessive bureaucracy, 
partisanship, and political clientelism (Rondón Quintero 2006); and, elected officials 
and civil servants’ reluctance to involve citizens is a major obstacle (Rondón 
Quintero 2006). 
 
Araujo’s (2010 pg 318) doctoral research found that CLPPs are ‘frequently 
interpreted as political threats to the power held by local and regional authorities’. 
Consequently, Araujo (2010 pg 318) identified three factors that were required for 
successful implementation of CLPPs: 
i) A need to show results (demonstration of effectiveness) 
ii) Political willingness  
iii) Existing/Realistic opportunities for citizen participation 
Given the many challenges that CLPPs have faced, national government sought to 
experiment and introduce further mechanisms for citizen participation. CCs were 
introduced as a means of generating participation at the sub-municipal level. 
Notably, these councils excluded any type of traditionally elected, political 
representative. The next section looks at this mechanism in more detail. 
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2.5  CONSEJOS COMUNALES  
 
Consejos Comunales (CC) are community councils formed at the sub-
neighbourhood level by residents within a certain (self-determined) geographical 
area. These councils were first introduced by law in 2006 (LCC) and then reformed 
into an organic law in 2009 (LOCC). Organic laws are considered to be a form of 
statute which is at a level between the constitution and ordinary federal laws. As 
such, the importance of CCs ‘increased’ with the change of status from the 2006 
LCC being superseded by the LOCC in 2009. Preceding the remainder of the 
Popular Power laws, which were enacted in 2010, the LOCC is considered to be 
one of the components of this body of legislation. 
 
Article 2 of the LOCC clearly sets out the intended remit of CCs: direct citizen 
participation in the management of community matters and projects which respond 
to the needs and aspirations of the community “…towards building a socially just 
and equitable society”. CCs can be understood as an attempt at achieving direct, 
local community involvement rather than trying to form a council where politicians 
share planning activities with community members, as is the case with CLPPs. The 
LOCC states that CCs are autonomous in their formulation, geographical remit and 
resource allocation. Yet in practice – as will be explored further in this thesis – CCs 
are supported significantly by the state (national, state and municipal governments) 
in most respects.  
 
The size of a CC’s geographical remit is dependent on whether it is within an urban 
or rural locale: CCs located in urban areas will be formed of 200-400 families, and 
greater than 20 families in rural areas. Any citizen over the age of 15 within the 
CC’s defined area can form the ‘Citizens’ Assembly’ on a volunteer basis (i.e. non-
compulsory and non-paid). The ‘Citizens’ Assembly’ is defined as the maximum 
instance of decision making within the CC. The CC Assembly then elects 
spokespeople who will form the units and sub-committees within the CC. 
 
In 2006, sub-committees comprised the executive unit, a CC ‘bank’ (financial 
management unit), the social control/accountability unit and then the various sub-
committees (e.g. housing, women’s issues, health or recreation) that the CC 
deemed necessary. CTUs, described above, are one of the organisations that can 
be subsumed as a sub-committee should the CC wish. The 2010 LOCC made 
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changes to the internal structure where the ‘bank’ became a more general financial 
and administration unit, and a new ‘coordination unit’ was added responsible for 
ensuring that each of the CCs units and committees worked together. The social 
control/accountability unit (contraloría social) ensures that resources are being used 
appropriately, that accounts and transactions are transparent, and ensures plans 
and projects are implemented and adhered to. 
 
Funding for CCs come from a number of sources, predominantly from the national 
government via a number of decentralised agencies. These have included 
organisations such as the Intergovernmental Decentralisation Fund (FIDES) and the 
Special Economic Assignations Fund (LAEE); at the time of writing, most funding 
was coordinated from the Federal Government Council (CFG) – but typically 
transferred to CCs by municipal government. Funds can also come directly from the 
national government, municipal government, private donations and any other 
means of securing resources. Citizens who involve themselves in CCs have a duty 
to ensure joint social responsibility, accountability, transparency, appropriate and 
efficient use of available resources, whether provided by the state or another 
source. 
 
Although day to day organisation is internal, Dorta (2007 pg 204) notes that CCs 
‘correspond to the realm of civilians, they are not a public authority, but the link with 
distinct national, regional and municipal “public power” entities for the development 
of their functions is evident’5. These include the Comisión Presidencial del Poder 
Popular, the national level commission; Ministerio del Poder Popular para la 
Participación y Protección Social; National Assembly; Ministerio del Poder Popular 
para las Finanzas; El Fondo Nacional de los Consejos Comunales; FIDES; LAEE; 
and states and municipalities (Dorta 2007 pgs 204-208).  
 
One of the more onerous elements that arose with the shift from LCC to LOCC was 
the need for existing CCs to re-register with the national ministry. The registration 
process also required a number of tasks such as conducting new censuses and 
providing additional financial information about residents. As will be discussed in 
chapter 8, these requirements have been challenging for and/or contested by local 
residents involved in their respective CCs. 
                                                
5 ‘corresponde al mundo civil, no es un ente público, pero es evidente la vinculación con distintos 
órganos de los poderes públicos nacionales, regionales y municipales para el mejor desempeño de 
sus funciones’ 
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Similarly, the LOCC set out more specifically the planning cycle that CCs should 
adopt while requiring them to have a stronger relationship with the national 
comunas ministry:  
 
The Popular Power Ministry with the competency for [promoting] citizen 
participation will dictate the political strategies, general plans, programmes 
and projects for community participation in public matters. [The Ministry] will 
support consejos comunales’ aims and proposals and facilitate their 
relations with Public Power bodies and organizations.6 
 
The next part of this section turns to the academic literature to provide a review of 
previous studies on CCs. 
 
2.5.1 Literature review of CCs in practice 
 
It has been estimated that at least a third of the country’s 20 million citizens7 over 
the age of 15 (the age that one becomes eligible) has participated in CCs at some 
time (Goldfrank 2011a;b). Goldfrank considers this is an unprecedented level of 
participation for participatory democratic institutions. To compare, Goldfrank states 
that participatory budgeting in Brazil has at maximum reached 10% in Porto Alegre, 
but has had much lower participation rates in other Brazilian cities.  
 
Scholars consider that CCs have reactivated an important debate about community 
organisation; consolidated citizen involvement in local matters; enabled a 
‘democratization’ of knowledge regarding the management of projects; allowed 
neighbourhoods to pressure governmental agents; and renovated social leadership 
and communities (Ciro Marcano 2012; Goldfrank 2011b; Lacabana 2009).  
 
A review of the literature shows that civil society in Venezuela is fraught with class 
conflict and ideology. This has affected how participatory mechanisms such as 
CLPPs and CCs have been implemented in practice (García Guadilla 2005; 2008b; 
                                                
6 El ministerio del poder popular con competencia en materia de participación ciudadana dictará las 
políticas estratégicas, planes generales, programas y proyectos para la participación comunitaria en 
los asuntos públicos y acompañará a los consejos comunales en el cumplimiento de sus fines y 
propósitos, y facilitará la articulación en las relaciones entre éstos y los órganos y entes del Poder 
Público. 
7 Venezuela’s population in 2014 was 30.4 million (INE) 
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Goldfrank 2011b; Smilde 2011). García Guadilla (2005) considers this conflict to be 
rooted as far back as the 1970s, and is therefore not a recent phenomenon. She 
argues that because of a poor (performing) representative democracy in the 1970s 
led to increasing poverty and social inequality in the subsequent years. Demands 
for inclusion and participatory democracy began at this time. However, social 
movements were aligned on class and ideological lines. Popular social movements 
advocated social justice and equality, whereas middle and upper class 
neighbourhood associations emphasised matters which would secure liberal 
democracy, economic freedom and the defence of private property (ibid 112-113). 
García Guadilla considers that the meaning of civil society is still aligned to these 
two classes, but there has been a considerable re-appropriation and understanding 
of the concept of ‘civil society’ in Venezuela. Previously, civil society was a term 
used only by the middle and upper classes, the Bolivarian project under Chávez 
adopted the term to include the people-orientated values sought by popular sectors. 
This has meant, that now the middle and upper classes organise more fervently on 
class grounds to protect what they have understood to be a threat to their individual 
freedoms (ibid pgs113-115). García Guadilla (2005) argues that this is manifested 
spatially (by poor and rich housing areas) leading to considerable segregation, 
animosity and increased violence in the country, particularly in the larger cities. 
 
Scholars have identified that funding for CCs have positively targeted poor and 
lower-income areas (barrios). Ciro Marcano (2012) argues that CCs have focused 
on projects of immediate needs for the community – these are usually matters that 
have been neglected by government administrations over decades (Ciro Marcano 
2012 pg 7). Lacabana (2009 pg 11) argues that CCs have enabled people to take 
more ownership of or within their community, helped communities create new or 
alternative forms of employment by establishing cooperatives or other ventures. He 
also states that CCs have sparked vibrancy in the street where previously residents 
were too focused on insecurity and violence.  
 
Compared with CLPPs, CCs have a number of strengths which have re-established 
the momentum for participatory democracy in Venezuela (González Marregot 
2010a). Ciro Marcano also notes the acceptance of participatory institutions in 
Venezuela, which he conceives as ‘collective legitimacy’ (2012 pg 7). According to 
Araujo’s (2010 pg 320) research, the main motivation for people to participate in 
CCs is to solve immediate community problems. In particular, the focus of projects 
often relates to the functioning of public services or improvements to community 
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assets such as water pipes, electricity infrastructure, road improvements, access to 
transportation systems, schools and the provision or improvement of parks. 
 
A number of weaknesses of CCs have also been identified in the literature. The first 
relates to the ambiguity with criteria in how to define CCs’ territorial remit (González 
Marregot 2010a). CCs can be of a very micro-scale, which in urban areas can be 
limited to a few streets; conversely, areas can be considerably large in rural areas 
(Lacabana 2009; Dorta 2007). Furthermore, CCs only have the capacity to influence 
public policy within their geographical area/remit and generally do not enable larger 
municipality-wide matters to be taken into account (Lacabana 2009; Ciro Marcano 
2012; Goldfrank 2011b). This overly-micro scale detracts from CCs’ efficacy (Ciro 
Marcano 2012; Goldfrank 2011b). It is only when larger organised groups or 
federations come together that these community voices can be heard at municipal, 
state or federal level (Ciro Marcano 2012 pg 8). Goldfrank (2011b) highlights that 
the newer 2010 reforms, which introduce comunas – amalgamations/federations of 
communal councils – as well as financial support from the CFG, may help in 
overcoming CCs’ issue of scale. 
 
A second set of weaknesses relate to the difficulties with organisation, financial 
management and accountability (González Marregot 2010a;b; Aceves López and 
Reyes Rodríguez’s 2012; Urdaneta 2011; Vicente León 2009). Additionally, CCs 
have been described as lacking communication with public authorities; assuming 
too many responsibilities; and that this can be exacerbated because those involved 
in the CC are volunteers (González Marregot 2010b pg 66).  
 
Araujo’s research identified (2010 pg 319) that CCs were implemented in a chaotic 
fashion (2006-2007): unclear mechanisms, regulations and procedures meaning 
their praxis was weakened and disorganised; while the intrusion of party politics 
divided communities. Goldfrank (2011b) also identified a clear lack of rules as a key 
issue, and McCarthy (2012 pg 24) argued that there is a ‘Pervasive influence of 
informal rules and practices’. Ciro Marcano (2012 pg 6), like Urdaneta (2011), 
advises that without clear objectives, goals and organisation, CCs can easily be 
entrapped in neoliberal or state-led processes which means they adopt a ‘sub-
altern’ role – which is to their detriment. 
 
Scholars opposed to CCs argue that CCs provide a limited means of participation 
and that those participants have a limited ability to engage in politics beyond 
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traditional representative means (Rangel Guerrero 2010; Vicente León 2009). CCs 
are also argued to be a mechanism designed to dismantle and remove 
competencies which belong to municipal governments (Rangel Guerrero 2010; 
Vásquez Vera 2010). Scholars (Brewer-Carías 2010; Rangel Guerrero 2010) 
consider, rather than being instances of self-government, CCs represent an effort to 
delegitimize local governments and any type of civil society which does not align 
itself with Chavismo. For Rangel Guerrero (2010 pg 86), CCs are an additional form 
of bureaucracy, only valid with the presence of national political leaders, eroding 
any certainty and confidence in state-civil society relations.  
 
CCs have also been criticised for being used as clientelistic tools in order to secure 
political support (Araujo 2010; Brewer-Carías 2010; García Guadilla 2008b; 
González Marregot 2010a; Lacabana 2009; Vásquez Vera 2010; Vicente León 
2009). Because CCs can be funded directly from national government, critics argue 
that funding is prioritised towards pro-government CCs – which tend to be the 
poorer sectors of Venezuelan society - rather than those that are aligned with 
opposition parties (García Guadilla 2005, 2008a;b; McCarthy 2012; Rangel 2005; 
Morales et al, cited in Goldfrank 2011b pg 49; Smilde 2009; Vásquez Vera 2010; 
Vicente León 2009). Additionally, CCs are argued to contribute to centralisation (by 
the increased linkages to national government) and the appropriation of popular 
power (Aceves López and Reyes Rodríguez 2012; Brewer-Carías 2010; Goldfrank 
2011b). Goldfrank (2011b) argues, however, that there is a lack of conclusive 
evidence to support these arguments. Conversely, Aceves López and Reyes 
Rodríguez’s (2012) argue that the autonomy given to CCs have created a ‘truthful 
explosion of popular power now that CCs [do] not rely on the CLPP’ (pg 4). 
Furthermore, they state ‘from our angle of observation, the CCs are live spaces that 
have served as a reference for community initiatives which allow participation, 
deliberation and management’.  
 
Scholars who have explored who participates in CCs have contended that those 
with political tendencies towards opposition parties do not participate in CCs 
because their ideological and personal reasons dissuade them from doing so 
(Aceves López and Reyes Rodríguez’s 2012; Vicente León 2009). However, other 
scholars argue that although the middle/upper classes in Venezuela participate less 
in CCs than the popular sectors, there is still a significant, and increasing, number 
who do (Hetland 2012; McCarthy 2012). It should be noted that a great debate in 
the literature surrounding the polarization of Venezuelan society (socially, 
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economically and politically) is a huge determining factor in the success or failure of 
participatory mechanisms (McCarthy 2012). 
 
In addition to the above, Aceves López and Reyes Rodríguez’s (2012) identify 
further problems and challenges including the ‘usual suspects’ scenario where the 
same people turn up to CC meetings. And for those people who do turn up, 
voluntarily in their spare time, there is a need for a work/CC–life balance.  
 
2.6  ADDITIONAL EMERGING MECHANISMS 
 
Though CLPPs and CCs provide the case studies of the thesis (see chapter 6), a 
more recent mechanism – the comuna (commune) - has been created and 
promoted by Chavismo. Comunas were first brought in to being with its 
corresponding law in 2010, which is one of the five Popular Power laws. Comunas 
are not one of the thesis’ units of analysis. They are therefore discussed only with 
reference to CCs and CLPPs rather than an additional mechanism for analysis 
within the thesis. 
 
Comunas are intended to provide an amalgamation of CCs within a certain 
neighbourhood or similar territory. It is argued by Chavismo that comunas lead to 
the creation of 21st Century Socialism by acting as a federation of CCs rather than 
being an authority imposing upon CCs. It is considered an alternative to the existing 
representative state. Chavismo describes the emerging parallel structure as the 
“communal state”. Figure 2.2 shows the elements discussed in this chapter, namely 
the federal government structure on the left, the planning councils in the middle at 
national, state and municipal levels and with the emerging communal structure on 
the right. 
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Figure 2.1 Interfaces and connections between federal government, multi-level 
planning councils and popular power mechanisms/ communal state. 
 
2.7  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The chapter opened with a historical account of the changes that have occurred 
politically and economically in the country since 1958. The key change that 
occurred in 1998 with the election of President Chávez led to the end of the 
puntofijísmo era. Chavismo brought about a number of key political and legislative 
changes via a new constitution and subsequent laws, many of which sought to 
increase the level of citizen involvement in public planning and policy making.  
 
Although the reasons why CLPPs and CCs were chosen as units of analysis are 
discussed in chapter 5, sections 2.4 and 2.5 introduced briefly the legislative context 
in which they have developed. The chapter highlighted the difficulties that CLPPs 
have faced; it highlighted mayors and councillors (traditionally elected politicians) 
have not necessarily placed as much emphasis on the importance of the CLPP as 
community members do. The literature review revealed that combining community 
members and politicians to undertake municipal level planning in CLPPs has not 
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lived up to initial expectations. This tension between community and representative 
members is a matter which will be the focus discussed in the next chapter.  
 
CCs, discussed in section 2.5, have provided a sub-neighbourhood level of 
participation for local residents. The literature review has pointed to high levels of 
engagement (although not necessarily long term participation) in the country. They 
have been acknowledged as a viable means for local communities to identify and 
carry out smaller scale projects to improve their local area; with evidence that those 
located in lower income and barrios have benefitted the most. However, critics have 
pointed to the fact that increasingly CCs have become a mechanism linked to 
national government, particularly through funding. Hence opinions suggest that CCs 
are forms of clientelism subject to prioritization in areas with pro-national 
government affiliations. The literature review shaped the development of the 
research questions and research design (see chapter 5) by raising the key issues 
that have been identified by other scholars, including their empirical research 
findings. 
 
The chapter raised one of the perpetual tensions between participatory democracy 
and representative democracy: the often-perceived division(s) and tensions 
between ordinary citizens and political representatives. Chapter 3 aims to draw out 
these tensions further, making reference to democratic and planning theory, in order 
to establish conceptual tools which can be used in the analysis of the research 
findings in chapters 7-9.  
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CHAPTER 3 REPRESENTATION, PARTICIPATION AND 
DEMOCRACY 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Policymaking and planning involve processes and mechanisms by which resources 
will be assessed, allocated and distributed (Hill 2005; Irazábal and Foley 2010; 
Rydin 2011). Traditionally, at the local level, municipal governments formulate plans 
and public policies and had responsibility for the implementation of policies, plans 
and service delivery. Government, predominantly led by elected representatives, 
and its corresponding bureaucracy were those with the remit to undertake such 
tasks. Liberal or representative democracy is based upon permutations of this 
model (Held 1996). In academic literature, the traditional representative approach 
has been referred to as elitist and/or technocratic (Irazábal and Foley 2010; Bevir 
2010a).  
 
Since the late 1980s, a number of experiences (participatory budgeting, community 
councils, public policy councils) in different countries of Latin America have sought 
to expand upon liberal models of democracy and establish new state-civil society 
dynamics (Baiocchi et al 2011; Goldfrank 2011a; Pogrebinschi 2012; Pearce 2010) 
Initially, Latin America’s ‘left-turn’ or ‘pink tide’ in the 2000s was understood to be a 
form of addressing the continent’s legacy of dictatorships; participatory democracy 
initiatives were seen to be a corrective mechanism and a way in which citizens 
could shape from below matters which affected them rather than these being 
decreed from above by authorities (Baiocchi et al 2011; Lievesley and Ludlum 
2009). Consequently, Irázabal (2005 pg 51) argues that ‘citizens of Latin America 
[and elsewhere] are demanding more substantial participation to exert more citizen 
control in the processes of urban governance and planning’. Given that reforms in 
Venezuela are aiming to give citizens the opportunity to get involved in policymaking 
and planning in their communities a number of interrelated issues need to be 
unpacked. Bringing everyday citizens into planning and policymaking arenas raises 
questions on the nature of democracy, particularly how, when and why people 
should be involved.  
 
Overall the chapter aims to establish the tensions that arise from Venezuela’s 
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transition towards a participatory democracy, with a particular focus on those that 
arise from the involvement of citizens in democracy and planning processes beyond 
the traditional representative means. Section 3.2 seeks to identify the key 
typologies, arguments and tensions that exist between participatory and 
representative forms of democracy. This is followed, in section 3.3, by looking at 
how citizen participation can be brought into the practice and processes of planning, 
typically undertaken by technocrats and/or ‘planning professionals’ (Allmendinger 
2009; Bevir 2010a; Rydin 2011). Section 3.4 turns to look at how Chavismo 
conceptualises the dichotomy between traditional expressions of representative 
democracy in Venezuela and the newer mechanisms of participation that it created 
in the 2000s. Contextual factors about how this is interpreted by Venezuela’s 
political opposition are also discussed. Conclusions to the chapter are provided in 
section 3.5. 
 
3.2  EXPRESSIONS OF DEMOCRACY  
 
With roots as far back as Athenian democracy in 5th Century BC (Held 1996), 
participatory democracy is a wide branch of democratic theory which advocates the 
active participation of citizens in public affairs, with some strands involving 
considerable elements of direct democracy (Bevir 2009; Held 1996; Hendriks 2010; 
Macpherson 1977; Pateman 1970). There is a central premise that citizens and 
institutions cannot be considered separately, and that institutions should enable 
citizens to participate with at least an element of self-determination or self-
governance (Bevir 2009; Hendriks 2010). There is less emphasis on the importance 
of elected representatives and institutions of representation; instead there is 
emphasis on public discussions, forums, deliberation, dialogue exchanges, 
negotiation and voting where citizens can take part in public matters (Bevir 2009). It 
is argued that including citizens in public affairs and processes results in more 
favourable policy outcomes, such as ‘trust, understanding and consensus’ (ibid pg 
146).  
 
Hendriks (2010 pg107) describes participatory democracy to be a form of 
democracy that is ‘…shaped interactively from the bottom up’. Bevir argues that 
‘one of the best ways to grasp the nature of participatory democracy is to think of it 
as an alternative to representative democracy’ (2009 pg 145). Yet expressions of 
participatory democracy are relatively rare compared with those of the liberal, 
representative state (De Sousa Santos 2005). With debates spanning centuries, 
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there are several reasons given by scholars why representative democracy is more 
favourable to participatory democracy.  
 
From Plato’s critique of Athenian democracy to 20th Century scholars such as 
Schumpeter and Weber, it has been argued that participatory democracy lacks an 
understanding of the need for leadership in democracy (Held 1996; Hendriks 2010; 
Macpherson 1977; Manin 1997). There is a need for considerable distance between 
the electorate and governing politicians because, in Weber and Schumpeter’s view, 
democracy in modern, complex societies requires a politically competent, 
competitive elite. These are typically highly educated individuals with advanced 
debating and reasoning skills. Competition occurs by these individuals seeking the 
‘best’ and most ‘rational’ policy via logical argument and debate (Held 1996; 
Hendriks 2010 pg 61). Schumpeter, following Weber, argued that once elected, 
politics is the realm of the politician not the citizen (Hendriks 2010 pg 61). Because 
citizens are under great influence from mass opinion, particularly the media, their 
judgment can be shaped – and consequently easily manipulated in accordance to 
the dominant elite's interests (Held 1996 pg 191; Hendriks 2010 pg 36). Hendriks 
(ibid) notes that democratic theorists such as Sartori, Weber and Schumpeter 
consider that ‘limited participation, disinterest and apathy have a positive effect on 
the stability of democracy’. In short, these theorists do not think direct or 
participatory forms of democracy are possible or appropriate for modern societies. 
For Weber, in order to counter participatory democracy there was a need to find ‘a 
balance…between political authority and accountability without surrendering too 
much power to the demos…[therefore] protecting and limiting the political rights of 
citizens’ (Held 1996 pg 173). 
 
In the 20th Century, a key argument that emerged in favour of representative 
democracy was that representation is the only feasible way of operating within the 
population size and complexity of modern societies. For many theorists, 
representative democracy has been established, and so widely adopted in practice, 
precisely because it is the means of achieving the generally accepted core values of 
democracy (formulating and enacting a constitution; the separation of the judiciary 
and executive branches of the state to ensure that new legislation will not be 
unconstitutional; secret voting; freedom of speech; decisive action; rule of law) in 
large and complex societies (Dahl 1998; Held 1996; Hendriks 2010; Manin 1997). 
These core values and features of democratic institutions have developed over the 
course of centuries. These institutions are generally considered to be important 
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distinctions and practices in contributing to the development of political rights of 
citizens (Held 1996). For those advocating representative democracies, another key 
aspect of the institutional design was to ensure the protection of minority interests 
from the majority, particularly with regard to the right to property (Held 1996; Manin 
1997).  
 
Manin (1997 pgs 6-7) defined representative governments or regimes to be based 
on four key principles where the essential component is the election. Those that 
represent or govern will: be elected at regular intervals; have independence to make 
decisions separate from citizens preferences; make public decisions following a 
process of debate; and promote the electorate to express an opinion on public 
matters independent of any control by those who govern. 
 
Drawing on the legacy of Rousseau, JS Mill, and GDH Cole, the New Left 
(particularly Macpherson and Pateman) was very critical of Weber and 
Schumpeter’s ill view of citizens’ capacity to learn and participate in politics (Held 
1996; Irazábal 2005; Macpherson 1977; Pateman 1970; 2012). Participatory 
democrats question the liberal, representative conception of democracy because 
they believe that it preserves the status quo and enhances the ability of a small 
sector within a given society to determine the course of action for any issue – 
normally in favour not of the collective society but of elite groups' interests (de 
Sousa Santos 2005; de Sousa Santos and Avritzer 2005; Macpherson 1977; Negri 
1999; Pateman 1970; 2012). Weber and Schumpeter’s vision of politics led by a 
small elite with very little input from ordinary citizens in public affairs was described 
by Macpherson (1977) as ‘oligopolistic’. Pateman summarises this issue where she 
describes that advocates of liberal democracy are: 
 
…concerned almost entirely with the national 'institutional arrangements' of 
the political system. The participation of the people has a very narrow 
function; it ensures that good government, i.e. “government in the universal 
interest”, is achieved through the sanction of loss of office... As we have 
seen, the formulators of the contemporary theory of democracy also regard 
participation exclusively as a protective device. (Pateman 1970 pgs 19-20) 
 
Negri (1999), whose position will be discussed in detail below, argues that non-elite 
‘constituent power’ is ever-present. De Sousa Santos, who also denounces the 
elitist conception of liberal democracy, states ‘representative democracy has 
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systematically denied the legitimacy of participatory democracy’ (2005 pg x). 
Drawing from Gramsci, de Sousa Santos provides an account of the history of 
liberal democracy which he considers is a hegemonic practice (ibid). In contrast to 
the so-called benefits outlined by Schumpeter and Weber, he sees this as: 
 
 …no more than low-intensity democracy, based on the privatisation of 
public welfare by more or less restricted elites, on the increasing distance 
between representatives and the represented, and on an abstract political 
inclusion made of concrete social exclusion (de Sousa Santos 2005 pgs ix-
x). 
 
Scholars (Bevir 2010a; de Sousa Santos 2005; Held 1996; Manin 1997) have also 
identified that Weberian and Schumpeterian elitist expressions of representative 
democracy are often linked to capitalism. From the late 1960s, liberal democracies 
have also associated and advocated pluralism where power is dispersed among 
several actors in governance networks rather than held entirely by government 
(Dahl 1961; Held 1996). Despite the trends of neoliberalisation, decentralisation and 
the increase of markets and networks since the 1970s, Bevir (2010a pg 64) argues 
‘the state continues to use the language of representative democracy…to try and 
cope with the new theories and new worlds of governance. Equally, the state tries to 
plug the holes in representative democracy…’ As a result, the link between 
representative democracy and traditional modes of governance (hierarchies, 
markets and networks steered by government) very much persists. Challenges arise 
as the relationships between elected politicians, civil servants and the increasing 
number of non-state actors associated with the pluralist nature of democracy 
becomes increasingly complex. 
 
De Sousa Santos and Avritzer (2005 lxvi) consider that alternatives to 
representative democracy are being explored for three reasons: the dismantling of 
the welfare, redistributive state and social contract by neoliberalism and neoliberal-
globalisation; the problematic relations between the political and economic realms – 
namely the blending of the two; and the link between capitalism and representative 
democracy - which has made elections less favourable with citizens because they 
no longer feel represented by their representatives, and they do not feel their vote 
(and what they are voting for) is relevant.  
 
With the late 20th Century shift towards market and network orientated governance, 
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two of the key challenges for the state include accountability and democracy (Bevir 
2010a pg 95). The neoliberal focus for market efficiency, competition and 
privatisation results in vague notions of representative democracy (growing 
discontent between citizen and representatives; increased emphasis and roles of 
unelected technocrats) as a means of achieving these neoliberal objectives (ibid). 
For Bevir (ibid), like De Sousa and Santos (2005), the danger of falling participation 
rates leads to a loss of legitimacy for public policy or government within such 
governance contexts.  
 
Like Pateman (2012), de Sousa Santos and Avritzer (2005 pg lx) see recent 
experiments – e.g. participatory budgeting in Brazil, and participatory democracy in 
Kerala, India – as a challenge to the orthodox expressions of representative 
democracy by processes they consider ‘democratize democracy’ (ibid). De Sousa 
Santos and Avritzer (2005) conceive these experiments not only to give greater 
citizen participation but as a means of “counter-hegemonic practice”. This, they 
argue, is organised from the bottom up; seeks new forms of resistance and new 
directions for social emancipation; rejects imperialistic (western) epistemologies in 
favour of indigenous alternatives. It is democratization beyond the political realm8 
(De Sousa Santos and Avritzer 2005 pgs lxii-lxix; de Sousa Santos 2005 pgs xvii-
xxxiii).  
 
Other scholars (Baiocchi et al 2011; Fung 2006; Goldfrank 2005; Pogrebinschi 
2012), however, are not so defiant in defining experiments of including citizens in 
the political sphere as counter-hegemonic. Instead many of these scholars conclude 
that participatory mechanisms reinforce rather than dismantle or provide an 
alternative to the representative state. Pogrebinschi (2012 pg 28) argues that, 
ultimately, ‘participation and deliberation can be understood as constitutive 
elements of political representation; rather than be seen [sic] as an attempt to add 
new semantic content to replace old concepts of political representation, they are a 
distinct means of putting political representation into practice’. Mechanisms such as 
participatory budgeting have brought accountability and transparency to existing 
and established political processes by being inclusive and creating spaces for 
participation and priority setting. How much one reads into the emancipatory or 
revolutionary potential of such practices is, it would appear, dependent on personal 
                                                
8 De Sousa Santos and Avritzer argue other social and cultural realms can be more democratic. 
Examples cited include patriarchy, exploitation, gender relations, economic and production systems, 
multiculturalism and minority rights. 
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preference and normative vision (Hendriks 2010).  
 
This has led to the umbrella term ‘democratic innovations’ in democratic theory. 
These are initiatives that seek to bring citizens into the political arena through 
varying degrees. They can range from consultation exercises to more participatory 
and deliberative forms of engagement and inclusion. Depending on the nature of 
these innovations, i.e. if they contain both representative and participatory elements, 
these may be termed ‘hybrid’ mechanisms. Examples of hybrid mechanisms include 
participatory budgeting and citizen assemblies on electoral reforms (Smith and 
Power 2005; Smith 2009). Following a review of 57 ‘democratic innovations’, Smith 
and Power (2005 pg11) consider that direct, popular referendums, participatory 
budgeting and citizen assemblies are ‘exceptional in the way they manage to both 
increase and deepen participation’. But, importantly, these innovations are not 
seeking to replace existing governmental and governance structures; they are 
inserted into existing practices in order to improve their corresponding processes.  
 
Arnstein (1969) provided ‘a ladder of citizen participation’ which sought to establish 
the different categories of participation that may occur within the political sphere. 
Despite its age, it is still referred to in contemporary literature as a useful framework 
for distinguishing citizen participation levels (Cornwall 2011; Ciro Marcano 2012; 
Irazábal 2005).  
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Figure 3.1 Arnstein’s Ladder of Participation. Source: Arnstein (2011 pg 5) 
The framework uses 8 rungs of the ladder (see figure 3.1) to differentiate between 
three typologies of citizen power (citizen power, tokenism and non-participation). 
The very top of the ladder is a situation where citizens have control. For Arnstein 
this meant ‘people are simply demanding that degree of power (or control) which 
guarantees that participants or residents can govern a program or an institution, be 
in full charge of policy and managerial aspects, and be able to negotiate the 
conditions under which ‘outsiders’ may change them (Arnstein 2011 pg 16). Moving 
down the scales involves less citizens’ ability to govern or manage matters. The 
very bottom of the scale involves non-participation, where citizens are generally 
subjected to ‘public relations vehicle[s] by powerholders’ (ibid pg 6).  
 
Although very difficult to determine without addressing specific cases, one would 
expect participatory democracy practices and mechanisms to come out towards the 
top of the ladder and a Weberian/Schumpeterian type liberal democracy, where 
ordinary citizens have a lesser role in public affairs, to be towards the bottom. It 
should be noted that Arnstein was aware that there might be many more rungs on 
the ladder than the 8 suggested, while accepting that blurring and fuzziness in 
practice is likely to occur between them.  
 
Hendriks (2010) highlights that it is simply not appropriate to advocate participatory 
democracy over representative models of democracy as ‘in practice… models of 
democracy always stray from their ideal types…in other words: practice abounds 
not with uniform, pure models, but with multiform, mixed models of democracy’ 
(Hendriks 2010 pg 135). Instead, an approach where the contextual background 
within which such idealised models of democracy are intended to be implemented 
needs to be understood. Given that transfer of participatory mechanisms from one 
context to another is difficult, recent scholarship also notes that participatory 
innovations need to be developed in response to the specific circumstances of a 
particular place. It is also considered that one innovation or mechanism is unlikely to 
meet all needs. A number of mechanisms may be required to tackle different issues 
(Crot 2007; Smith 2009).   
 
Notwithstanding the important identification and nuance that Hendriks (2010) makes 
about making preferences and advocating one form of idealised model of 
democracy over another, the ‘deliberative turn’ of democratic theory has expanded 
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considerably over the last 20 years (Dryzek 2010; Held 2006). This strand of theory, 
as its name suggests places participant deliberation at its core as a means of 
establishing ‘legitimacy’ (Dryzek 2010 pg14). As a body of theory, it has taken on 
the matter of not only advocating an increasing number of citizens participating in 
the political sphere, but also seeking ways to improve the quality of this 
participation. Held (2006 pg 246) argues that deliberative democrats put ‘the quality 
of public decision making at the centre of the debate’. Furthermore, advocates 
‘champion informed debate, the public use of reason and the impartial pursuit of 
truth’ (ibid pg 232).   
 
A large part of the theoretical discourse in the deliberative democracy strand is the 
need for mechanisms and procedures that facilitate deliberation and reflective 
preference debate (Offe and Preuss, 1991 in Held 2006 pgs 233-234). This body of 
theory comes from a position that understands the socio-economic and cultural 
differences between participants when gathering in meeting, assembly, jury or 
parliament. Deliberation is seen as a means of transcending and transforming 
citizens’ preferences through the act of taking part in a deliberative forum where a 
wide range of other preferences and issues will be heard. The act of being part of 
this process will involve reflexive participation leading to processes of social 
learning and, theoretically, the choosing of sound policies or decisions (Held 2006 
235-238). Drawing from Habermas, it is considered that preferences are moving 
and adjusting and that collective solutions will be attained through ‘communicative 
and discursive rationality’ (Held 2006 236). Unlike Habermas, Dryzek (2010 pg 15) 
does not regard reaching consensus as ‘the gold standard of political legitimacy’.  
 
CLPPs (to a lesser extent) and CCs (to a greater extent) allow citizens in Venezuela 
to get involved in a political arena, deliberate their preferences on a wide range of 
public affairs. CCs, in particular, provide any voting-age citizen in Venezuela, should 
they wish to participate, a means of deliberating on community matters in their local 
neighbourhood. Though the arena for deliberating exists, and taking part is possible, 
the question of the quality of deliberation remains. For deliberative democrats there 
is considerable debate about methodologies of achieving ‘sound public reasoning’ 
(Held 2006 pg 238). As Held describes, there are the scholars, on one side, who 
argue for ‘impartialism’, which assumes that citizens’ preferences are not given and 
that in the deliberative forum they will listen to other preferences and select 
accordingly after a debate of the pros and cons of each preference has been 
presented (2006 pgs 239-241). On the other side, opponents to impartialism argue 
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that the act of trying to be impartial is not possible as people come to a forum with 
values, biases and/or entrenched preferences. To try and achieve the ‘best’ 
argument (as impartialists advocate) is therefore unattainable. These scholars 
argue that political history has shown that politics and moral values cannot be 
simplified (ibid pgs 241-242). Thus the act of deliberating is a form of trying to 
achieve some sort of compromise, given that agreement on preferences is highly 
unlikely.  
 
Two ongoing debates within participatory and deliberative democratic theory exist:  
1) If those coming to a deliberative forum with strong views listen to other 
preferences and values during the debate but their views or opinions remain 
unchanged does this mean that meaningful deliberation did not happen? 
This first scenario arises, as there is a general assumption that some form of 
preference transformation should occur.  
2) In a delegative or representative system of deliberation, a delegate may 
be sent to a higher abstraction of a council meeting (for example citywide 
meeting of neighbourhood councils) representing the neighbourhood 
council’s preference. However, if that delegate engages in the city-level 
debate and changes opinion from the one he or she was sent to advocate by 
being persuaded during the deliberation, the latter can cause conflict with 
the neighbourhood. The result can be ongoing disagreement about what 
constitutes valid deliberation if the neighbourhood council maintains that its 
position was not put forward correctly at the higher-level council. Despite 
that the neighbourhood council took part in the deliberation, via their 
delegate, the collective believes its position was violated. This scenario 
provides an example showing how the creation of viable systems of 
deliberation can be challenging.  
 
One of the key arguments made by deliberative democrats, and perhaps a means 
of simplifying the dilemmas set out above, is the need for ongoing civic education 
(learning about the meaning and practice of deliberation) to ensure the widespread 
adoption and understanding of deliberation as a process. Lacabana (2009) has 
indicated that practices within CCs in particular have allowed communities to obtain 
a civic and political education experience and knowledge which was previously 
unavailable to them. At the same time participants acquire skills and knowledge 
which enables them to engage with the existing municipalities and articulate 
preferences, or at least provides the means to do so should they wish – personally 
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or via proxy. Citizens have therefore undergone a (collective) transformative 
process by having taken part in participatory and deliberative processes. Scholars 
argue the more this happens, the more it will continue as such practices become 
embedded (Held 2006 pg 251-252) across a wide range of political levels: 
 
For theorists like Young and Dryzek, deliberation is a way of transforming 
democracy and creating a new language of radical politics – a deliberative, 
participatory political order…to the extent that deliberation is regarded as a 
transformative mode of reasoning which can be drawn upon in diverse 
setting, from micro-fora and neighbourhood associations to national 
parliaments and transnational settings, it tends to be interpreted as a new 
radical model of democracy. (Held 2006 pg 252) 
 
While this section has focused on the key concepts of participatory and 
representative forms of democracy it has not focused on how policies or plans are 
turned into action and delivered. Consequently, the next section looks at how the 
debates of participation translate to the practice and processes of policymaking and 
planning.  
 
3.3  PLANNING AND PARTICIPATION 
 
This section explores the nature of alternative worldviews and epistemologies 
regarding planning processes and concepts. It aims to look at the debate in 
planning and public policy literature about how to bring citizens into these practices 
and processes at a local level. It also seeks to explore how planning can be 
conceived and carried out in an inclusive and participatory manner. Given the 
political context and discourse in Venezuela, it is considered that such alternative 
approaches to planning, policymaking, and ultimately who decides resource 
allocation, will be useful for understanding and evaluating the planning and 
decision-making processes undertaken by CLPPs and CCs. 
 
At a more conceptual level, Verma (2010 pg 399) argues that public policy and 
political science ‘emphasize the separation of authority at federal, state and local 
levels’ whereas planning is ‘concerned with how all policies, programs and initiatives 
come together and get enacted at the local level’. Traditionally, planning is seen as 
a practice led by professionals and a process that is undertaken by governments 
and associated agencies (Allmendinger 2009; Healey 1997; Rydin 2011). 
46 
 
 
Within the planning literature, there is debate about the nature of the ‘planner’ and 
how the planners’ reputation/ professionalism/ expertise may be questioned as a 
result of changes in policymaking, planning and their implementation in practice 
(Allmendinger 2009; Healey 1997; Forester 2008). Forester (2008 pg 126) defines 
“planners” and the process of planning in a broad sense rather than the narrow 
concept of an urban planner (traditionally a local government officer) seeking to 
create plans and adhere to statute: 
 
To make new things happen, to find out what we can do effectively in 
politically uncertain and fluid settings, we need to learn—and to learn, we 
very often need to ask questions and listen carefully. When we do this, we’re 
‘‘planners’’ and policy analysts in the most general sense: exploring what’s 
possible, finding out about what we can and can’t do... I use the term 
‘‘planners’’ to refer very generally to all those who need to learn about their 
environments—public or private, social or natural—in order to change them. 
 
Allmendinger (2009 pgs 220-221) being more cautious frames the debate as 
follows: 
 
To accept…[a more participatory type of]…planning you must 
accept…[the]…foundations of planning as redistributive activity, of planners 
as more than apolitical arbiters between different interests, and, most 
importantly, of planning as a participative process. These are definite 
political stances that involve a radical break with the concept of 
planners…how can you have a profession (whose raison d’être is the 
application of expert knowledge) if you argue that there is no such thing as 
expert knowledge, only different opinions brought together? 
 
Although Almendinger’s general premise that planning is inherently an elite, expert 
driven process, a number of others ways of conceiving the way in which planning 
can be undertaken is prevalent in planning theory.  Non-orthodox planning scholars 
reject traditional (technocratic, expert driven) forms of planning practices, 
particularly when applied to the global south, because they are considered 
hegemonic and contain entrenched worldviews and practices borrowed from the 
first world or European-centred traditions (Irazábal and Foley 2010; Forester 1999; 
Friedmann 1987; Miraftab 2009).  
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Linking with the debates in the previous section, Bevir (2010a) argues that rather 
than linger on to outdated notions of representative democracy and its institutions 
there should be a move towards citizen orientated, alternative modes of action 
which facilitate participative democracy. Healey (2011 pg xiii) shares this sentiment 
when she considers that those involved in planning should be part of a 
transformation, not only of the system but actors involved in that process: ‘the 
planning endeavour should focus on transformative development which changes the 
parameters of the systems and structures that limit people’s opportunities to flourish 
and pursue their search, individually and collectively, for a “good life”’. This implies 
that both citizens and policymakers/planners need to transform their current 
conceptions of practising and doing.  
 
In order for planning practices to become citizen orientated, scholars argue that 
there is a need to re-conceptualise how planning and policymaking processes are 
viewed, particularly by public authorities (Beard, Miraftab and Silver 2008; Healey 
1997, 2011; Irazábal and Foley 2010; Miraftab 2009). Whilst Healey’s model of 
‘collaborative planning’ shares many sentiments with inclusive and collaborative 
modes of planning, its focus lies in established Anglo-american and European 
democracies and planning systems (Healey 1997 pgs 284-314). Consequently, 
scholars looking at developing countries have a different perspective. Roy (2005 pg 
152, cited in Irazábal and Foley 2010 pg 106) argues this requires a new 
epistemology that “disrupts models of expertise, making it possible to generate 
knowledge about [slum/urban] upgrading and [implementing] infrastructure from a 
different set of experts: the residents”. Where communities are completely 
marginalized from traditional planning practices and processes, planning happens in 
‘invented spaces’ when communities take matters into their own hands. These 
forms of planning develop in spaces that are not sanctioned or invited. Nor are they 
confined to professional planners being involved (Miraftab, Silver and Beard 2008; 
Miraftab 2009 pgs 41-42). Yet, what unorthodox planning theorists seek is for 
ordinary citizens, residents of local communities, to share a meaningful formalised 
space within planning frameworks.  
 
Once citizens are brought in to the formalised planning arena, there are also 
debates about how the operational dynamics of this engagement should work, 
particularly in making mechanisms for participation meaningful for those involved. 
The end of the previous section highlighted the deliberative turn in democratic 
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theory and its focus on bringing citizens into the sphere and enabling them for 
deliberation; spaces that can include both lay-people and expertise. Scholars (Bevir 
2010a; Dryzek 2008) argue that deliberative approaches to policymaking are a 
positive counter to technocratic, centrally-controlled public policymaking/ planning.  
 
Advocates of a deliberative arena for policymaking believe that knowledge held by 
bureaucrats and planning professionals is flawed given their view that objective 
knowledge does not exist and no expert can be all-knowing (Bevir 2010a; Dryzek 
2008; Forester 1999; Friedmann 2011). Dryzek provides two reasons why he 
believes ‘perfect’ policy decisions or agendas set by technocrats are unrealistic: the 
first is that ‘a single locus of decision making may not exist, and ii) ‘technocratic 
analysis often proceeds from its own frame of reference which may embody values 
different from those of policy makers’ [and citizens] (Dryzek 2008 pg 191).   
 
Forester (1999 pg 246), despite being an advocate of deliberation, offers some 
caution: ‘public deliberation in participatory planning processes is a contingent, 
fragile, vulnerable possibility in a precarious democratic society; it depends not on 
some virtuous “good planner”, but on the struggle and hard work, insight and 
imagination, moral 'sensitivity and political perception too’. This position also mirrors 
Hendriks’ (2010) caution about advocating one normative model of democracy over 
another. Like Hendriks’ position, which seeks acceptance of hybrid, contingent and 
contextual practices of democracy, Forester in effect argues that some form of 
middle ground is needed between planning among citizens and government, 
bureaucrats and planners (though these may overlap). Planners can encourage 
technical inquiry that contributes to deliberative policy and design conversations, 
encourage explicit value inquiry – such as pros/cons, costs/benefits, goals and 
values etc, and foster deliberation about citizens’ fears, hopes, or commitments 
(Forester 1999 pgs 244-245).  
 
Given that the world is one of myriad, consistently changing complexities, the 
challenges to implementing deliberation into policymaking, planning and decision-
making processes outlined by Forester and Dryzek are made very real. Some of the 
limitations that Irazábal and Foley (2011 pg 114) encountered in their empirical 
research on Venezuelan planning processes included: a parallel functioning of 
representative and direct democracy institutions; longer and more cumbersome 
decision making processes; lack of procedural and factual certainties; changing 
regulations and organizational structures, as the system moves to a more direct 
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democracy; participation is easier at the local level, less so at the regional or 
national scale; persistence of hierarchies; unequal power relations between 
stakeholders; as well as dealing with entrenched ways of thinking. 
 
The above list highlights the many issues that arise in practice between state-led 
policymaking - which tends to be elite-driven and leads to the reproduction of elite 
worldviews (Bevir 2010a; Dryzek 2008; Roy 2005) – and citizen participation. It also 
highlights the issues that are raised when innovating and introducing new 
mechanisms, processes and practices into existing arrangements. The numbers of 
conditions and obstacles to overcome traditional, or entrenched, processes are 
many. The contingent nature of praxis, particularly with any democracy, planning or 
policymaking process, has a number of unforeseen outcomes. Nonetheless, as 
described in this section, despite the many challenges to increasing participation in 
planning processes there is increasing scholarship and advocacy from practitioners, 
as well as citizens, for greater participation. 
 
Dryzek clearly summarises the essence of the debates explored in this chapter. To 
improve the scope and authenticity of democracy, citizens need to be brought into 
the policy arenas and deliberations. However, in doing so: 
 
there need to be open arenas for public discourse in which all relevant points 
of view are expressed; citizens ought to view their role as citizens as 
important, as involving obligations as well as rights, and they must be 
convinced that government has the interest and capacity to solve public 
problems; citizens themselves should be supportive of policies and positively 
involved in producing shared goals; and there must be means to hold 
government accountable for its actions. These important conditions for 
democracy are directly related to consequences flowing from policy designs: 
the framing of issues, how targets are constructed, the structure of 
implementation and delivery systems; and transparency of governmental 
actions and citizen access to information. (Dryzek 1997, cited in Ingram and 
Schneider, 2008 pg 172) 
 
The preamble of the 1999 Venezuelan constitution sets out that citizens should be 
active protagonists in shaping public matters and democracy. The intentions of the 
Venezuelan constitution and later legislation provided a formal framework within 
which citizens and civil society can begin to flesh out new norms, cultures, or modes 
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of action which include spaces for community orientated, and context driven 
practices. How this has been interpreted and conceived, the focus of the thesis, is 
introduced in the next section. 
 
3.4  CONCEPTUALISING PARTICIPATION IN VENEZUELA  
 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 discussed the theoretical positions of different forms of 
democracy and planning and where citizen participation should be placed within 
such models. This section seeks to unpack where Venezuela’s national government 
and plans – which have advocated and instigated the moves towards participatory 
mechanisms.  
 
Chavismo introduced a new lexicon into the Venezuelan political landscape. The 
move towards creating a “communal state”, which is the basis for creating “21st 
Century Socialism”9, has meant that Chavismo has needed to define and 
conceptualise what it means to have the traditional federal structure – with a strong 
executive – sitting in parallel with the new “communal state” mechanisms. As such, 
Chavismo introduced terms which differentiate the two. In legislation, traditional 
federal government is referred to as “public power”, whereas the newer “communal 
state” mechanisms are termed “popular power”.  Yet, to distinguish between citizens 
and representatives, as well as between representative and participatory democracy 
mechanisms, there are two further terms which Chavismo uses (see Acosta Rico 
2012). The first of these is “constituted power”, which refers to those who have been 
elected to be political representatives in the traditional structures (president, 
governors, mayors and councillors). The second is “constituent power” which 
includes those elected within communities to sit on committees within the various 
mechanisms, such as CCs and comunas, which fall under the umbrella of “popular 
power”. Based on Acosta Rico (2012), figure 3.2 shows where the concepts 
‘constituent/constituted power’ fall within Venezuelan institutions. Figure 3.3 shows 
how the two powers work together and function as ‘national planning and 
coordination’. 
                                                
9 Chavismo named the movement this way in order to try and divorce itself from the negative 
connotations of communism in the previous century. 
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Figure 3.2 Constituted and constituent powers10. Adapted from Acosta Rico 2012 pg 
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Figure 3.3 National planning and coordination involving both constituted and 
constituent powers. Adapted from Acosta Rico (2012 pg 95) 
                                                
10 N.B. Acosta Rico omits entities such as the CFG and CLPPs from this conceptualization; see figure 
2.2 for where these sit.   
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Negri (1999) provides a theory of constituent power11. He considers that ‘to speak of 
constituent power is to speak of democracy… to acknowledge constituent power as 
a constitutional and judicial principle, we must see it not simply as producing 
constitutional norms and structuring constituted powers but primarily as a subject 
that regulates democratic politics’ (ibid pg 1). By formalising constituent power 
within the modern state’s apparatus, via juridical figures such as the constitution 
and legislation, there is a danger that, though powerful, constituent power is often 
masked and subordinated by representation which, to paraphrase, ‘denaturalizes 
and disempowers it’ (ibid pgs 10-12). Negri considers that whenever constituent 
power has arisen in history (such as the English, American, French, Russian 
revolutions), “constituted power” opposes and extinguishes the movement (ibid viii). 
Consequently, Negri considers that constituted and constituent powers exist in 
parallel in an ongoing, interminable process because constituted power reduces 
citizen’s sovereignty, whilst constituent power is the embodiment of political 
sovereignty, liberty and freedom. Using the Soviet-Bolshevik experience in Russia, 
Negri argues that: 
 
After Marx and Lenin it is not possible to talk of political freedom without 
talking of economic freedom, free production, and living labor as the political 
foundation. Freedom has become liberation and liberation is constituent 
power…the irreversibility of the paradigm of constituent power…[means it] is 
affirmed as the exclusive foundation of the political. (Negri 1999 pg 300) 
 
Negri continues by arguing that constituent power is an ever present component of 
the political realm (and democracy) which has provided ‘historical continuity’ of the 
concept. He sees that constituted power enshrined in acts such as constitutions can 
come and go, but constituent power, even if subverted and hidden from view for 
periods at a time, will re-surface (1999 pgs 309-322). It does so because  
 
Constituent power is the paradigm of the political because its process is 
metaphysically defined by necessity. There is no other manner of existence 
of the political… Constituent power responds to the conditions of definition of 
the political because it interprets the creative determination of the political 
and cooperation. Effectiveness and legitimacy…find in strength and in the 
                                                
11Acosta Rico (who wrote his manual on behalf of national government) does not reference Negri 
despite adopting his concepts. Consequently, I have made the linkages between Negri’s theoretical 
position and Chavismo’s application of the concepts in this chapter. 
53 
 
cooperation of the multitude… (Negri 1999 pgs 332-333) 
 
Reflecting on Negri’s definitions and theoretical position, Chavismo has sought to 
reconceive state civil-society relations by creating a dual role among “constituted 
power” conferred to representatives and governmental institutions and “constituent 
power” which lie upon citizen agency and participatory mechanisms. In doing so, 
Chavismo, has sought to redefine the relations among the planners within 
government and the state bureaucracy with local residents (Acosta Rico 2012; 
Ciccariello-Maher 2013). Here linkages begin to emerge between the characteristics 
relating to citizen participation within radical planning epistemologies and alternative 
expressions to liberal, representative democracy so far discussed in this chapter. 
 
At the time of the 2007-2013 national plan, Chavismo had not fully defined these 
concepts; instead it focused principally on giving sovereignty to citizens. “Public 
power” (government and elected representatives) is stated to be a ‘lever’ to provide 
‘social welfare and justice (MINCI 2008 pg 35). Policies within the plan state that 
efforts will be made to develop “popular power” and ‘guarantee protagonistic 
participation in national public administration’ (MINCI 2008 pg 39). It was not until 
the enactment of the “popular power laws in 2009/2010 that specific definitions were 
provided for these terms. 
 
Acosta Rico’s (2012) book for CC and comuna participants, published by national 
government, provides an interpretation of the move towards the “communal state” 
and how planning should work within the framework of the new legislation. Acosta 
Rico (ibid pg 40-42) identifies that the elite-led representative liberal model of 
democracy advocated by Weber is too prone to rule following and maintaining the 
status quo; this can be avoided by bringing citizens into the process, as they can 
provide a corrective oversight to policy. The book provides insight into the way in 
which Chavismo envisages the dual power structure to operate. Consequently, to 
build “popular power” is to bring to the fore an ‘invisible power that has been hidden 
and turned off” by capitalism. The state, bureaucracy and government (“constituted 
power”) are referred to as ‘nothing more than the apparatus of collective power’ 
(Acosta Rico 2012 pg 11). The intent brought about by Chavismo is to bridge the 
gap between the interests of the state (“constituted power”) and the people 
(“constituent/popular power”) to ‘apply policy and ensure resources are applied 
correctly’. Doing so, ‘will create an intersection [between the two ‘powers’] which will 
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permit shared decision making in public policy’ (ibid pg 43).  
 
Following Hendriks (2010), theories of democracy in reality are subject to contingent 
factors which shape the way in which they will be implemented. Most often, this 
means that the normative ideal of a particular form or theory of democracy will not 
be replicated in practice.  The socio-political polarization within Venezuela meant 
that Chavismo’s alternative conception of building alternative mechanisms 
alongside, or in parallel to, the traditional, liberal federal state reflects Hendriks’ 
argument. Scholars acknowledge that the setbacks that President Chávez faced12, 
in the period 2002-2006, meant that the electoral and referenda wins gave 
Chavismo motivation, defiance and gumption to increase its socialist rhetoric and 
accelerate the Bolivarian revolution and its move towards creating “21st Century 
Socialism” (Ciccariello-Maher 2013; López Maya 2011; MINCI 2008; Smilde 2011).  
 
An additional factor that occurred from the mid 2000s onwards was the 
concentration of the diverse and numerous political parties into political coalitions 
for electoral purposes. The first of these was to consolidate political parties of the 
left, which supported Chávez, into the PSUV (see chapter 2). Similarly, political 
parties opposed to Chavismo formed a coalition called the Democratic Unity Table 
(MUD) in 2008. The consequences of increasing consolidation into two completely 
opposed coalition camps, despite the diverse panorama of political parties, 
exacerbated Chavista and non-Chavista sentiments; it deepened the animosity 
between the two.  
 
As noted above, Negri (1999) argued that since Marx, notions of radical democracy 
are often linked with the (political) economy. President Chávez was openly critical of 
capitalism and detailed his vision of moving to “21st Century Socialism”. Bevir notes 
‘Radicals, socialists, and anarchists have long advocated patterns of rule that do not 
require the capitalist state…the spread of the new governance has prompted such 
radicals to distance their visions from that of the neoliberal rolling back of the state’ 
(2009 pg 7-8). Bevir continues: ‘The association of democratic governance with 
participatory and deliberative processes in civil society thus arises from radicals 
seeking to resist state and corporate power…these…ideas are not just responses to 
the new governance, they also help construct aspects of it’ (Bevir 2009 pg 8). 
                                                
12 Increasing opposition pressure culminating in an attempted coup, national oil company strikes in 
2002; revocation of Chávez referendum in 2004 
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Despite not writing about Venezuela, Bevir’s reading mirrors Chavismo’s intentions 
and programmes.  
 
As discussed in chapter 2, Venezuela’s decentralisation and legitimisation crisis in 
the 1990s sparked the intended shift to a ‘participatory and protagonistic 
democracy’ following the new constitution instigated and implemented under 
Chavismo. Chavismo’s intention to create spheres for citizen involvement in 
planning and service delivery was a move away from the neoliberal, market 
orientated policies of the 1990s to one which was intended to be citizen orientated, 
pluralistic and democratic. Such a shift is closer to the ‘radical’ form of governance 
described above which challenges neoliberalism and technocratic, elite-driven 
practices13 (such as those advocated by theorists such as Schumpeter and Weber) 
in favour of collective decision making via public deliberation, debate and discourse.  
 
National government’s aim to redistribute and reform territorial, geographically and 
socio-economic inequalities means that policies target the country’s lower income 
citizens (MINCI 2008). The opposition often viewed such mechanisms with 
scepticism, claiming they were tools that Chavismo/national government used to 
ensure continued electoral support (Brewer-Carías 2010; García Guadilla 2005; 
2008a;b; Gates 2012; López Maya 2011; MUD 2013). Because the middle and 
upper classes (which comprise the large majority of the opposition) saw Chavimo’s 
changes as a challenge to their class interests and diminishing dominance in 
political and economic life, they initially rejected most mechanisms. With time, 
mechanisms such as participatory budgeting, CLPPs and CCs were adopted by 
certain sectors of the opposition for their own purposes (García Guadilla 2005; 
2008a; Hetland 2012).  
 
López Maya (2011) argues that the process towards ‘radicalising the revolution’ has 
resulted in centralisation (nationalising water, electricity and telecommunications, for 
example) and that participatory processes, particularly CCs, have tacitly given new 
levels of participation. However, because these are controlled and coordinated by 
central government, decentralisation as the rhetoric intends has been weakened. 
Critics of Chavismo (Brewer-Carías 2010; Corrales and Penfold 2011; Monaldi and 
Penfold 2006) consider that the mechanisms of participation given in the 
                                                
13 Such as creating state-controlled industries as well as reversing privatization of water, electricity 
telecommunications, certain agricultural industries (sugar), and steel. General resistance to IMF, World 
Bank and wider global north economic practices, as well as technocratic and elite-driven policymaking. 
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constitution have been subject to political control by the president and his political 
party. Monaldi and Penfold (2006 pg 19) state explicitly that increased presidential 
powers means ‘most political actors have no choice but to be subordinate their 
political careers to the executive branch’. Corrales and Penfold (2011 pg 1) contend 
that Chavismo has converted the country from a ‘pluralist democracy into a hybrid 
regime…in which access to state offices combines both democratic and autocratic 
practice…[and]...the state actively seeks to undermine the autonomy of civic 
institutions’ (ibid). Furthermore, Chavismo’s social programmes are also considered 
to be forms of populism (Corrales and Penfold 2011; Uzcátegui 2010), and 
Bolivarian Circles (see chapter 2) Chavismo’s ‘state laboratory of cooptation’ 
(Uzcátegui 2010).  
 
The language and discourse used by Venezuela’s opposition to Chavismo and its 
corresponding projects is attributed to the beliefs that they hold and seeking to 
protect the existing representative/federal government and associated institutions. 
Cannon’s (2013 pg 6) analysis of Venezuela’s opposition and the MUD coalition 
identified three characteristics: 1. The opposition recognise that the socio-political 
nature of Chavismo goes beyond liberal democracy, 2. Their worldview is 
considerably different to Chavismo, some parts of the opposition seek to reverse 
the regime, others wish to modify it, and 3. the opposition has a diversity of actors 
and strategies within it. Cannon (ibid) aiming to synthesise these characteristics 
states that although the opposition is a broad spectrum its ‘objectives are seen 
implicitly or explicitly as fundamentally to construct, or as the opposition would 
argue, restore, a liberal democratic politico-institutional regime (liberty) and a market 
based socio-economic regime (property rights)’ (ibid).  
 
The above context shows that the basic tenets and beliefs of ‘democracy’ are 
contested in theory, interpretation and practice. A basic reading of the Venezuelan 
context would appear to provide quite sharp dichotomies: representative versus 
participatory democracy; anti-capitalism and/or state control versus private property 
rights and liberal, market economies; Chavismo or opposition. Nonetheless, given 
that Chavismo has spent over a decade trying expand more participatory forms of 
democracy, despite the complex socio-political landscape and extreme polarization, 
there remains considerable scope to understand how their respective participants 
have understood CLPPs and CC processes – and how these fit into the wider 
democratic context within which they are situated. 
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3.5  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Democracy has myriad meanings and permutations (Hendriks 2010). 
Representative forms of democracy evolved into systems where professional 
politicians, who have the inclination, resources, time and capacity to contend with 
numerous, complex issues are considered the most appropriate way to organise 
and coordinate society. For democratic theorists such as Schumpeter and Weber, 
democracy should be an elite-led process. Other scholars believe that such a way 
of organising society leads in the end for those elites to reimagine the world and 
frame matters towards their own interests, usually disregarding huge sections of 
society (Bevir 2010a; de Sousa Santos and Avritzer 2005; Pateman 1970, 2012).  
 
Section 3.3 established that theorists consider alternative ways of conceiving and 
implementing the praxis of citizen participation in planning and policymaking 
processes possible. Rather than relying on the traditional top-down expert-driven 
approach, whether state-led or private sector-led, new epistemologies can allow for 
more community orientated modes of deliberation, formulation and action (Miraftab 
2009; Friedmann 2011; Roy 2005). Deliberative democrats argue that increasing 
participation is not enough and that seeking a high quality of deliberation within 
these arenas is vital.  
 
Venezuela’s shift towards implementing packages of reforms, particularly the CLPP 
and CC mechanisms, have created alternative spaces to the existing state 
structures where citizens can get involved in public affairs. More radical theorists 
argue that such moves are important as they provide spaces for dialogue and 
deliberation that encompass alternatives to elite views (Bevir 2010a; Irazábal and 
Foley 2010; Roy 2005).  
 
The chapter also established that Chavismo has adopted a conceptual model 
involving dual powers: “Constituent/popular” power comprises mechanisms based 
on community participation compared with the mechanisms, and “constituted/public” 
power which encompasses elected representatives and the traditional federal state. 
But these moves have not been accepted throughout Venezuelan society, 
particularly opposition parties and their supporters. As García Guadilla (2005; 
2008a;b) described, participatory mechanisms have not been implemented with 
approval across all sectors of Venezuelan society. Venezuela’s middle and upper 
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classes are generally opposed to these mechanisms, as they see this process as 
an infringement on pre-Chavismo civil society organisations, such as 
neighbourhood associations, and the federal government institutions and 
mechanisms that have protected their interests for decades. Although recent 
studies have shown that areas of opposition are starting to use these mechanisms 
for its own purposes (Hetland 2012).  
 
This chapter has shown that creating spaces and mechanisms for citizen 
participation is problematic. Not only do the debates regarding the virtues of 
representative democracies versus participatory democracy arise, but also the 
national and local contexts provide contingent factors that theories are unable to 
foresee. Hendriks (2010) considers that once applied in practice democratic 
theories end up becoming hybrids of one form or another. 
 
The following chapter will explore new institutionalist and interpretive theories, 
which in conjunction with the above discourses of participatory planning and 
policymaking processes and the context covered in chapter 2, establishes a 
framework through which the empirical research (chapters 7-9) can be analysed. 
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK: INTERPRETIVE 
INSTITUTIONALISM 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter establishes the thesis’ theoretical framework drawing from strands of 
new institutionalism and interpretivism. As chapter two established, over the last 12 
years, numerous constitutional and legislative reforms in Venezuela have sought to 
shift the country from being a representative democracy to a ‘participatory and 
protagonistic democracy’. Two mechanisms (CLPPs and CCs), the units of analysis 
of this thesis, provide potential for citizen participation in municipal/neighbourhood 
policy and decision making. A key component of the research design and 
methodology is to establish which theoretical ‘lens’ will enable the analysis of 
whether: a) the reforms have consolidated the new participatory mechanisms, b) 
citizens, as a result of these new mechanisms, have been able to influence local 
planning and policy making, and c) the new mechanisms have impacted local 
governance structures and institutions. The theories of new institutionalism and 
interpretivism are two approaches which provide conceptual and analytical tools to 
develop the answers of the thesis research questions (see chapter 5). This section, 
therefore, aims to synthesise the arguments and nuances of these theories to 
establish an appropriate framework for analysis. 
 
Section 4.2 discusses the nature of institutions and how new institutionalism has 
moved away from the institutional research of the 1960s. The section outlines the 
key variants of new institutionalism before looking at how scholars account for 
institutional creation and change. 
 
Section 4.3 looks at interpretive theory, predominantly from the strand advocated by 
Bevir and Rhodes. In developing their strand of interpretivism Bevir and Rhodes 
have explored governance contexts to show how ‘storytelling’ and narratives are 
important tools in the political/social scientists’ toolkit. This theory is considered an 
alternative to institutionalist approaches. As such, the alternative ontological 
approach to institutionalism will be described in this section. 
 
Section 4.4 discusses the two different theories in relation to the thesis research 
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questions (section 5.3.3) in order to establish a theoretical and analytical framework. 
A move toward consolidating the two above strands of theory as ‘interpretive 
institutionalism’ is advocated. It is argued that this approach provides an analytical 
and methodological framework useful for studying the Venezuelan context. 
Conclusions of the chapter are provided in section 4.5. 
 
4.2  THEORISING INSTITUTIONS – DEFINITIONS, VARIANTS AND 
CHANGE IN NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 
 
Several disciplines within the social sciences have adopted new institutionalism (NI) 
as a means of explaining how actors’ behaviour is shaped by the institutional 
contexts within which they are situated. It has emerged as a clear distinction from 
‘old’ institutionalism, which new institutionalists consider to be more of a ‘descriptive’ 
exercise than analytical. In Bell’s words, ‘the main emphasis [of old institutionalism] 
was on description, not on explanation or theory building’ (2005 pg 4). Furthermore, 
there was a focus on the formal institutions of government, the state and legal 
procedures rather than the informal, cumulative, cultural and inherited practices that 
may occur within a particular social setting (ibid). 
 
For scholars, there is great debate and different interpretations of what an institution 
is and how it can be defined. This is clearly reflected in the literature (Rhodes, 
Binder and Rockman 2006; Lowndes and Roberts 2013; Williams 2011), some of 
which will be explored below. 
 
In the preface to the extensive Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, which 
provides a comprehensive overview of institutional scholarship and research, 
Rhodes, Binder and Rockman (2006) acknowledge that, despite the new 
institutionalist interest in institutions and the number of variants, there is a lack of a 
definition of an institution. They identify a key point which arises from this situation: 
 
The range of ideas is consequential: it signals that there are also 
considerable differences of view about why and how we should study 
institutions, about the impact of institutions, and indeed about the extent to 
which institutions may be thought to be endogenous (independent or 
autonomous) or inextricably exogenous (woven into traditions, cultures, 
norms and preferences). (Rhodes, Binder and Rockman 2006 pg xiii) 
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Williams’ (2011 pg 1) review of NI literature also describes the variety of definitions: 
‘Nearly every author seems to propose different definitions of institutions, different 
reasons why institutions are created and different reasons for their continuation’. 
Given this diversity it is generally understood that each of the variants of NI have 
defined institutions differently and make clear distinctions (Lowndes and Roberts 
2013; Rhodes, Binder and Rockman 2006; Williams 2011).  
 
March and Olsen, two of the early proponents of NI, argued that political science 
scholars focusing on behaviourism was ‘reductionist’ and would not ‘ascribe the 
outcomes of politics to organisational structures and rules of appropriate behaviour’ 
(1984 pg 735, cited in Bell, 2005 pg 4). Lowndes (2001 pg 1953), one of the current 
key advocates of the NI approach, sets out clearly where the NI breaks from old 
institutionalism: 
…new institutionalists concern themselves with informal conventions as well 
as formal rules and structures; they pay attention to the way in which 
institutions embody values and power relationships; they study not just the 
impact of institutions on behaviour, but the interaction between individuals 
and institutions. 
As such, NI includes the informal ways that actors’ behaviours can be influenced 
and shaped, be these rules, customs, practices or social norms, as opposed to a 
descriptive focus on government, the state and associated institutions, as was the 
case with ‘old’ institutionalism. It is in this context that Sweeting (2008 pg 1) argues 
that ‘the new institutionalist approach rejects a dry, descriptive study of legal 
competences and formal powers, in favour of a more nuanced, rounded and 
ultimately more informative way of researching institutions and actors’ behaviour’. 
 
The NI literature predominantly identifies three key strands of NI, however other 
variants are emerging. The three strands identified by the majority of scholars are 
‘rational choice’ (RC), ‘historical (HI) and ‘sociological’ (SI) new institutionalisms. A 
review of the literature has identified a further two variants. These are ‘discursive 
institutionalism’ and ‘interpretive institutionalism’, respectively. It should be noted 
that interpretive institutionalism is at a very emergent stage and is not discussed in 
this section. It is briefly mentioned in the following section as it arises from Hay’s 
(2011) response to interpretive theory. An additional caveat: although the 
characteristics for each of the variants mentioned above will be discussed 
62 
 
separately, overlapping of the different strands occurs depending on the scholars’ 
interpretations and understandings. As Lowndes and Roberts (2013 pg 12) note, 
scholars such as Vivien Schmidt and Colin Crouch have identified the need for 
recognising similarities and compatibility among types of NI, despite the need to 
remain vigilant to ontological differences and/or incompatibilities (such as rational 
choice and constructivist approaches).  
 
4.2.1 Rational Choice institutionalism (RC) 
 
RC defines institutions as ‘a system of rules and incentives’ (Rhodes, Binder and 
Rockman, 2006 pg xiii). In defining institutions, Williams (2011 pg 2) argues RC 
institutionalists ‘underline the purposive existence of institutions as sets of rules 
agreed upon by the actors to facilitate interaction and provide stability’. 
 
Hall and Taylor’s eminent study describes that RC emerged from the study of 
congressional behaviour in the US. Institutions were a key aspect of this study as it 
was believed that ‘institutions solve many of the collective action problems that 
legislatures habitually confront’ (1996 pg 943). The RC approach was then used in 
various types of political science studies. Hall and Taylor (1996 pgs 944-946) 
identify four key features of the approach. These are: 
 Advocates of the approach ‘employ a characteristic set of behavioural 
assumptions’ 
 They tend to see politics as a series of collective action dilemmas 
 They have a particular view in the origin and emergence of institutions, 
namely by using a deductive position to arrive at how the institution performs 
 Actors are considered to make strategic decisions or choices to determine 
political outcomes. 
Bell (2005 pg 5) also identifies that the RC approach is deductive and ‘borrows 
heavily from economics’. He argues that these points are the source of general 
academic debate between RC and HI approaches. Bell, like other scholars (Bevir 
2009; 2010a), criticises RC for being narrowly focused and a ‘mechanical 
specification of actor motives, preferences and institutional contexts’ (Bell 2005 pg 
6). 
 
As such, the rational choice approach assumes that individuals act within a setting 
using utilitarian self-interest, out of which rational institutions will arise. Bell 
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continues his critique of RC by highlighting ‘There is an old debate in the social 
sciences about the extent to which agents’ behaviour is self determined or to what 
extent their behaviour is shaped by wider institutions or structures - the so-called 
agency/structure debate’ (Bell 2005 pg 7). Bevir (2009 pg 166) also notes that 
‘criticisms of rational choice theory generally challenge its assumptions of 
individualism, rationality, and selfishness’. RC institutionalists, according to Bevir 
(2009 pg 112), argue ‘that institutions, such as rules of procedure, structure the 
information that individuals have and thus the choices that individuals make. In this 
view, then, institutions are a solution to collective action problems’.  
 
Given that rational choice theory, as a whole, borrows from economic micro-
analysis and applies the concept of human behaviour in society to institutions which 
favours market solutions and expertise (Bevir 2010a pgs 178-179) this approach will 
not be adopted as a theoretical lens. Instead, as will be discussed below, a 
constructivist approach will be adopted. 
 
4.2.2 Historical institutionalism (HI) 
 
‘Historical institutionalists see institutions as continuities’ (Rhodes, Binder and 
Rockman, 2006 pg xv). In a more expansive definition, Hall and Taylor (1996 pg 
938) argue that HI defines institutions as ‘the formal and informal procedures, 
routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the 
polity or political economy’ [my emphasis]. 
 
Hall and Taylor (1996 pg 937) describe that HI emerged as a response to political 
and structural-functionalism theories in the late 1960s and 1970s. It was at this 
stage that new institutionalists were seeking a more ‘expansive conception both of 
which institutions matter and how they matter’ (ibid). Hall and Taylor (1996 pgs 938-
939) identify four characteristics which define the HI approach: 
 Conceptualization of the relationship between institutions and individual 
behaviour is broad 
 Power relationships which define institutions’ operations and development 
are emphasised 
 An emphasis on developments occurring as a result of path dependency 
 A general unwilling to combine institutional concepts with factors such as 
‘ideas’ as alternative means of determining political outcomes. 
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Rhodes, Binder and Rockman (2006 pg xv) describe that advocates of HI see 
institutions as being ‘preservative’ and path dependent. The analogy used is that of 
‘dried cement’ (ibid). HI institutionalists, Rhodes et al (2006) argue, see institutions 
as preserving the status quo. Bevir (2010a pgs 50-51) also notes that HI 
institutionalists see path dependency as the reason why policy and institutional 
changes only occur infrequently. The reasoning given for this is that ‘social learning’ 
and ‘policy transfer[s]’ are ‘constrained by the legacy of the past’. For HI scholars, 
change only occurs at crisis points (critical junctures). HI is considered too narrow in 
its analytical capability; it considers human agency too constrained by historical 
antecedents. As a consequence it will not be adopted within the thesis’ research 
framework. This will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
4.2.3 Sociological institutionalism (SI) 
 
Hall and Taylor’s account of SI states that its origins are within the subfield of 
organisation theory (1996 pg 946). Hall and Taylor argue that SI advocates define 
institutions more broadly than political scientists do by including many elements of 
culture. SI therefore sees institutions comprising norms and culture, whereby history 
of the way that these are undertaken and practised become institutionalised over 
time (Rhodes, Binder and Rockman (2006 pg xv). In contrast to ‘rational self 
interest, individuals are said to behave according to their sense of duty and 
obligation as structured by prevailing rules and routines’ (Rhodes, Binder and 
Rockman (2006 pg xvi). As Bell (2005 pg 5) describes, deriving his definition from 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991), SI puts emphasis ‘on the way in which institutional life 
establishes behaviour, often in subtle ways’. 
 
As such, the adoption of the SI approach has enabled scholars to begin to include 
routines, symbols or scripts into their templates for assessing behaviour (Hall and 
Taylor 1996 pg 948). Because of this cultural inclusion, SI allows a distinctive view 
of the role between institutions and individuals’ behaviour (ibid). Lowndes (2001 pg 
1958) provides a useful, analogous way of conceiving institutions: ‘the sets of rules 
that guide and constrain actors’ behaviour’. In other words, institutions ‘provide the 
“rules of the game”, while organisations – like individuals – are players within that 
game’ (2001 pg 1958).  
 
Leach and Lowndes (2007 pg 185) claim that ‘all institutions are expressed through 
rules’. Rules can be ‘rules in use’ or ‘rules in form’. This underlines the particularity 
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of NI, where it is thought that practices and scripts that underlie the formal are 
important in any given context (ibid). Leach and Lowndes derive their analogy and 
definitions from Ostrom, who states “Rules in use are, in short, the distinctive 
ensemble of ‘dos and don’ts that one learns on the ground’ (Ostrom 1999 pg 38, 
cited in Leach and Lowndes 2007). 
 
Although SI advocates argue that the approach allows for a more nuanced analysis 
of the underlying ‘rules in use’ which shape actors’ behaviour, Ostrom (2011 pg 18) 
offers caution by arguing that ‘scholars frequently try to understand where working 
rules come from’. She notes that ‘rule-following or conforming actions by humans 
are not as predictable as biological or physical behavior governed by scientific laws’. 
As a result, trying to classify rules imposes ‘superficial order onto a large set of 
seemingly disparate rules’ (ibid pg 19).  
 
The hermeneutic concepts developed within the SI such as “rules of the game”, 
“rules in use” and “rules in form” provides useful tools in understanding actors’ 
norms, cultures, practices, and scripts, as well as the opportunities and constraints 
presented by institutional contexts. As such these elements are adopted in the 
thesis’ analytical framework which is presented in section 4.4. 
 
The previous sections have described the three ‘main’ new institutionalist 
approaches discussed in the literature. Although they have been presented 
separately, it should be noted that there is a considerable overlap between variants 
and the characteristics from each are frequently used interchangeably by different 
scholars (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). In addition to the three main variants, two 
further variants have been addressed in the literature that incorporate elements of 
contingency and advocate dialogue and deliberation. Discursive institutionalism will 
be discussed next; the newer interpretive institutionalism will be discussed in 
section 4.3. 
 
4.2.4 Discursive institutionalism (DI) 
 
Vivien Schmidt (2008) provided an additional variant of NI on publication of her 
explanatory paper on discursive institutionalism (DI). She argues that this approach 
‘lends insight into the role of ideas and discourse in politics while providing a more 
dynamic approach to institutional change than the older three new institutionalisms’ 
(Schmidt 2008 pg 303). Schmidt argues that scholars whose work falls within the 
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parameters of DI show similar characteristics, namely: a) ideas and discourse are at 
the core of the analysis, b) ideas and discourse are set in the institutional context, c) 
communication and meaning are explored, and d) there is a dynamic view of 
change (ibid pg 304).  
 
Where DI differs from the three main NIs is in their conception of institutions, which 
she claims are ‘overly simplistic’ (ibid). Schmidt argues that DI’s main innovation is 
its ‘ability to explain change and continuity’ by answering the question, ‘how does it 
do so?’ (ibid pg 305). Furthermore, the discursive element enables political 
scientists to establish not only what is said, but also where, when, how and why it 
was said (ibid). This, Schmidt believes, breaks with looking only at structure by 
incorporating agency (‘who said what to whom’). 
 
DI moves towards other theoretical approaches to political and social science such 
as interpretivism because of its constructivist ontology. DI and interpretivism share 
the view that institutions or actors’ collective patterns are not objective but 
intersubjective and founded on actors’ meanings. Lowndes and Roberts (2013 pg 
31) state that DI’s ‘frames of meanings’ are ‘ideas and narratives that are used to 
explain, deliberate or legitimate political action’. However, the extent that ‘ideas 
seem to trump institutions as the key explanatory factors…in political behaviour’ 
makes them question whether the DI approach is at all “institutionalist” (Lowndes 
and Roberts 2013 pg 66).     
 
Although the DI approach can provide interesting insights it is not adopted within the 
thesis research framework. Schmidt’s approach tends to focus on ‘creative agents’ 
such as political leaders, government spokespeople, party activists, and spin 
doctors (Lowndes and Roberts 2013 pg 101). In other words DI centres on political 
elites rather than other political actors like community participants. Instead, as will 
be explained in more detail below, the interpretive approach is adopted. The latter, 
based on Hay (2011), is considered to be robust enough and manageable given the 
time, space and resources experienced by the researcher. It is recognised, 
however, that future research could analyse CLPPs and CCs through the lens of DI 
to provide supplementary studies to that undertaken in this thesis. 
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4.2.5 Institutional creation and change 
 
March and Olsen (2006) provide a reflexive review of their seminal 1984 work. In 
providing a ‘reappraisal’ of political institutions one of the five criteria that they used 
to do so was how institutions emerge. At the macro level, March and Olsen argue 
that ‘political order is created by a collection of institutions that fit more or less into a 
coherent system’ (ibid pg 6). This is conceptualised by Lowndes (2005 pg 292), and 
later adopted by March and Olsen, to be an ‘institutional matrix’. The origin of the 
various institutions which form such a matrix or political order are described by 
March and Olsen as follows: 
 …actors operating within this political arena ‘organise themselves and act in 
accordance with rules and practices which are socially constructed, publicly 
known, anticipated, and accepted. By virtue of these rules and practices, 
political institutions define basic rights and duties, shape and regulate how 
advantages, burdens and life chances are allocated in society, and create 
authority to settle issues and resolve conflicts. (March and Olsen 2006 pg 7) 
In essence, as they later describe, the political order is essentially rule-following (or 
resistance).  
 
Von Beyme notes ‘institutions develop less quickly than theories on institutions 
(2006 pg 752). This he argues is demonstrated by HI which shows how embedded 
institutions consolidate once established over a period of time (ibid). On the whole, 
within the NI discussion there is little disagreement on the origin of institutions – 
they can be formal or informal but involve socially accepted practices or frameworks 
which people generally adhere to. The great debate in the literature is how 
institutions change. 
 
Williams’ (2011) review of the NI literature identifies that change becomes possible 
because although existing institutions inhibit and set parameters on actors’ actions 
they still have scope to effect change. She relates this to the nature of structure and 
agency and of actors’ psychology (ibid pg 3). However, it is worth looking more 
specifically to NI theories on change, the majority of which argue that institutions are 
generally stable except for occasional moments in time. These are termed ‘critical 
junctures, punctuated equilibrium, positive/negative feedback loops, [or] windows of 
opportunity’ (Williams 2011 pg 3). Each of these share the common element of 
being a radical shift in the overall institutional matrix. Williams’ empirical research 
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provides a counter to this generally accepted view of institutional change:  
‘institutional change is not a binary process of stasis and upheaval. Instead, 
much of institutional existence is composed of incremental change, a 
gradual shifting that amounts to substantive changes over time but that may 
pass relatively unnoticed. Furthermore, the critical junctures and punctuated 
equilibrium frameworks are difficult to operationalize and test and generally 
require the liberal application of hindsight’. (Williams 2011 pg 4) 
For March and Olsen, change is inevitable: ‘Rules, routines, norms, and identities 
are both instruments of stability and change. Change is a constant feature of 
institutions and existing arrangements impact how institutions emerge and how they 
are reproduced and changed’ (March and Olsen 2006 pg 11). However, March and 
Olsen also acknowledge that change is generally a slow process and institutions are 
particularly robust even in times of great pressure, criticism and reflection (ibid). 
Punctuated equilibrium requires ‘massive failure [of the institution in question] as an 
important condition for change’ (ibid pg 12). 
 
Critical junctures are situations such as post-war periods where a new beginning 
can be sought and new institutions designed and implemented to deliver such 
visions (Schmidt 2008; 2011). A key point regarding the general stability of 
institutions is that rules and routines carry 'accumulated knowledge and generally 
reflect a broader and a longer experience than the experience that informs any 
individual actor' (March and Olsen 2006 pg 13).  
 
A further point discussed by March and Olsen (2006 pg 14) is that institutions are 
not solitary, but exist within an ‘institutional matrix’ (Lowndes 2005) where 
institutions interact with other institutions. This practice of institutional interaction 
creates norms which are shared and created at a meso-level, just as they are 
between actors to form the rules in use at the micro-level. As such, challenges, 
inconsistencies and forms of enlightenment of discovery allow institutions to 
change. But it should be acknowledged that this does not happen arbitrarily (March 
and Olsen 2006). Lowndes (2005) does not accept the linear type process of 
change described above. She argues that institutional change is not necessarily 
path dependent but better described as cyclical as institutional changes can see 
reversal changes as well as new.  
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Schmidt (2011), on the other hand, argues that discourse is a key factor in effecting 
change. She argues that, whether in crisis or in incremental change, ideas and 
discourse are fundamental. Discourse of ideas can occur in two ways: a) a 
coordinative discourse amongst policy actors, or b) a communicative discourse 
between political actors and the public (ibid pg 305). Ultimately, Schmidt sees 
‘discourse as an interactive process [which] enables agents to change institutions, 
because the deliberative nature of discourse allows them to conceive of and talk 
about institutions as objects at a distance, and to disassociate themselves from 
them even as they continue to see them’ (Schmidt 2011 pg 316). Like Lowndes, 
Schmidt is critical of historical institutionalists’ punctuated equilibrium, critical 
junctures or windows of opportunity as explanations for change; instead she 
considers these ‘inexplicable moments’ (ibid pg 316). Discursive institutionalists see 
discourse as an explanatory mechanism for the change happening in a more 
evolutionary manner. 
 
Schmidt’s evolutionary explanation of change via discourse appear similar in nature 
to the incremental changes argued by Williams (2011). However, Schmidt is critical 
of incremental explanations too: 
The incremental processes of change resulting from actors’ use of 
mechanisms of layering, conversion, and interpretation mainly describe such 
change rather than explain it by reference to what actors themselves think 
and say that leads to change. (Schmidt 2011 pg 317) 
The crux of DI’s development over other variants of NIs is its ability to see 
institutions of ideas and discourse not only as structures but also as forms of 
agency (Schmidt 2008 pg 399). 
 
Expanding on the developments of NI in the 2000s, Lowndes and Roberts (2013) 
argue that there is need for a form of convergence between the way institutionalists 
conceive change; Rather than adopting a ‘sectarian’ stance where change occurs 
via “critical junctures”, “punctuated equilibrium” or as a gradual change. They 
consider that understanding the relationship between actors and institutions shapes 
the type of change that will occur: 
 
 Agency is constrained by, but constitutive of, institutions.  We need to 
understand agency “in and against” institutions. Institutional change occurs 
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when the balance between constraint and creativity shifts in favour of the 
latter (Lowndes and Roberts 2013 pg 138). 
 
From the literature reviewed, the positions from the SI and DI variants could both be 
insightful in the Venezuelan context. Lowndes’ concepts of institutional matrices and 
(borrowing from Ostrom) ‘rules of the game’, ‘rules in use’ and ‘rules in form’ have 
potential to highlight the way in which actors can accept formal rules or whether 
practices in a particular community or area actually go beyond such formal rules 
and are enacted in informal norms. Empirical research shows that this differentiation 
occurs in practice (Lowndes and Leach 2007; Lowndes and Roberts 2013). In the 
context of CLPPs and CCs, which are defined formally through legislation, a NI 
approach, using Lowndes’ concepts, would enable analysis of which type of rules, 
norms and practices are followed in particular contexts.  
 
4.2.6 Section summary 
 
This section has provided a general overview of NI. It departs from more traditional 
institutional analyses which focused only on formal institutions and state 
organisations. NI, however, includes an understanding that institutions can be 
influenced by a number of day-to-day practices that are not necessarily written 
down or formalised. These can be inherited, learned over time, and/or form part of 
individuals’ behaviours. Political actors are subject to, and create, these informal 
rules, scripts and behaviours alongside more formal understandings of institutions 
acknowledged by old institutionalism. 
 
NI has emerged into four main variants. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the four 
variants of NI - in addition to interpretive theory and the emerging interpretive 
institutionalism. The three ‘main’ variants emerged from different backgrounds – the 
historical tendency for path dependency, the economic focus on rational choice and 
the sociological approach to cultures, norms and scripts. The more recent variant, 
discursive institutionalism, builds upon the three main variants, but includes an 
analysis of how ideas and discourse shape the institutional arenas within which 
actors are situated. Thus the DI variant, which focuses on a constructivist rather 
than positivist ontology, sees a shift towards (namely, contingent patterns of change 
through dialogue) the ideational dimensions explored in interpretive theory.  
 
As indicated above, RC has a narrow interpretation of human agency in that it views 
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actions, like liberal economics, to be made for selfish, individualistic gain. It also 
generally advocates market and expertise over deliberation. HI is also rejected as a 
theoretical lens for its narrow view that human agency is constrained by historical 
antecedents. Although it is acknowledged that these can play a part in institutional 
development and change. Elements of DI have also not been included in the thesis 
framework because of constraints on time for single researcher, space/length 
permitted within the thesis, and because of the DI’s focus on “creative agents” 
(political elites). 
 
SI provides useful elements involving the identification of ‘rules of the game’, ‘rules 
in form’ versus ‘rules in use’. This understanding can elicit and enable the analysis 
of the norms, cultures, practices, and scripts that can define and influence human 
agency. These components have been incorporated into the thesis framework.  
 
The following section will discuss interpretive theory’s position given that it provides 
an alternative to the NI approaches discussed above. As will become evident, the 
thesis framework adopts a composite derived from different elements of SI and 
interpretive theory, based on Hay’s (2011) model. 
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Theoretical 
Approach 
Definition of 
Institutions 
Ontological/ 
epistemological 
position 
Focus of analysis Creation Change Role of Agency 
Rational Choice 
Institutionalism 
‘Political institutions are 
systems of rules and 
inducements within 
which individuals attempt 
to maximize their utilities’ 
(Lowndes and Roberts 
2013 pg 31). 
 
Positivist; structuralist Individuals' preferences 
and behaviour. 
Institutions are solutions 
to collective action 
problems that arise out 
of individual's utilitarian 
objectives and action. 
Institutions try to change 
and influence behaviour 
by providing the settings 
within which individuals 
act on their preferences; 
institutions change when 
people's preferences 
change (Bevir 2009) 
Individuals seek to 
maximise satisfaction of 
their preferences  (Bevir 
2009) 
Historical 
Institutionalism 
Institutions are ‘formal or 
informal procedures, 
routines, norms and 
conventions embedded 
in…organizational 
structure[s]’ (Hall and 
Taylor 1996). 
Positivist; structuralist The precedents that 
influence, and can be 
maintained, within a 
given institutional and 
cultural context; 
particularly, political 
elites and national policy. 
 
Institutions come 
together as a result of 
historical factors or 
incremental changes. 
Given that institutions 
are understood to be 
stable (path dependent), 
change is rare. Change 
occurs at 'critical 
junctures' or 'punctuated 
equilibrium'. 
Minor role 
Sociological 
Institutionalism 
Institutions are defined 
by reference to formal 
and informal rules, 
scripts, norms, symbols, 
beliefs (Hall and Taylor 
1996); coined as 
“’frames of meaning’ 
guiding human action’ 
(Campbell 1995 cited 
Hall and Taylor 1996 pg 
947). 
Structuralist The underlying scripts, 
roles, symbols, norms 
etc which can affect 
individuals, contexts and 
institutional 
arrangements; 
institutions are 
considered dynamic. 
 
Institutions provide the 
context within which they 
are situated and 
influence individuals 
through norms, 
conventions and 
‘appropriateness’ 
(Lowndes and Roberts 
2013). 
As a result of shifts in 
norms, roles, scripts, and 
beliefs within the cultural 
environment, change is 
possible. 
Individuals act on the 
adopted rules, scripts, 
norms, beliefs within the 
contexts within which 
they are situated. Rules 
can be conceived as 
formal or informal. 
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Theoretical 
Approach 
Definition of 
Institutions 
Ontological/ 
epistemological 
position 
Focus of analysis Creation Change Role of Agency 
Discursive 
Institutionalism 
Institutions are agent-
centred, dynamic 
constructs and structures 
created through agents’ 
ideational and discursive 
interactions (Schmidt 
2008). 
Post-structuralist; 
Constructivist. 
Ideas and discourses 
and the interactive 
processes in which they 
are generated (Schmidt 
2011) 
Institutions and norms 
are the result of 
interrelations of ideas 
and discourses; norms 
are dynamic not static. 
Understands institutions 
as dynamic as well as 
seeing change as being 
dynamic. Discursive 
interrelations within 
institutional contexts 
serve to gradually alter 
institutions. 
Actors interact via 
communicative, 
'coordinative' and 
discursive processes that 
generate and develop 
ideas and may achieve 
change in discourse. 
Interpretivism Institutions are 
‘composed of contingent 
and possibly competing 
webs of belief. 
Interpretive science 
encourages us to think of 
institutions not as reified 
structures but in terms of 
traditions, practices, 
dilemmas, and other 
concepts that refer to 
beliefs’. (Bevir 2010 pgs 
266-267) 
Constructivist; empiricist; 
ethnographic 
Thick description; 
narratives; storytelling 
Practices, traditions, 
dilemmas arise from 
individuals' actions and 
decisions which come 
from their 'webs of 
belief'. 
Individuals’ 'dilemmas' 
(To accept a new 
belief is thus to pose a 
dilemma that asks 
questions of existing 
traditions); ‘Local 
reasoning’ can be 
elicited through the 
decentred approach and 
enables unpacking the 
creation, maintenance or 
change of traditions and 
institutions. 
Situated agency; 
contingency of actors 
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Theoretical 
Approach 
Definition of 
Institutions 
Ontological/ 
epistemological 
position 
Focus of analysis Creation Change Role of Agency 
Interpretive 
Institutionalism  
Institutions are the 
structural contexts and 
configurations that 
present situated actors 
with constraints and 
opportunities (Hay 2011). 
Structuralist/ 
Constructivist  
Explores relationships 
between actors’ ideas 
and discourses, where 
these come/develop 
from, as well as the 
institutional and extra-
discursive contexts of 
those ideas (Hay 2011).  
Practices, traditions, 
institutions arise from 
individuals' actions and 
decisions, in addition to 
institutional and 'extra-
discursive' arrangements 
(Hay 2011) 
Through institutional 
failure as well as 
individuals’ dilemmas. 
Both mutually influence 
one other. 
Adopts situated agency, 
enhanced with structural 
and other similar 
contextual 
arrangements. 
Table 4.1 Summary of New Institutionalism, Interpretivism and Interpretive Institutionalism theories 
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4.3  INTERPRETIVE THEORY 
 
The prevalence of NI approaches to social science has been considerable over the 
last decade or so. However, a new theory, interpretivism, is also gaining popularity 
because it enables a lens from which to elicit ‘thick descriptions’ of participants’ 
beliefs underpinned by ethnography. This section aims to establish its 
characteristics, usefulness and how it relates and differs from the approach taken by 
NI. 
 
In a recent paper, Rhodes (2011a pg 202) summarises the ‘interpretive turn’ as 
follows: 
…individuals are situated in webs of beliefs handed down as traditions and 
these beliefs and associated practices are changed by the dilemmas people 
confront. To explain individual actions, we must identify the set of reasons 
that led to the particular action. To understand an institution and its 
processes, we must understand the beliefs and practices of its members and 
the traditions that inform those beliefs and practices. We summarize this 
approach as ‘situated agency’. 
Rhodes (ibid pg 203) argues that his and Bevir’s work has identified stories that 
‘show how ministers, civil servants and citizens construct and reconstruct the state 
in their everyday lives’. It is argued that these qualitative, expanded narratives 
provide insights that set the interpretive approach apart from other (particularly 
positivist) theoretical standpoints (Bevir 2010a; 2011b; Bevir and Rhodes 2003; 
2006). According to Bevir (2011b pg 183), the ‘interpretive approach rests on 
“meaning holism” which arises from the ‘emphasis on meanings and storytelling’. 
Meaning holism consists of ‘a comparative epistemology, constructivist ontology, 
and contextualizing an historical form of explanation’ (ibid pg 190). The following 
paragraphs will take each of these elements in turn to unpack their meaning.  
 
Firstly, Bevir argues that social scientists are predominantly empiricists; therefore 
epistemologically they believe knowledge is acquired through experience (2011b pg 
187). Comparative epistemology is stressed to be a method of attaining knowledge 
by comparing theories and accounts rather than empiricism via inductive processes 
(Bevir 2011b; Rhodes 2011). Interpretivists criticise social scientists that focus on 
purely quantitative data; they advocate a need to attain validity through comparing 
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rival data, bundles, assumptions and accounts generated through individuals’ 
interpretations (Bevir 2010a; Bevir 2011b pg 188; Bevir and Rhodes 2003; 2006).  
 
Secondly, ontology should comprise constructivism (Bevir 2010a; 2011b; Bevir and 
Rhodes 2003; 2006). This, Bevir argues, ‘does not preclude the existence of 
institutions or structures. It just requires social scientists to conceive institutions and 
structures as practices’ (2011b pg 189). Emphasis is given to practices and the way 
people do things as part of their ‘webs of belief’. Therefore, the holism approach is 
to interpret the contextual in order to uncover explanation. To qualify this ontological 
approach, Bevir argues that: 
 
Our beliefs, concepts, actions, and practices are products of particular 
traditions or discourses. Social concepts (and social objects), such as 
‘bureaucracy’ or ‘democracy’, do not have intrinsic properties and objective 
boundaries. They are artificial inventions of particular languages and 
societies. Their content varies with the wider webs of belief in which they are 
situated. (Bevir 2011b pg188) 
 
Interpretivists (Bevir 2010a; 2011b; Bevir and Rhodes 2003; 2006) argue that 
‘storytelling’ and uncovering narratives provide the context and explanations for how 
public administrations or democracies function. Instead of number crunching and 
isolating precision-like causal relationships, social scientists should remember that 
the data refers to people and their actions. As such there is a need to bring ‘people 
back in’ by eliciting narratives through storytelling (Bevir 2011b pg 193). As Rhodes 
(2011b) describes it, the outcome is often ‘thick description of life’, whether life is 
citizen, civil servant or ministerial. It is through these ‘thick descriptions of individual 
beliefs and preferences’ that people’s constructs and the reasons for the way in 
which they act can be explained (Bevir and Rhodes 2003 pg 195). 
 
Interpretivism, at its simplest, can be considered to be a form of interpreting what 
people say and do as part of their social practices. Storytelling can elicit and explore 
these narratives (Bevir 2010a; 2011a;b; Bevir and Rhodes 2003; 2006). In contrast, 
causal relationships obtained through forms of inductive processes prevalent in 
other social science theories are incomplete and belong to ‘reified’ ontologies (Bevir 
2010; 2011b; Bevir and Rhodes 2003). As discussed in the previous section, newer 
variants of NI, such as Schmidt’s DI (2008; 2011) have adopted constructivist 
approaches (Hay 2006). This has been criticised by scholars such as Lowndes and 
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Roberts (2013) for being centred on ideational and discursive elements rather than 
institutions. 
 
Bevir and Rhodes interpretivism is underpinned by three key concepts that will be 
discussed below. These are ‘beliefs’, ‘dilemmas’ and ‘traditions’. The key concept 
for change is that of the ‘dilemma’ (Bevir and Rhodes 2003; 2006; 2012): 
A dilemma captures the way in which situated agents are able to bring about 
changes in beliefs, traditions and practices (Bevir 1999: 221–64)…situated 
agency suggests change originates in the responses or decisions of 
individuals. Whenever someone adopts a new belief or action, they have to 
adjust their existing beliefs and practices to make way for the newcomer. To 
accept a new belief is thus to pose a dilemma that asks questions of existing 
traditions. A dilemma arises for an individual or group when a new idea 
stands in opposition to existing beliefs or practices and so forces a 
reconsideration of the existing beliefs and associated tradition. Political 
scientists can explain change in traditions and practices, therefore, by 
referring to the relevant dilemmas. Traditions change as individuals make a 
series of variations to them in response to any number of specific dilemmas. 
(Bevir and Rhodes 2006 pg 9) 
With a nod towards theories such as new institutionalism, Bevir and Rhodes 
describe ‘The interpretive approach relies on an alternative epistemology to both 
modernist empiricism and positivism. It represents a challenge to this dominant or 
mainstream tradition’ (2003 pg 3). Rather than undertaking a process of 
accumulating facts and truths, interpretivism instead looks at revealing the how 
‘actions or institutions are constructed by prior webs of belief informed by traditions’ 
(ibid). As a result, they argue there are several ways in which individuals construct 
political concepts. 
 
Bevir and Rhodes (2003 pg 2) accept that individuals’ beliefs are not divorced from 
the social context within which they are situated and can be influenced by them; 
however, they do not ascribe to the new institutionalist approach which argues that 
beliefs are held by individuals because of the social context. In other words, 
interpretivists contend that beliefs are contingent on the dilemmas and situated 
agency (context) that actors experience. A way of separating the aggregative from 
the individual webs of belief is by ‘decentering’. This allows detailed understanding 
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of the myriad individual sets of beliefs that may be encompassed in an aggregative 
context such as a tradition or culture (Bevir and Rhodes 2003). 
 
Bevir and Rhodes ‘insist on the fact of agency’, because although backgrounds and 
contexts may influence individuals there is always the possibility that individuals can 
‘reason and act in novel ways to alter this background’ (2003 pg 32). They consider 
that just because a tradition exists it is not enough to be fixed and hence it can 
change. Traditions should not be reified (ibid; 2012). Bevir and Rhodes (2003 pg 35) 
consider that: 
 
Traditions do not contain an inherent logic that fixes their development; there 
are no compelling causes making individuals change their beliefs and 
actions. Rather, we argue that people change their beliefs or actions in ways 
that depend on local reasoning. 
 
It is argued that this ‘local reasoning’ can be elicited through the decentred 
approach as it allows unpacking the creation, maintenance or change of traditions 
and institutions14. 
 
Bevir argues that interpretivism critiques other theories that replace ‘one type of 
modernism for another. Out go the bureaucratic narrative, the neutral expertise of 
the professions, and procedural accountability. In come markets and networks, 
rational choice theory and network institutionalism, and performance accountability’ 
(Bevir 2011a pg 16). Instead, Bevir (2011c pg 277) argues: 
I believe that social life consists in a constant flux of activity, and that activity 
is contingent. The contingent nature of actions and practices implies that 
social concepts…do not have core properties by which social scientists can 
define them and explain their other properties and interactions…To explain 
contingent activity and the patterns to which it gives rise, social scientists 
have to tell historical narratives relating actions to meanings against 
contingent historical backgrounds. 
                                                
14It is important not to conflate Bevir and Rhodes conception of institution with that of NI scholars. For 
Bevir and Rhodes institutions are practices that are contingent on actor’s actions as a result of their 
ideational reasoning. Bevir and Rhodes resist focusing on institutions because they consider doing so 
is to reify them, especially when they consider that ‘institutions or structures…are composed of 
contingent and possibly competing webs of belief’ (Bevir 2010 pg 247; Bevir and Rhodes 2003; 2006; 
Hay 2011). See table 4.1 for how these are defined.  
79 
 
As noted above, Bevir and Rhodes make clear demarcations between interpretive 
theory and (predominantly) structuralist theories, such as most variants of NI, 
because of their tendency to reify structures and provide causal explanations (see 
Bevir 2012). More recently, however, Hay (2011) sought to explore the potential of 
blending elements of NI with interpretive theory. Hay argues that despite 
interpretivists’ descriptions of interpretive approaches, such as those by Bevir and 
Rhodes, which focus on individuals’ beliefs and actions, there is still a motivation 
and need to understand institutions. Thus he argues that a logical step, and 
research programme, could be to develop such insights into a 
‘constructivist/interpretivist institutionalism’. Such an approach, Hay argues (2011 
pg 180), would: 
 
explain both incremental/path dependent change and more dramatic/path-
shaping episodes…[Furthermore] an institutionalist-augmented interpretivist 
approach is capable of explaining (indeed, even of anticipating) the dilemma 
and of describing the conflict and ensuing ideational and institutional change 
to which the dilemma is likely to give rise. It is not, I think, difficult to see the 
value of such an approach.  
 
Other critiques of the interpretive approach advocated by Bevir and Rhodes 
highlight that is too parochial (in the case studies used so far, i.e. British 
Governance) (see Rhodes 2011a) and that there is a “relative paucity of their [Bevir 
and Rhodes’] own empirical work” (Wagenaar, cited in Bevir and Rhodes 2012 pg 
202). In response to the latter comment, Bevir and Rhodes have decided to infer 
there is a need for further empirical research adopting an interpretive approach 
(ibid). 
 
The interpretive approach, outlined by Bevir and Rhodes, is appealing in the way 
that it places contingency and individual human agency at the centre of its ontology. 
It argues that individuals have their own webs of belief that shape the way in which 
they act, without being constrained by institutional contexts, norms, and cultures. It 
is not, as many institutionalists generally argue, that these components determine 
the behaviour of individuals. Furthermore, their emphasis on eliciting ‘thick 
descriptions’ and finding out ‘how things happen around here’ (Rhodes 2011b) is 
potentially revealing, particularly in the contexts of CLPPs and CCs.  
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4.4  ESTABLISHING AN ‘INTERPRETIVE INSTITUTIONALIST’ 
FRAMEWORK  
 
The thesis seeks to establish whether CLPPs and CCs have increased citizen 
inclusiveness in relation to the existing representative state institutions and the way 
that they are structured and/or operated. It also aims to establish from participants’ 
understandings the agency they have within CLPPs and CCs. As indicated in 
section 4.2, certain variants of NI, such as RC, HI and DI, do not form part of the 
framework and will not guide the analysis. This section aims to synthesise the 
components drawn from new institutionalism and interpretive theory to establish a 
framework which responds to the thesis’ objectives and research questions.  
 
Hay (2011) argues that it is insightful to combine elements of interpretive theory and 
institutionalism than to dismiss the merits of the latter entirely – as Bevir and 
Rhodes (2012) continue to do. Hay derives his understanding from the shift in the 
concept of ‘dilemma’ defined by Bevir and Rhodes. Namely that ‘dilemmas’ can be 
derivatives ‘of problems and failings in existing institutional arrangements’ (Hay 
2011 pg 179). He continues: 
 
What is important about such suggestions, underdeveloped though at this 
stage they undoubtedly remain, is that they refer to extra-discursive factors, 
institutional pathologies in particular. As such they indicate, for the first time 
really, that interpretivists are starting to move beyond the narrow 
contextualization of situated actors within ideational contexts. For here we 
see a clear link drawn between the institutional context within which political 
actors are situated (in this case an institutional context confounding 
prevailing expectations of it) and the ideational context (the context within 
which such expectations were first forged and must now be renegotiated in 
some way). This suggests to me the value now of an explicit attempt to 
broaden the interpretivist research agenda by bringing institutional (and 
potentially other extra-discursive contexts) into the analysis. (Hay 2011 pg 
179) 
As a constructivist, Hay (2006) provided an initial outline of the benefits of a 
constructivist form of institutionalism. This approach, in conjunction with the 
discursive approach advocated by Schmidt (2008; 2011) indicates further support 
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for Hay’s (2011) model – and the thesis framework derived from it – which will be 
discussed below. 
 
Whilst recognising the institutions provide ‘opportunities and constraints’, Hay 
(2006; 2011) does not ascribe to many new institutionalist scholars’ position that 
institutions are a purely a form of structure. As noted above, Hay (2006) instead has 
advocated the need for developing constructivist theories of new institutionalism. He 
states: 
 
 Actors are strategic, seeking to realize certain complex, contingent and 
constantly changing goals. They do so in a context which favors certain 
strategies over others and must rely upon perceptions of that context which 
are at best incomplete and which may very often prove to have been 
inaccurate after the event…[actors’] desires, preferences, and motivations 
are not a contextually given fact – a reflection of material or even social 
circumstance – but are irredeemably ideational [my emphasis]. (Hay 2006 
pg 63) 
  
As discussed in section 4.3, Bevir and Rhodes have been particularly reluctant to 
accept that institutional factors can affect the way in which actors may interpret the 
world and this may affect their subsequent actions. Hay identified that their most 
recent work has shown an evolution in their conceptualisation of collective entities 
such as institutions. As we can see, Hay’s emphasis on the ideational places 
constructivist institutionalism much closer to the interpretive position set out in the 
previous section. Hay poses a further question in his exposition of a constructivist 
form of institutionalism. He states (ibid pg 70), ‘In short, where do such ideas come 
from and who, in a moment of crisis, is capable of perceiving that they have a 
clearly identified self-interest to the served by the promotion of such ideas?’ This 
resembles the heuristics of Schmidt’s DI ‘Who said what to whom?’ Seeking to 
establish the position and journey of actors’ ideas, discourse and subsequent 
actions shows a turn towards Bevir and Rhodes epistemological and ontological 
position outlined in section 4.3. Hay (2011) seeks to narrow the gap between 
interpretive and institutionalist theories by showing the benefits of combining 
elements of both sets of theories together in his model.  
 
Hay (2011 pg 180) considers that by bringing in institutions, which he defines as 
‘configurations of constraints and opportunities’ that generate ‘good/bad 
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expectations and performance’, explanations of change can be provided - whether 
incremental, path dependent or more punctuated. The way in which Hay has 
conceived bringing institutional and interpretive/ideational dimensions together is 
illustrated in figure 4.1. 
 
 To operationalize this diagram there was a need to develop concepts from both 
dimensions to establish the thesis framework (table 4.2). The components are set 
out in table 4.2, below. The components are subsequently discussed, with links to 
the reasoning provided by scholars of the two strands of theory, in section 4.4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 Linking institutional and interpretive (ideational) contexts, adapted from Hay (2011 pg 180) 
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Component 
Theory 
variant  
Understanding Analytical application  
A Rules of the 
game 
SI Definition of institution adopted in 
the thesis framework; Metaphor 
that conceptualises institutions as 
providing the rules of a game 
whereas actors are players within/ of 
that game. They are influenced to a 
varying degree by the rules of the 
game. 
The analytical potential of component A 
comes from exploring its sub-components, 
B and C, which allow the 'bigger picture' of 
the rules of the game to be described. 
B Rules in 
form 
SI Concept that establishes that rules 
can comprise those designated 
more formally e.g. by legislation, 
constitutions, or traditions. 
Enables an understanding of how the 
legislative and organisational processes 
are intended to work.  
C Rules in 
use 
SI Described by Lowndes and Roberts 
(2013) as ‘practices’. Distinguishes 
that practices may deviate from the 
rules in form in as a result of 
context-driven norms, scripts, 
cultures etc. 
Enables analysis of how processes work in 
practice to be evaluated against the formal 
rules (B). 
D Tradition Int Traditions are webs of meanings 
which actors draw upon to make 
sense of their experiences (Hay 
2011). Traditions are considered a 
starting point in the cycle of ‘situated 
agency’. Actors’ are situated within 
contexts that present certain 
traditions. These are then subjected 
to continued acceptance or 
challenge (and subsequent action if 
accepted) depending on the 
dilemmas the actor is faced with.  
Analysis of how actors describe and 
narrate their experiences helps establish 
the personal traditions they draw upon. 
These will include formal or informal rules 
(components B and C) as well as actors’ 
ideational contexts such as beliefs 
(component E) and dilemmas (component 
F). 
E Beliefs Int Concept which considers that the 
beliefs that actors hold are 
influenced by individual ‘webs of 
beliefs’ which are made sense of 
depending on the tradition(s), and 
dilemmas, that the individual is 
exposed to. 
Exploration of actors’ beliefs enables the 
contingent nature of individuals' accounts 
and traditions to understand the way in 
which they interpret matters that they 
confront and contexts within which they are 
created (situated agency). Closely related 
to components D and F. 
F Dilemma Int The choice that actors face between 
the existing 'webs of belief' that they 
hold and the new alternatives that 
arise through practices, discourse, 
ideas or contextual and institutional 
contexts. 
 
Enables assessment of why individuals' 
acted or decided to act in a particular 
manner given the circumstances faced. 
Links closely with contextual/ institutional 
components A-D. 
Table 4.2 Interpretive-institutionalist analytical framework components 
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4.4.1 Explaining the interpretive institutionalist analytical framework 
 
This section aims to explain the relationship between the components of the 
framework derived from NI and interpretivism provided in table 4.2 and figure 4.1, 
which shows the interaction between institutional (non shaded area) and ideational 
dimensions (shaded area in figure 4.1). It also aims to explain the advantages of 
combining institutionalist and interpretive components of analysis. It is considered 
that such an approach gives greater potential for providing answers to the thesis’ 
research questions (see chapter 5) given the dynamic political context of 
Venezuela.  
 
Lowndes and Roberts (2013) consider that the three concepts of rules, practices 
and narratives (see below) enable the exploration of where rule breaking or shaping 
occurs, and provides insightful analysis. In order to do this there is a need to study 
power and agency. Power, they argue, can be conferred by formal rules 
(regulation), which empower certain political actors and constrain others. The formal 
rules describe what should happen. On the other hand, looking at practices (rules in 
use) show informal ways of conducting political behaviour. Unlike rules, practices 
are not formal or sanctioned. These are the “way things are done around here”. 
These practices may, over time, shape new rules of the future.  
 
Lowndes and Roberts (2013 pg 46) state ‘institutionalists are agreed that political 
institutions are “the rules of the game”’. Consequently, this is the definition of 
institution adopted in the thesis framework (component A). Yet, Lowndes and 
Roberts also note that institutionalists require further nuance to this concept in order 
to understand what ‘constrains political behaviour and decision-making’ (see also 
Hay’s 2011 ‘opportunities and constraints’). Drawing from Ostrom, scholars have 
drawn a distinction of types of rules into two discrete categories: ‘rules in use’ and 
‘rules in form’ (Lowndes 2005; Lowndes and Roberts 2013).  
 
Components A-C help study of CLPPs and CCs by enabling an analysis of how 
they have been incorporated into a dynamic institutional matrix/ landscape in 
Venezuela (brought about by frequently changing legislation15). As described in 
chapter 2, given the political polarization in Venezuela, CLPPs have not been widely 
implemented despite being stipulated both in the constitution and legislation. This 
                                                
15 CLPPs, introduced in 2002, have had two reforms (2006; 2010) within 8 years; CCs introduced in 
2006 have had one reform within 5 years (2009).  
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indicates that ‘rules in use’ compared with ‘rules in form’ are being played out 
differently in various municipalities in the country. Given that actor relationships may 
occur at multiple levels, within CLPPs and CCs, these concepts are very useful for 
differentiating between how things should work (formally by legislation) and ‘how 
things work around here’ (the informal scripts and norms). As such, the thesis 
framework includes these concepts (table 4.2, components A-C). 
 
Bevir argues that ‘holism’ compares actors’ beliefs and histories to explain actions 
and practices. This becomes apparent when he states that his approach is ‘less on 
formal connections…[and more on] telling stories about beliefs, actors, practices 
and contexts’ (Bevir 2011b pg 190; see also Bevir, Rhodes and Weller 2003). As 
discussed in section 4.3, Bevir and Rhodes enable these ‘stories’ to be uncovered 
by focusing on the components of ‘beliefs’, ‘traditions’, and ‘dilemmas’. These 
components are included in the thesis framework (table 5.2, components D-F). 
These ideational elements (shaded area in figure 4.1) provide the understanding 
that actors are able to conceive and talk about discourses, traditions and practices. 
Actors are also able to see discourses, traditions and practices at a distance and 
disassociate from them. Not only do these components reflect the interpretive 
position but also reflect Hay (2006) and Schmidt’s (2011) plea for the need to 
understand how actors’ ideas and discourses shape and construct institutional 
opportunities and constraints.  
 
The outcome of applying an ethnographic, interpretive approach by eliciting stories 
and narratives from actors within a given context will provide understanding of how 
actors see their relationship with both institutional and ideational contexts which 
have influenced their situated agency. The result of the ‘thick description’ or 
narrative built by ethnography enables an analysis of how practices are understood 
and enacted within a given context. Thus the overall framework indicates that 
institutional factors can influence actors’ ideational components and vice versa. It is 
this bridging between the institutional and interpretive dimensions that Hay’s model 
(and the framework) provides great potential for insight. 
 
Lowndes and Roberts (2013) also argue, drawing from more recent developments 
in institutionalism (constructivist and discursive) that narratives also play their part in 
institutionalism. Narratives are defined as the processes of explanation and 
persuasion that political actors use by embodying values, ideas and power. They 
are considered to be expressed via the spoken word and result in constraining 
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some actors whilst empowering others. Power – an addition to those 
constrained/enabled via rules and practices - is drawn via storytelling and 
narratives; power via narratives and storytelling is dependent on the ‘significance of 
collective understandings in shaping political behaviour’ (ibid pg 98). Constructivist 
institutionalism moves towards ‘narratives’ (Hay 2006; Hay 2011; Lowndes and 
Roberts 2013; Schmidt 2011) which bear resemblance to the ‘thick description’ 
provided by interpretivism. As set out above, it is this important addition to the 
institutionalist toolkit that brings institutionalism closer to the ideational context 
studied by interpretivists and gives greater weight to Hay’s model, because it seeks 
to bring the two theories together.  
 
The components that comprise the framework are considered to reflect the 
convergence in theory between increasingly constructivist approaches of NI and 
interpretivism (Hay 2006; Hay 2011). Both NI and interpretivism seek to link theory 
with practice(s) (Bevir, Rhodes and Weller 2003; Lowndes and Roberts 2013). The 
application of Hay’s (2011) model is considered appropriate and advantageous 
given the dynamic and rapid institutional changes experienced in Venezuela since 
1999. The institutionalist components enable identification of the ‘opportunities and 
constraints’ actors encounter, while the interpretivist components elicit the ideational 
reasoning that actors have undertaken in response to the opportunities and 
constraints within the context they are situated. The framework is suitable in 
highlighting structure and agency, as well as describing and explaining practices 
through the narratives generated from participants involved in CLPP and CC 
processes.  
 
Hay’s model, and the framework, is considered beneficial because it provides scope 
for a number of unique analytical insights. Firstly, as Hay (2011) notes, it allows a 
dialogue between both agential and more structural/ institutional factors regarding 
change, without privileging one over the other. Secondly, it provides institutionalists 
with the potential to understand better the way in which actors assimilate, and react 
to, ideational matters in addition to institutional constraints and opportunities. 
Thirdly, there is scope to move beyond – and between – the individual nature of the 
interpretive position, and the more structural/ collective nature of the institutionalist 
focus of analysis. As a result, the model enables ideas and ‘extra-discursive 
contexts’ to be identified, and subsequently unpacked in a way which provides new 
insights not currently being provided by new institutionalist or interpretivist theories 
alone. 
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While Hay’s model has been useful in creating a dialogue between constructivist 
institutionalism and interpretivism it does have a certain limitation (discussed fully in 
chapter 9). Hay gives little emphasis to the role of traditions, and the way that these 
traditions contribute to explaining the shift between the individual/ ideational and the 
collective/ institutional dimensions. This gap is discussed fully in chapter 9, which 
reflects on how the operationalization of the model and framework presented certain 
challenges in the data analysis. 
 
4.5  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The chapter provided an overview of the key variants of new institutionalism and a 
strand of interpretivism. It established that both NI and interpretivism have useful 
components which can be applied to the Venezuelan context of participatory 
mechanisms at the municipal level in order to evaluate the nature of practices within 
these new arenas. NI underlines rules in use that shape the institutional boundaries 
to be understood. Interpretivism enables actors’ ideational elements to be elicited, 
via the concepts ‘dilemmas’, ‘beliefs’ and ‘traditions’, which enable the researcher to 
establish individuals’ reasons for holding the beliefs the way they do – and in doing 
so understand why actors act in a particular way. 
 
The thesis framework was adopted following Hay’s (2011) premise that an 
institutional analysis combined with elements of the interpretive approach would 
provide a sounder theoretical standpoint and greater insights. The framework 
established in the chapter adopted concepts from Lowndes’ variant of NI and Bevir 
and Rhodes’ strand of interpretivism. It is believed that such a combination of 
components gives a more rounded framework for analysis. The framework is also 
considered to overcome the downsides (namely lack of institutional influence in the 
origin of ‘dilemmas’) of a purely interpretive approach. The linkages between 
agency and opportunities and constraints are not typically incorporated in Bevir and 
Rhodes strand of interpretivism. Participants’ responses can be understood as a 
narrative, which can be analysed using the components of the framework to elicit 
how actors’ beliefs, traditions and dilemmas shaped their subsequent responses to 
institutional constraints and opportunities. 
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CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Previous chapters described that Chavismo initiated a unique process in Venezuela 
which sought to establish a ‘participatory and protagonistic democracy’. The thesis 
aims to elicit the meanings and understandings of participants involved in CLPPs 
and CCs. Chapter 4 established the interpretive institutionalist framework adopted 
in the thesis. Such an approach is considered to elicit the underlying beliefs, norms 
and practices that participants draw on and influence their subsequent actions.  
 
Section 5.2 sets out the ontological and epistemological positions of the framework 
adopted in the thesis. As the interpretive approach is a relatively new addition to 
political science research, the chapter contrasts the differences between the 
adopted framework and the objectivist and positivist terminology commonly referred 
to in traditional research designs. Section 5.3 provides the aims, objectives and 
research questions of the thesis. Section 5.4 describes the selection process of the 
case studies. This includes a sub-section that provides an account of the pilot study 
at the start of the fieldwork period. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 discuss data generation 
and data analysis. Sections 5.7 and 5.8 discuss limitations and ethical 
considerations of the research. The chapter closes with conclusions in section 5.9.  
 
5.2  ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL POSITION 
 
Hay (2002 pg 63) summarises the link between ontology, epistemology and 
methodology as follows: ‘ontology relates to the nature of the social and political 
world. Epistemology to what we can know about it and methodology to how we 
might go about acquiring that knowledge’. On the one hand, positive and objective 
approaches see collected data as mirrors of reality (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 
2012). Such approaches consider knowledge and social phenomena to exist 
independently from social actors. These influence, act upon and inhibit actors’ 
behaviour. Knowledge can be defined and informed by statistics, causal 
relationships or models. On the other hand, interpretivists consider that an 
objectivist ontology, which seeks to provide formal explanations and causation 
through positivist approaches to epistemology, end up only describing snapshots of 
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contingent social actions (see Bevir 2012 pg 636-638). Interpretivist ontological 
approaches consider reality (or realities) to be socially constructed (Bevir and 
Rhodes 2006; Hay 2011; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012). Reality is generated 
and reproduced through shared interpretations by social actors (Blaikie 2010). 
Blaikie (ibid pgs 93-94) describes such an idealist’ ontology considers that ‘reality 
consists of representations that are the creation of the human mind…[and] there 
may be different and multiple perspectives on an external world’. Accordingly, this 
thesis is premised on an ‘idealist’ ontological position, which in turn is underpinned 
by a constructivist epistemology. 
 
Hay (2011 pg 169) summarises the interpretive epistemological position as follows: 
knowledge looks different depending on the perspective the actor/observer looks at 
it. Because knowledge is socially constructed there is no definitive or objective 
knowledge (political or social) to be obtained through research. The social 
construction of knowledge means that any claims are intersubjective. Interpretive 
researchers consider that explanations of social and political phenomena are a 
result of eliciting actors’ intersubjective traditions, beliefs and meanings, which are 
subsequently turned into actions or practices. By uncovering the intersubjective 
traditions and beliefs that actors hold can provide an account of their motivations 
and behaviour. Interpretivists believe that knowledge can only be sought by 
understanding the meanings which inform agents’ actions (Bevir and Rhodes 2006; 
Hay 2011; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012).  
 
Meanings are contingent on context, time and place and are not ‘essential, timeless 
and universal’ (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012 pg 23). Meanings can change over 
time and location because knowledge is situated and contextual. The process of 
making or establishing meanings has no starting point – it begins wherever the 
interpreters’ knowledge or understanding is at that point in time and place. Practices 
that occur as a result of beliefs are contingent and are constructed upon the local 
(ideational not geographical) context, time and place in which actors are situated 
and embedded (Bevir 1999; Hay 2011; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012).  
 
A constructivist approach was chosen because it provides a lens through which 
participants’ intersubjective meanings of CLPPs and CCs can be understood. The 
interpretive institutionalist approach provides a unique contribution to academic 
studies on CLPPs and CCs that have not, to the knowledge of the researcher, been 
used to date. Rather than adopting the objectivist position where data collected are 
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considered a mirror of reality – enabling models or causal explanations – the 
interpretive approach conceives multiple and rival interpretations of events and 
practices (see Bevir and Rhodes 2006 pg 28). Because different neighbourhoods 
(in the case of CCs) or municipalities (in the case of CLPPs) have their own local 
issues and/or practices, the interpretive approach provides a way of eliciting the 
meanings and interpretations that different actors hold within these contingent 
contexts. Comparing rival interpretations and actions, which occurred as a result of 
participants’ individual and collective dilemmas, provides a ‘thick description’ (see 
chapters 7 and 8) of a wide range of beliefs and practices co-existing in a period of 
time and space (Rhodes 2011b). 
 
The interpretive approach enables participants’ to tell the meaning and 
understandings of participatory democracy, citizen participation and their role in 
policy making and decision making at the municipal level in their own words. As 
Rhodes (2011b pgs 6-7) argues this ‘narrative’ are actors’ explanations that result 
from studying their beliefs and desires in the context of the traditions and dilemmas 
they face. 
 
5.3  RESEARCH AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Given the interpretive and constructivist approach to institutionalism adopted in the 
framework, the thesis aims, objectives and research questions are as follows.  
 
5.3.1 Aims of research 
 
To describe and explain, from CLPP and CC participants’ understandings (or ‘webs 
of beliefs) and experiences: 
 The meaning of participatory democracy 
 The role of citizen participation in policymaking and planning 
 How participants see themselves (their agency) within policy making and 
planning processes 
 Whether citizen involvement has changed the process of policy making and 
decision making at the municipal level. 
5.3.2 Objectives of research 
 Identify municipal level governance actors involved in policymaking and 
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planning mechanisms (CLPPs and CCs) 
 Elicit participants’ views, experiences and understandings of the role of 
citizen participation in policy making, planning and decision making within 
CLPPs and CCs by carrying out interviews, non-participant observation, and 
documentary review. 
5.3.3 Research Questions  
 
Based on the aims and objectives, the thesis framework in chapter 4 and the 
ontological and epistemological positions set out in section 5.2, the thesis has been 
built around four research questions: 
 What is the meaning of participatory democracy for CLPP and CC 
participants in Venezuela? 
 What do CLPPs and CCs and their respective processes mean to 
participants? 
 What do CLPP and CC participants do to meet their respective needs/goals 
and preferences?  
 How do CLPP and CC participants understand planning practices and 
processes at the neighbourhood and municipal level? 
 
5.4  CASE STUDY RESEARCH STRATEGY  
 
Yin defines (2003 pg 13) a case study ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’.  
Consequently, following Yin’s definition, we can consider the units of the analysis, 
the CLPPs and CCs, as the real-life phenomena that are the focus of the study. 
Furthermore, the real-life context of the CLPPs and CCs is what is not evident and 
will be elicited according to the accounts provided by CLPP and CC participants. 
Case studies can be either a single case or multiple cases (Yin 2003). The 
appropriateness of whether the research should adopt a single or multiple cases is 
dependent on what the research seeks to achieve. Yin advises that a 
comprehensive strategy will be one that is designed logically by employing data 
collection and analysis techniques responding to the research aims, objectives and 
questions. Consequently, the thesis’ research strategy was designed in accordance 
with the interpretive institutionalist framework. 
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Drawing from Bevir and Rhodes, Hay (2011, figure 1) states that the methodology 
of interpretivism finds out about phenomena by ‘[capturing] the meaning [of] political 
actors[‘] actions and practices…[via] embedded research and an ethnographic 
method…[with an analysis] undertaken inductively rather than deductively’. 
Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012) argue interpretive approaches place focus on 
access to material as a key component of case selection. 
 
Traditional research designs consider reliability, replicability and validity vital 
components of a robust research strategy (Babbie 2007; Bryman 2012; Yin 2003). 
Interpretivists consider these components of mirroring natural sciences (or positivist 
approaches) inappropriate to interpretive approaches (Bevir 1999; Bevir and 
Rhodes 2010; Rhodes 2011b; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012). Interpretive 
research (Bevir 1999; Bevir and Rhodes 2003; 2006; 2010; Rhodes 2011b; 
Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012 pgs 91-113) focuses on ‘meaning-making’ as 
opposed to measurement; contextuality in place of generalizability or replicability of 
knowledge; and explanatory description and narratives versus prediction or 
causality. Consequently interpretive research is abductive, iterative and recursive, 
not deductive (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012). Importantly, interpretive strategy 
involves analysis of the evidence by drawing from hermeneutics, searching for 
coherence in the narratives provided, and logic in argumentation. These are 
evaluated by considering the data are trustworthy, systematic, reflexive and 
transparent with regards to the context in which they were drawn. Interpretivists 
maintain that ‘sense-making’ (see below) is the key element in establishing 
confidence in the data. Furthermore, data are considered to be ‘co-generated’ 
between the researcher and the participant (ibid).  
 
Co-generated data are underpinned by an ethnographic approach. Ethnography is 
considered to be key to eliciting and establishing actors’ meanings (Bevir and 
Rhodes 2006; 2010; Bevir, Rhodes and Weller 2003b; Rhodes 2011b; Schwartz-
Shea and Yanow 2012). Rhodes (2011b) argues that our presence as observers 
and interviewing subjects influence their behaviour, whether consciously or 
unconsciously. Something he argues anthropologists and ethnographers have 
recognised for years. This influence is also recognised by Schwartz-Shea and 
Yanow:  
 
Understanding data to be co-generated means that the character of 
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evidence in an interpretive project cannot be understood as objectively 
mirroring or measuring the world. The researcher is not outside that which is 
under study (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012 pg 80).  
 
As noted above, interpretive approaches ‘make sense’ of phenomena by seeking 
out the logic and coherence of arguments and data. This is done by pointing to the 
consistency of evidence among sources and highlighting where conflicting 
narratives have emerged. Rhodes (2011b) considers that comparing texts (for 
example participants interview responses and documentary review will produce 
something similar to ‘triangulation’. Conflicts are not seen as something to be 
‘resolved’, but rather artefacts to be made sense of (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 
2012). Bevir (2011b) and Rhodes (2011b) consider these artefacts to be presented 
as ‘thick descriptions’ or ‘narratives’. As such, to ensure that the thick descriptions 
obtained are ‘valid’, interpretivists: 
 
Prefer webs of interpretation that are accurate, comprehensive, and 
consistent. Objectivity is, therefore, a product of “local reasoning” in that it 
arises from the critical comparison of narratives within an academic 
community, reconfirmed in debate between communities, where all debates 
are subject to the provisional rules of intellectual honesty. (Rhodes 2011b pg 
14). 
 
In an earlier work, Bevir and Rhodes (2006) state that the objectivity of the 
interpretive researcher comes from our ability to be part of the world in which we are 
researching through which we genuinely act using our perception on a daily basis. 
For this reason they argue: 
we can relate relative objective narratives to truth because our ability to find 
our way around the world vouches for the basic accuracy of our 
perceptions…our ability to act in the world suggests that our knowledge, 
beliefs, and perceptions are not wildly random or wholly unreliable, even if 
they are also not infallible (ibid pg 30).  
In light of the interpretive research approach discussed above, the remainder of this 
section focuses on how and why case locations were chosen; the reason for 
undertaking a pilot study and an account of the experience. This is then followed by 
sections on gaining access to CLPPs and CCs in order to undertake semi-
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ethnographic research embedded within their real-life contexts. Over the course of 
the remaining sections, the ‘logic’ of the case study approach is provided. The 
methods used are discussed in section 5.5. 
 
5.4.1 Case location selection 
 
Although the case locations are discussed in detail in chapter 6, this sub-section 
outlines the process by which the case locations of the units of analysis were 
chosen. In order to identify potential case locations, a systematic internet search 
was undertaken of the 336 Venezuelan municipalities. A number of criteria were 
used to identify the most appropriate municipalities. The search identified the 
municipalities with the existence of: an established CLPP; a municipality website 
where documentary resources could be found (budgets, details of relevant people, 
policies and plans); a local plan, a participatory budget (PB); and details of local 
CCs. As discussed in chapter 2, participatory democracy initiatives should have 
been implemented throughout Venezuela, however, not all local municipalities 
incorporated a CLPP. Municipalities that had not adopted a CLPP were eliminated 
as potential case locations. The results were tabulated in a spreadsheet and a 
shortlist was created giving ten suitable municipalities out of the original 336. On 
further investigation and checking details (whether documents and plans existed 
and were available to the researcher) it was found that seven were potential case 
locations. 
 
The seven municipalities identified through the systematic search were explored in 
further detail by undertaking a background study to establish the socio-political 
status of the municipality. This included identifying the political party that mayors 
belonged to, the political affiliation of the State governor, population, key industries 
and economic activity within the municipality, and whether the municipality was rural 
or urban. Through this process two were considered unfeasible due to being located 
in expensive (island) locations.  
 
In addition to the pilot (Baruta, Miranda – described below), two municipalities were 
chosen: Chacao and Libertador, both within the Caracas metropolitan area. 
Municipio Girardot, Aragua had been identified prior to arriving in the field as a 
potential case location instead of Chacao (which was in the shortlist). However a 
number of factors, explained in more detail below, highlighted Chacao as providing 
greater access than Municipio Giradot.  
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Given the time and financial constraints of a single PhD researcher, using cases 
within two municipalities was considered most feasible. Consequently, the research 
involved ‘multiple’ case studies (Yin 2003). The lack of online information rendered 
impossible to organise contact with CCs prior to the fieldwork period. Contact had to 
be made whilst in the field – a common experience within interpretive research 
(Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012 pg 71). Following this principle of flexibility, the 
case locations were decided whilst in the field. The pilot study was also a key factor 
in determining the final choices of the two municipalities that provided the case 
locations of the research. 
 
5.4.2 Pilot Study – Baruta Miranda 
 
A pilot study was considered during first year of the doctoral research (2012). 
However, two matters arose that meant that the pilot study would be deferred to the 
beginning of fieldwork (2013). The first was the presidential elections held in 
October 2012. It was considered that going to the country in the run-up to the 
elections would be fruitless as getting access to municipal staff, elected officials and 
CC participants (who may or may not be political activists) would be difficult. 
Furthermore, it was considered that going to the country immediately after the 
election may also have been complicated, particularly if there was a change in 
president following the election, as municipalities would be preoccupied with the 
change in government. The second factor that changed the decision was that going 
to the country in November or December 2012 was too close to the beginning of the 
intended fieldwork stage (January 2012/February 2013) and would incur expensive 
costs (flights and accommodation). It was therefore agreed that a pilot study could 
be commenced immediately on going to Venezuela for the fieldwork. This would 
enable testing out methods and refining matters fully before undertaking the core 
research. 
 
Baruta was chosen as the municipality for the pilot study. The municipality is located 
in the State of Miranda but within the metropolitan area of Caracas. It is 
predominantly middle-class with pockets of extreme poverty and of upper-class 
residents. Politically, during the Chávez era the municipality mayors have belonged 
to opposition parties. Nonetheless, the municipality had established a CLPP, 
conformed to legislation regarding participatory mechanisms and had also 
implemented a PB scheme. The municipality website provided a wealth of 
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documents regarding policy and decision making online which helped identify it 
early on as a potential case location. Furthermore, a former CLPP vice-president 
wrote a blog detailing the municipality’s engagement with participatory mechanisms, 
details of which included aspects of the CLPP and local CCs. Contact was made 
with the person and a ‘gatekeeper’ was established. The pilot study was undertaken 
over a six week period between early February to mid-March 2013. 
 
The pilot study provided an adjustment period for getting to know a country that was 
unknown to the researcher other than media, academic journals and other sources 
of information. It provided a number of interesting experiences, including some that 
were unprecedented, such as the death of President Chávez and subsequent state 
mourning and funeral. It also provided first-hand experience of the extreme political 
polarization that existed in the country. 
 
Baruta provided a case where political polarization did not only exist against the 
ruling national party, but also among competing parties of the opposition. This 
polarization affected citizen participation at the municipal level. The CLPP was on 
permanent hiatus due to councillors’ objections to the demise of JPs and political 
‘games’. This occurred despite municipal residents trying to prevent such a hiatus. 
The pilot showed that political differences, particularly the webs of belief that 
influence such ideas, decisions and actions should be explored throughout the 
fieldwork period. Because of the political hiatus, observing meetings of the CLPP 
was not possible.  
 
CCs in Baruta had several problems, particularly registering with the national 
ministry. Many CCs in Baruta were run on an informal and ad-hoc basis. 
Observation was not possible either for any CC meeting during the pilot study 
period. Contacting people in CCs and the community proved to be a time-
consuming task; CC participants preferred being introduced to me by other known 
people so that trust could be established and apprehension appeased, most often 
due to personal safety concerns. Snowballing techniques were required in order to 
establish interviews with CC members. 
 
All of the proposed fieldwork methods (see below) prior to the fieldwork period were 
used, except one: focus groups. Due to limitations on the reach of public transport, 
time, lack of opportunity to observe and meet CCs in groups, organising focus 
groups were not possible. It was envisaged at later stages of the case study 
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research that this method would still be viable and useful. However, on reflection 
with supervisors and thesis reviewer it was considered unlikely that focus groups 
would provide additional insights over and above the other methods of data 
generation. Interviews, on the other hand, provided rich sources of information. 
Observation and documentary review were fundamental in establishing wider 
contextual and background understanding. Despite requesting certain documents 
(CLPP agenda and minutes, draft local plan) the CLPP technical team - Sala 
Técnica (ST) - refused to provide these documents because they were considered 
‘politically sensitive’16. 
 
Because the pilot study showed the time consuming nature of establishing new 
contacts, it was decided appropriate to pursue leads and contacts for other 
municipalities in Caracas. Starting from scratch in another city would have likely led 
to unexploited time which would have been detrimental to the fieldwork research. 
Access to municipalities with functioning CLPPs and CCs, and with an open attitude 
to providing information, was fundamental in choosing the case locations of Chacao 
and Libertador. The following two sections describe how access was gained in 
these two municipalities. 
 
5.4.3 Gaining access to the CLPPs 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, scholars have noted that CLPPs were not fully 
operational or implemented in many municipalities. The pilot study in Baruta, which 
was chosen due to contact with certain members being established before arriving 
in the field, uncovered a CLPP that was at a complete standstill. It was during the 
pilot study experience that CLPP members in Baruta put me in contact with 
Chacao’s CLPP ST and gave me a name of a contact in Libertador’s CLPP. The 
case study locations of Chacao and Libertador emerged through a process of 
systematic analysis prior to the field as well as encountering the ‘reality’ of fieldwork 
such as geographical location, transport constraints and whether CLPPs were 
operating at the time of fieldwork. One of the key differences in being able to gain 
access to Chacao compared to Libertador was the presence of the CLPP’s ST.  
Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012 pg 34) argue that flexibility in the field is key and 
part of the iterative, deductive approach to interpretive research because the 
                                                
16 No further details were provided during the course of the meeting. I was told in the lift afterwards 
that the reason was cross-party conflict regarding a range of political matters; the CLPP hiatus was a 
one of the results of these disagreements.  
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researcher cannot fully anticipate everything in advance. 
 
Like Baruta, Chacao’s ST was located within a small office in the municipal 
government’s modern Atrium building. The orange brickwork of the facade is 
interlaced with green shrubs and plants which hang from the balconies of each 
floor. The municipal government shares the building with the Concejo Municipal 
(municipal legislature), the Italian Consulate and the Caracas Stock Exchange. 
Entrance to the building required registering at the front desk. The desk was usually 
staffed with three people who issued visitor cards that unlocked the turnstiles. Two 
or three security guards closely observed this entrance process.  
 
The initial meeting with Chacao’s CLPP Secretary was positive; I was assured 
access to the CLPP and given an outline of the CLPP’s procedures as set out in the 
municipal by-law. I was invited to attend the monthly plenary meetings and as many 
of the PB meetings as I wished. Overall, I was given a considerable sense of 
transparency and was welcomed to undertake research.  
 
Conversely, establishing initial contact with Libertador’s CLPP was not easy. As 
described in greater detail in chapter 6, the municipality of Libertador is 
considerably larger, more populated and with greater socio-economic disparity than 
Chacao. The telephone number of Libertador CLPP contact that the Baruta CLPP 
participant provided me was no longer working. There was no information on the 
municipal government website about CLPP meetings and scant information about 
councillors.  
 
Libertador’s main municipal buildings are located in the blocks around the historic 
centre of Caracas and Plaza Bolívar. Over the course of two days I spent several 
attempts going from one building to another, one office to another whilst trying to 
convince security guards and police officers my reasons to get access to the 
buildings, particularly the Palacio Municipal (where the mayor’s office was located). 
When I finally made it to the finance department I was told that the CLPP was in 
operation (until this point nobody could confirm the existence of the CLPP). A 
finance officer informed me that the CLPP’s offices were located in Los Símbolos, a 
predominantly residential area, 20 minutes away from the centre of Libertador in the 
metro.  
 
Libertador’s CLPP offices were located in a brown brick, residential building with two 
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commercial units at the ground floor level. Above the door was a banner stating 
“CLPP Libertador”. I arrived late morning and nobody was present. I was informed 
that after 2pm someone would be in the CLPP office. Compared to my experiences 
of Baruta and Chacao, both of which had their CLPP ST in the main headquarters, 
finding the location of Libertador took considerable persistence. This experience 
provided an initial indication of the level of importance the CLPP was given in 
Libertador (see chapter 7 for further discussion). 
 
5.4.4 Gaining access to CCs 
 
Making contact with CCs also required persistence and making use of previous 
contacts, who acted as gatekeepers. In Chacao, the CLPP secretary and ST 
maintained a register of CCs with corresponding contact details. Some CCs were 
contacted by telephone by referring to the register. Other CCs participants’ were 
approached at CLPP meetings and/or the PB meetings. Participants from 14 of 
Chacao’s 22 CCs were interviewed (see full list in appendix 1). Due to the small size 
and the central location of the municipality, which is served well by public transport, 
meeting with CC participants was not problematic. Interviews were held in public 
places or cafes, predominantly in the afternoon or early evening when participants 
finished work.  
 
Libertador, on the other hand, due to its large territorial size and population, had 
around 1500 CCs (MPComunas 2013). Because many of these were located in 
barrios, CCs were generally not accessible without being provided access by a 
gatekeeper. Many CCs met in the evenings so that people who work can 
participate. Violence and organised crime meant that precautions needed to be 
taken to ensure safe access to barrios. Going unaccompanied or uninitiated to 
these areas of the city in the evenings was not recommended. Municipal 
government employees did not enter these areas without being accompanied by 
local residents. Few employees, if any, entered after late afternoon or darkness. 
Following these practices, my access to evening CC meetings in Libertador’s 
barrios was constrained. 
 
Another factor, which limited initial contact with CCs in Libertador, was related to 
CCs being a sub-neighbourhood level organisation. CCs typically do not have any 
association outside of their geographical remit unless contributing to other 
organisations such as comunas. Hence, obtaining knowledge of CCs’ activities as 
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an outsider can be difficult to find out.   
 
Access to CCs in Libertador resulted from snowballing facilitated by establishing 
contact with a municipal government employee. The director of Fundacaracas’ 
barrio development programme (an agency of Libertador municipal government) 
provided contacts where specific projects were being implemented. These projects 
were underpinned by CC involvement. On contacting these project leaders, only 
one in particular was very keen to give me access and enable me to observe the 
programme in which he was involved. As a result, the CCs, and their respective 
participants, that were interviewed in Libertador were only located in barrio La Silsa. 
 
Participants in La Silsa gave me considerable levels of access. I attended meetings, 
observed ST life, chatted with people, and came and went on a relatively free basis. 
There was considerable ethnographic opportunity to observe people in their day-to-
day practices. La Silsa had 12 CCs which were working together to create the 
“Comuna Bolivariana Revolucionaria La Silsa”. As mentioned in chapter 2, 
according to the 2010 national comuna law, each of the CCs in the geographical 
area of the comuna needed to be fully registered with the national ministry to 
become fully formalised. Comunas which were working towards but were not yet 
formally registered were called comunas en construcción. During fieldwork there 
were approximately 44 comunas en construcción in Libertador (Rojas 2013).  
 
The interpretive institutionalist framework adopted in the thesis did not aim to 
provide a ‘representative’ and/or comparative study of CCs. Although the focus of 
the thesis is not a comparative study of CCs, the interviews secured in La Silsa 
provided sufficient data to provide a narrative about how CCs work in a different 
socio-economic, geographical and political context and conditions than those in 
Chacao. Full discussion of participants’ responses about their understanding of CCs 
and corresponding processes is undertaken in chapter 8.  
 
5.5  DATA GENERATION (COLLECTION) 
 
The thesis so far has drawn on four main bodies of theory (democratic theory, 
planning, new institutionalism and interpretivism) in order to provide a contextual 
background and framework of analysis for fieldwork research. Drawing on theory 
has provided an understanding of what to look for in the field, particularly as a 
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means of being able to respond to the research questions and aims of the thesis. 
Although such an approach may appear to be deductive, the research adopted an 
interpretive, abductive approach.  
 
The interpretive approach uses abduction as it considers that the researcher, in line 
with hermeneutics, does not start from scratch and has a certain amount of 
knowledge and a ‘starting point’ from which to engage in the research process. 
Each researcher will have a different starting point and will use an iterative and 
recursive process of experiencing the field and relating it to their prior knowledge (in 
this case, the literature review) of the field. Questions and interpretations of the field 
experienced, with reference to their knowledge, will inform the course of field 
research (Schwartz and Yanow 2012).  
 
Interpretive research is considered an instance where the researcher and 
participants construct and generate knowledge and meaning of the acts, objects 
and language that the research questions initiate (Schwartz and Yanow 2012 pg 78-
79). The researcher’s background and understanding also generates different data 
than another researcher would by virtue of their positionality and rapport. 
 
Methods are important to interpretive research as they are to other forms of social 
science research; however, the modes of conducting particular methods, such as 
interviewing or participant observation, are done with the understanding that the 
researcher holds certain knowledge which will in turn generate contingent and 
context based data. There is a need to ensure that the methods used are 
appropriate and consistent to interpretive research, not the standards and criteria 
applied to other forms of social science (positivist quantitative and positive 
qualitative) research (ibid pg 128). 
 
The methods used in the research - participant observation, interviewing, 
documentary review and maintaining a fieldwork diary - involved working in an 
iterative and recursive manner by analysing data as the fieldwork period progressed 
and responding to findings, collecting further data, and exploring strands of 
research interest. The remainder of this section discusses each of these methods in 
turn.  
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5.5.1 Participant observation 
 
Participant observation, a form of ethnography, is considered a means through 
which a researcher can get involved in the day to day life and activities of a 
community, group or organisation. The level of immersion, usually over an extended 
period of time, allows the researcher to see through the eyes of those they are 
observing (Bryman 2008; Fetterman 2010; Spradley 1980; Rhodes 2011b). Being 
able to adopt such a position enables the researcher to tell an authentic story, 
giving voice to participants in the local context and often relying on verbatim 
quotations to contribute to the “thick descriptions” of phenomena (Fetterman 2010; 
Rhodes 2011b).  
 
Similarly, Spradley (1980 pg 5) articulates the essence of ethnography as a 
‘concern with the meanings of actions and events to the people we seek to 
understand’. Spradley argues that fieldwork ‘involves the disciplined study of what 
the world is like to people who have learned to see, hear, speak, think, and act in 
ways that are different. Rather than studying people, ethnography means learning 
from people’ [original emphasis] (ibid pg 3). The above thick description and 
learning from others complies with the interpretive research approach of eliciting 
meanings that actors have, enabling the local context to be heard. Furthermore, 
Spradley’s description of learning from others reflects the co-generation of data 
between participants and the researcher (see Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012). 
 
Rhodes (2011b) considers ethnographic observation to be an important method, 
which he argues, until recently, has been absent in political science research 
approaches. Provided that the observation is compared and contrasted to other 
sources of information (e.g. interviews and documents) then the data generated can 
increase the researcher’s confidence in its veracity (in a process akin to 
triangulation). 
 
The main focus of the ethnographic approach and participant observation was 
attending and observing CLPP and CC meetings. This enabled me to observe ‘how 
things are done around here’. For example, who participates, how they participate, 
observe whether citizens influence public servants and elected officials in the 
agenda-setting and decision making, observe how matters are taken up and carried 
through within the CC context, and also to observe how people within the CLPP and 
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CC context make decisions. Being present in the field also allowed observation of 
culture and the ways the wider community operated. 
 
To achieve the above, three ethnographic techniques were adopted including 
interviews (discussed below) and participant observation. This was approached in a 
sequential (Spradley 1980) or step-by-step (Fetterman 2010) manner. The 
procedure began with asking general descriptive questions at the start of the 
research period in the field (e.g what are people doing?). These became 
increasingly specific (structural questions) once the research period had gone on for 
a while (a number of weeks or months). The sequential process was undertaken 
with the knowledge that the (interpretive) ethnographic and participant observation 
process is cyclical rather than linear (Spradley 1980; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 
2012). It involved a process where I sought to describe phenomena, not try to “find 
something” (Spradley 1980 pg 26). The cyclical process involved writing a field diary 
which comprised field notes (where possible) during the periods of observation 
(more below). Constant analysis and noting of impressions and thoughts of the field 
note observations were part of a recursive and iterative process which created new 
ethnographic questions leading to more focused observations at the next meeting or 
assembly.  
 
On arrival in the field, observation of ‘Venezuelan culture’ was undertaken. This 
comprised observing people and how they did things, watching and listening to local 
media, attending debates, hearing people chatting in the street and squares, 
chatting with locals, making local friends, reading local newspapers - particularly the 
opinion and letters pages to get a sense of what the topics of the day were and the 
differing opinions made. Making local friends was considerably useful in helping to 
make sense of observations; friends were available to talk through events of the day 
as well as discuss or provide their views of historical events. Following up these 
observations and discussions with documentary review (see below) was a key part 
of the iterative process. 
 
In total, I attended and observed six CLPP plenary meetings in Chacao. In 
Libertador, I attended five CLPP meetings. Additionally, I went to 11 PB meetings 
organised by the CLPP in Chacao. Unfortunately, fieldwork attendance at PB 
meetings in Libertador was not possible because they were held in local 
communities outside of my time in the field (November 2013).  
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As will be discussed in chapter 9, CC meetings in Chacao were infrequent which 
limited observation. However, I attended two events that involved five different CCs 
meeting together to discuss concerns about a future tower development. As noted 
above, CC meetings in La Silsa were held predominantly in the evening and after 
dark. For safety reasons, I was not able to attend. However, I observed eight weekly 
meetings of La Silsa’s comuna en construcción. These meetings involved several 
CC spokespeople who would present their respective CCs’ proposals, projects or 
wider concerns regarding comuna and/or community matters. As such, it was 
possible to ascertain information about La Silsa’s CCs. I also accompanied ST staff 
on site visits and observed other comuna committee meetings. Furthermore I spent 
two to three days per week over a two-month period sitting in the ST office and 
watching and observing how things operated. This enabled informal conversations 
with residents, ST members and municipal government staff providing considerable 
background information.  
 
5.5.2 Fieldwork diary 
 
In accordance with pre-fieldwork planning, a notebook was carried at all times. It is 
considered an important part of the ethnographic and fieldwork experience to 
continue to write down observations and thoughts as they occured to ensure that 
they were not forgotten. Small observations, which seem inconsequential at the 
time, may over the course of the fieldwork period amount to a wealth of 
ethnographic information that can be used to inform the analysis and subsequent 
writing up stages of the thesis (Spradley 1980).  
 
The notebook enabled ideas, observations or overhearing something of interest to 
be jotted down. As such, day to day activities, observations and thoughts were 
frequently noted allowing for reflection later in the day, or at another appropriate 
time. Notes were also made when attending academic events, meetings and 
interviews. Summaries about the setting, the sounds, and the actions of people or 
interviewees were made. Reports about personal feelings about certain 
occurrences were also written down.  
 
Following the day’s events and observations, a fuller description of events and 
observations was written up at the end of the day. This write-up, which formed the 
bulk of the fieldwork diary, allowed for more concrete ideas and strains of thought to 
be described and written down. Linking events and observations to academic 
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literature or the theoretical framework was also undertaken. Given the ‘newness’ to 
the field, the longest entries were made at the start of the fieldwork period. Towards 
the end of the 10 months in the field, observations were made but these were often 
repetitions of previous observations or ideas; as such, entries were much shorter 
indicating connections to previous observations. 
 
5.5.3 Interviews 
 
For many approaches to research, interviews are regarded as one of the most 
important sources of information (Bryman 2008; Rhodes 2011b; Yin 2003). In 
contrast to a quantitative research approach where structured interviews would be 
used, qualitative interviews are often semi-structured where the researcher follows 
their line of enquiry whilst allowing the interviewee to elaborate and follow their own 
course of describing events or phenomena (Yin 2003 pg 89-90). As a result, ‘case 
study interviews are of an open-ended nature, in which you can ask key 
respondents about the facts of a matter as well as their opinions about events’ (Yin 
2003 pg 90). 
 
Although interviews are regarded as an excellent source of verbal reports, they 
have a disadvantage: they are at the mercy of the respondent’s ‘bias, poor recall, 
and poor or inaccurate articulation’ (Yin 2003 pg 92). However, Schwartz-Shea and 
Yanow (2012 pg 41) note that a researcher adopting an objectivist ontological 
position will interview to find out what “really” happened in a particular situation, 
which will be established by interviewing numerous participants to establish the 
validity of the accounts they give. In contrast, a researcher adopting an interpretive 
ontological position will interview with the understanding that the researcher is an 
interpreter of world of multiple, intersubjective social realities (Bevir 2010a; 2011b; 
Bevir and Rhodes 2010; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012). Interviews were used to 
allow participants to provide accounts not in order to determine what they said was 
‘truthful’, but to establish the meaning of phenomena to each person interviewed. 
 
It was considered important to support participants’ verbal accounts with other 
information sources to increase confidence in the data (Bryman 2012; Rhodes 
2011; Yin 2003). Other methods employed in the data generation period (participant 
observation, documentary analysis, fieldwork diary) contributed to establishing 
confidence to participants’ responses.  
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Interviews were conducted using guides that were prepared in advance. These 
outlined key topics that would be covered and were informed by the literature review 
and research questions. The guides provided a framework that allowed the aims 
and research questions of the thesis to be addressed while enabling the respondent 
to reply in a flexible manner. Depending on the interviewee, the order of the guide 
differed; however, efforts were made to ensure that each of the topic areas was 
covered. In general, interviewees were comfortable with the procedure of questions 
and were happy to talk freely. Responses to unplanned questions were also given 
importance. As Kvale (2007 pg 51) describes ‘the semi-structured life-world 
interview seeks to obtain descriptions of the life-world of the interviewee with 
respect to interpreting the meaning of the described phenomenon’.  
 
In total, 68 interviews were carried out, including the pilot study. A full list is provided 
in Appendix 1. Key stakeholders in the CLPP and CC processes were interviewed, 
including councillors, CLPP community members, government officials, and CC 
members. Interviewees were asked at the start of the interview if they minded it 
being recorded; none of the interviewees raised any concern. Although consent 
forms were prepared and taken along to interviews these were considered 
superfluous and none were signed. Similarly, most interviewees did not see 
anonymity as important. However, in the interests of all those involved, this was 
assured and confirmed verbally. Consequently, interviewees in the thesis have 
been assigned a code - and pseudonym if quoted directly in the thesis.  
 
5.5.4 Documentary review 
 
Documentary review is considered in academic literature as an additional key data 
source. It is considered not only a source of collective or individual meanings 
depending on the document, but also serves as a source of information on local 
contexts, history, culture and experiences (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012). 
Documents facilitate contrasting different sources of information and collective 
meanings with individual meanings (Rhodes 2011b; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 
2012). Consequently, any documentary material that outlined descriptions, 
interpretations, understandings or meanings of CLPP and CC processes were of 
use.  
 
During fieldwork, a number of different sources of documentary material were 
consulted. These included local and national government websites and papers, 
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academic and political speeches/events, newspapers, web forums, blogs, books, 
social media and academic articles. Local and national government websites 
typically published relevant legislation and by-laws online. Libertador was the 
exception; the municipal government and CM provided scant information. This had 
to be sourced through persistent liaison with municipal government staff. Review 
and analysis was made of municipal and CC plans, reports, budget documents, and 
meeting agendas and minutes. This provided contextual and background 
information as well as increasing confidence in the information generated from other 
data collection methods. Government documents were consulted frequently 
throughout fieldwork for reference purposes and to consolidate understanding of 
formal versus informal (where applicable) practices of CLPP, CC and other 
municipal processes. 
 
Obtaining copies of municipal documentation was very easy for Chacao; most 
documentation could be found on the municipal government website. This was not 
the case for Libertador; instead the municipal government website focussed on 
providing news reports. Most official documentation (such as budgets, plans and by-
laws) was not published online (or easily available elsewhere). The CLPP 
community members in Libertador helped source copies of Libertador’s municipal 
budget. Similarly, the CLPP’s technical team in Chacao was very helpful in 
providing minutes of CLPP meetings and PB information when requested. 
 
CCs interviewed rarely provided any copies of documentation. The main reasons 
given were that the amount of pages was numerous (for registration purposes) and 
that the participants who held copies of this information were not the same as those 
being interviewed.  
 
Media sources and newspapers were reviewed daily in a systematic manner. 
Relevant articles were stored and recorded in a database. Newspapers, in 
particular, were used to triangulate information that interviewees mentioned during 
interviews. Newspapers such as El Universal (anti-Chavismo) or CiudadCCS (pro-
Chavismo) provided online archives that were used to explore historical events. 
Newspapers also published articles announcing events for the next few days. 
 
Aporrea, a forum and news website written from a pro-government perspective, was 
another useful source used during fieldwork. Pro-government academics published 
articles, often critical, about aspects of government policy and implementation. It 
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was useful for getting detailed analysis about aspects of Chavismo both current and 
historical.  
 
Social media, like elsewhere in the world, was used to disseminate information. 
Many academics, politicians and citizens announced certain or published links to 
information sources and articles via twitter. During the course of fieldwork many 
political and community events were arranged at short notice. Twitter and other 
social media were a vital way of finding out that these events were occurring in a 
timely way. 
 
5.6  DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Given that interpretive research is an abductive, reflexive and recursive process 
there is no clear division between data collection and analysis as with other 
approaches to social research (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012). During the 
course of an investigation the researcher, who has prior knowledge and certain 
expectations, will encounter experiences, personal interpretations, meanings and 
discovery of new knowledge, which informs the course the research will take (ibid). 
Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012 pg 56) state that ‘it is the continuous juxtaposition 
of conceptual formulations with field realities and the requisite flexibility that 
accompanies it that comprise the foundational rhythm of interpretative research’. 
The data generated and subsequent ‘sense-making’ analysis occurs in a circular or 
iterative manner throughout the period of research. 
 
The research methods facilitated the abductive, refexive interpretive approach to 
analysing the data collected. Note taking in a field diary during observations led to 
the making of detailed notes and impressions at a later stage; note taking/making 
and impressions which arose led to exploration of matters that warranted further 
investigation at a later opportunity. Interview responses were compared and 
contrasted with prior knowledge, understandings and meanings established during 
the literature review. Documentary evidence provided a further strand of 
confirmation and confidence in participants’ meanings.  
 
I transcribed 53 of the interviews. A friend, following instructions, transcribed the 
remaining 15. Interviewees’ identities were protected at all times. Transcriptions 
were fully checked and corrections made where needed. Local friends also helped 
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check here any sections of interviews that raised doubts, particularly Venezuelan 
slang. Although transcribing proved to be a lengthy and time-consuming exercise it 
was considered useful as part of the iterative process. Returning to interviews 
allowed full engagement with the material. It assisted identification of patterns and 
points of interest. Checking and making minor corrections to transcriptions was a 
means of ensuring consistency, particularly with informants ‘language’. Interview 
transcriptions were initially coded and analysed using NVivo. Coding was 
undertaken in a systematic manner. Table 5.1 outlines this process.  
 
Stage No. 
 
Stage 
 
Process 
1 
Generating ‘in vivo’ codes; and 
making sense of data: using 
theory based on ‘a priori’ codes in 
Nvivo 
For each interview transcript: 
 
a. Line by line analysis, ‘in vivo’ codes generated.
 
b. A priori codes refined based on reference to 
theory chapters and analytical framework (a priori 
codes); consolidate repeats. 
 
2 Memoing 
Revisit each transcript and create extensive 
memos - building upon the a priori codes, linking 
to literature and research questions. 
 
Export extensive memos into Excel. 
 
3 Creating themes and identify patterns 
Themes based on a priori knowledge (literature), 
analytical framework and research questions to 
sort memos/ codes. Excel used to identify 
characteristics and patterns of memos and codes 
for each theme. These were then sorted and 
collated according to similarity. 
 
Export themes, consolidate and organise memos 
into Word to structure draft case study chapters. 
 
4 
Abstraction of codes leading 
towards/ linking with theory.and 
analytical framework; Writing of 
draft chapters (analysis) 
Synthesising and aiming to answer research 
questions, revisiting the original transcripts, codes 
and themes, especially when new thoughts or 
questions arose. 
Table 5.1 Coding and analysis procedure 
 
The analysis procedure followed a grounded theory method of analysis literature 
(Corbin & Strauss 1990; Saldaña 2013). Stage one, ‘in vivo’, coding produced 262 
codes. Given that this number was too large to be manageable, several visits to 
transcriptions were made where repetitive codes were identified and consolidated 
into a common code. ‘A Priori’ codes derived from the theory chapters (2 and 3), the 
interpretive institutionalist framework (chapter 4) and research questions (above) 
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guided consolidation of ‘in vivo’ codes. Memoing enabled the coding process to 
involved moving iteratively between research questions, literature chapters and data 
generated in the field. The case chapters (7 and 8) were written based on the 
themes and patterns generated via the coding and refinement process. The data 
presented in these chapters were underpinned by the research questions, analysis 
framework and theory outlined in previous chapters.  
 
5.7  LIMITATIONS 
 
While it is considered that the chapter has provided reasoning and justification for 
the case approach, case locations studied and the methods used, it was possible to 
identify three limitations:  
 
 The cases studied were all located in the capital/Metropolitan Area of 
Caracas. Consequently it is acknowledged that undertaking research in rural 
and/or predominantly indigenous regions of the country might generate 
different data.  
 The second limitation related to the number and type of CC participants 
interviewed. CCs can have up to 1000 members; however, given feasibility 
and time constraints of a single researcher, the majority of interviewees were 
CC spokespeople; typically this involved one or two members per CC. It is 
recognised that scope therefore remains for interviewing a wider cross-
section of CC members in future research. 
 As discussed in section 5.4.4, observation of CC meetings was limited. In 
Chacao this was because meetings weren’t happening during fieldwork. In 
La Silsa, the area was considered unsafe in the evenings when CC 
meetings took place. However, observations of comuna assembly and 
committee meetings (which involved CC spokespeople) were considered 
appropriate alternatives. 
Given the ontological and epistemological position of the thesis, it is considered that 
because no generalisations or aggregations were sought between different cases or 
locations the effect these limitations had on the findings were minimal. Furthermore, 
given the social and political polarization in Venezuela combined with serious public 
safety and insecurity problems, the fieldwork was undertaken in the best way 
possible.  
112 
 
 
5.8  ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Ethnographic research involves deciding how much to observe and how much to 
participate in a given situation. The level of researcher participation and observation 
will involve more or less interaction with those being studied. It is acknowledged that 
this will be entirely context dependent (Fetterman 2010; Rhodes 2011; Spradley 
1980; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012). Furthermore, it is acknowledged that the 
rapport that may be developed between researcher and participant may be 
considered friendship and matters discussed in a more frank manner than might 
otherwise be told via other means or if there was less rapport. In these instances, 
care needs to be taken to ensure that the information told can be used – much like 
‘Chatham House Rules’ in the UK where it is accepted practice to cite politicians’ 
discussions but not provide attribution, except where agreed (Rhodes 2011b). 
 
As noted above, Venezuelan interviewees did not seek to formalise interviews more 
than they had to and formal consent forms were not signed. Despite interviewees 
stating that they had no problem being identified, I had decided prior to fieldwork 
that interviewees would be kept anonymous. Interviewees were informed verbally 
that their anonymity would be maintained. As such, the table and any reference to 
interviewees are made using codes and pseudonyms. Rhodes (2011b) adopted a 
similar tactic. Such an approach was considered to be both professional respecting 
those who took the time to be interviewed.  
 
Prior to fieldwork, it was considered that ‘sensitive matters’ such as corruption, 
issues of security or violence (such as gang relations) would be dealt with in a 
confidential manner. It was not envisaged that the research would require specific 
dealings with such activities, but it was considered appropriate to be aware that 
such practices do occur in Venezuela – and may become apparent in the field. 
Within the units of analysis, CLPP and CC processes, no such problems or matters 
occurred. Furthermore, given that certain CCs in La Silsa were based in areas 
where levels of poverty and crime were considerably high it was considered 
important to maintain the anonymity of those involved. 
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5.9  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The chapter provided the research aims and objectives and set them in the context 
of the interpretive institutionalist ontological and epistemological research approach 
adopted in the thesis. The research questions were provided in the context of this 
discussion and were linked to the theoretical and contextual discussions in chapters 
2 to 4. 
 
The chapter subsequently described the case selection process, which explained 
that this was linked to the interpretive approach, and although similar to a case 
study approach, was not to be conflated as the same thing. The pilot study 
experience in Baruta was described and pointed to matters which influenced the 
adoption of the case locations of Chacao and Libertador. These were chosen due to 
access to active CLPPs and CCs, geographical location and the potential for 
researching CLPPs and CCs in municipalities with very different socio-political and 
economic backgrounds (discussed in detail in the next chapter). It was described 
how gatekeepers and snowballing were fundamental in securing access to 
participants in Chacao and Libertador’s CLPPs and CCs respectively.  
 
Discussion of methods, data generation and analysis followed. The final two 
sections described limitations and ethical considerations taken into account, 
respectively. Overall, the chapter explained that the research was undertaken in a 
flexible, abductive, iterative and recursive manner where going back and forth 
between prior knowledge (the literature review and theory) and information 
gathered/ generated in the field. 
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CHAPTER 6 CASE LOCATIONS: LIBERTADOR AND 
CHACAO 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides contextual background of the two municipalities, Chacao and 
Libertador, the locations of the CLPPs and CCs studied in this research. Chacao 
and Libertador are two of the five municipalities that form part of the metropolitan 
area of Caracas (the others being Baruta, El Hatillo and Sucre; see figure 6.1). 
Sections 6.2 and 6.3 provide descriptions of Chacao and Libertador, respectively. 
Each section is sub-divided to depict the geography, demography, and political, 
social and economic characteristics of each municipality.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Metropolitan Area of Caracas and its five constituent municipalities. 
115 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Case location municipalities and points of reference. 
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6.2  CHACAO 
 
6.2.1 Geographical and demographic context 
 
The municipality of Chacao is located in the centre-north of the metropolitan area of 
Caracas. The municipality has a population of 71,411, with a high level of 
development and income equality (relative), according to its human development 
index (0.87; anonymous, 2010) and Gini coefficient (0.18; CORPOCENTRO, 2010; 
IADB, 2003). Chacao is highly urbanized with almost no undeveloped parcels of 
land. The core of the municipality comprises many high rise apartment buildings 
with commercial spaces at street level. The periphery of the municipality, particularly 
the north of the municipality has large houses (quintas) with gardens. 
 
Chacao has five very small barrios or ‘popular sectors’ scattered through the 
municipality. The 2011 Census registered 36 “ranchos” (informal houses made from 
salvaged materials) in the municipality (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 2013). 
The percentage of homes considered “extremely poor” and “poor” are less than 1% 
and 4%, respectively. Conversely, 95% of homes are considered “not poor” 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 2013). In comparison to other neighbouring 
municipalities in the metropolitan area of Caracas (AMC), Chacao’s barrios are 
considered much more developed in terms of services (water, electricity and so on). 
Table 6.1 provides comparison of poverty levels in locations relevant to the thesis. 
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Area Not poor Poor 
Extreme 
Poor 
% Not 
Poor 
% Poor 
% 
Extreme 
Poor 
Libertador/ 
Distrito Capital 904,969 106,562 15,787 88 11 1 
Sucre (parish) 81,592 11,265 1512 86 12 2 
Chacao 20,257 947 46 95 4 0 
Metropolitan 
District 23,730 27,713 5746 88 10 2 
AMC 928,699 134,275 21,533 86 12 2 
Table 6.1 Number and percentage of poor and non poor inhabitants in Caracas17 and 
case study municipalities. Source: INE, 2013 
 
Given Chacao’s location in the centre of the city and with two main arterial roads 
running east/west through the municipality thousands of transport units (cars and 
buses) cross through each day. Additionally, given Chacao’s importance as a 
commercial and business district in the city many people who work in the 
municipality come from other parts of the city or beyond. This causes considerable 
strain on the transport network within the municipality (Graterón, 2013). 
 
6.2.2 Political and administrative context 
 
Chacao was frequently referred to as a ‘model municipality’ by interviewees. 
Compared with other municipalities in Caracas, and other large urban areas in 
Venezuela, Chacao has relatively low crime, high standards of living, high quality 
plazas and a range of popular cultural venues and recreational activities. 
Furthermore, the municipality has in the last ten years implemented a municipal 
health service. The municipal government also strives to be ‘transparent’ (Alcaldía 
de Chacao, 2012a; C001). 
                                                
17Area Metropolitana de Caracas (AMC): the name and government which covers the whole of the city 
of Caracas comprising the five municipalities, Baruta, Chacao, El Hatillo, Libertador and Sucre. The 
AMC’s elected mayor is Antonio Ledezma, who is politically opposed to Chavismo. Since the creation 
of Gobierno del Distrito Capital in 2009, the AMC has had serious cutbacks in its competencies and 
budget following a reform of its corresponding law. Distrito Capital: same geographical area as 
Libertador; shorthand for referring to the area governed by Gobierno de Distrito Capital. Distrito Capital 
is its own federal entity and does not belong to a federal state. 
Distrito Municipal: describes the four municipalities (Baruta, Chacao, El Hatillo and Sucre) of the 
metropolitan area of Caracas (AMC) without including Libertador or Distrito Capital. Distrito Municipal 
and its four constituent municipalities belong to the State of Miranda. Gobierno del Distrito Capital 
(GDC): a governing body created by the National Executive in 2009 covering the geographical area of 
Distrito Capital/ Libertador. The National Executive appoints the director and is therefore not 
democratically elected 
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Like Baruta (pilot study municipality), Chacao’s political persuasion is one of 
‘opposition’. The opposition in Venezuela is complex and at the time of writing 
consisted of a union of many different parties, including some that were previously 
aligned to national government, known as the Mesa de la Unidad Democrática 
(MUD). MUD is a relatively recent addition to the Venezuelan political landscape, 
comprising 17 political parties18. Its main purpose has been to provide a counter to 
the PSUV and other aligned parties which have a network known as the Comando 
de Campaña Carabobo (CCC) where other pro-government political parties support 
Chavista candidates in elections. 
 
A considerable proportion of Chacao’s citizens have consistently voted for non-
government aligned parties (>80%; CNE, 2013). There are of course exceptions, 
particularly in the lower income neighbourhoods, but these, unlike other areas of 
Caracas, are more diverse in their political affiliations (C001; C004; C010).  
 
The mayor of Chacao (during fieldwork), Emilio Graterón, belongs to a currently 
small, but growing, political party, Voluntad Popular (VP). The party is very new, 
only becoming a full political party in 2011. VP is a splinter political party created by 
former members of one of the key political parties of Venezuela’s opposition, 
Primero Justicia (PJ).  
 
The former mayor of Chacao (2000-2008), Leopoldo López, started VP as an 
activist organisation for values which he considered important to continue in the 
national political context. These are wide ranging but are underpinned by a centrist, 
progressivist political stance. It advocates economic “pragmatism” (but unspecified), 
as opposed to the economic measures taken by the national government (Voluntad 
Popular 2013). It also advocates citizen participation but is unspecific at the time of 
writing what this entails (ibid).  
 
Chacao provides a unique example in Venezuela of a municipality which has 
implemented the full range of participatory mechanisms implemented by the 
national government, and also has a history of continuity of these processes. 
Chacao has a culture of experimentation and seeks to learn from previous years’ 
experiences and expand upon them (C001). 
                                                
18 http://www.unidadvenezuela.org/ 
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Chacao received international notoriety for its mayor, Irene Sáez, in the 1990s as 
she was a former Miss Universe participant. Notwithstanding this anecdotal point, 
Sáez was a popular mayor and re-elected for a second term. She later ran for 
president in 1998, but lost to Hugo Chávez. Sáez was considered to have 
implemented a number of well regarded policies and organisations within the 
municipality. The most notable is the municipal police force. Interviewees noted that 
Chacao’s municipal police force is considered to be highly functional, polite and 
responsive with extended training in conflict resolution and ways of dealing with the 
public (C001; C002; C006; C012). 
 
During fieldwork, five of Chacao’s seven councillors belonged to opposition parties. 
The remaining two were independent and from PSUV, respectively. As described in 
chapter 2, councillors form the legislative branch of the municipality responsible for 
developing and approving local by-laws (often local interpretations of national laws). 
During fieldwork, councillors met twice a week (Tuesdays and Thursdays) in the 
municipal legislature (CM). 
 
6.2.3 Social context 
 
Chacao has a highly active civil society. As of October 2012, 119 organisations 
were registered with the municipality. Of these, 27 were CCs. The other 
organisations were predominantly related to cultural, recreation and sporting 
activities.  
 
Observation in the municipality showed that on weekday nights the main squares of 
the municipality turned into large congregations of people who wished to undertake 
sporting activities (cyclists, running, aerobics or yoga). Citizens described that the 
people who met to take part were local citizens; meetings were not organised by the 
municipal government and responded to the will of local citizens to participate in 
these activities (informal conversations with local residents, 2013).  
 
Chacao inhabitants are typically well educated. The percentage of tertiary educated 
inhabitants is 65%, above the AMC average (48%) [see table 6.2 below] and 
Venezuela (48%; INE, 2013). 
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Area 
3-6 yrs 
(no.) 
7-12 yrs 
(no.) 
13-17 
yrs 
(no.) 
18-24 
yrs 
(no.) 
3-6 
yrs 
(%) 
7-12 
yrs 
(%) 
13-17 
yrs 
(%) 
18-24 
yrs 
(%) 
Libertador 85,622 159,290 125,130 10,9411 75 96 85 45 
Sucre 16,233 30,812 23,847 17,787 74 95 84 39 
Chacao 1385 2763 2438 3894 71 94 92 65 
Distrito 
Metropolitano 38,841 7,3094 55,184 52,203 70 94 85 49 
Area Metropolitano  124,463 232,384 180,314 161,614 74 95 86 48 
Table 6.2 Educational attendance numbers and percentage in Caracas and case study 
municipalities. Source: INE, 2013  
 
The municipality invests 5% of its budget in Cultura Chacao, 7% in Salud Chacao 
(local health service) and 5% in “welfare”. The welfare budget include programmes 
for the homeless, older people, extracurricular activities for schools and social 
services (Alcaldía de Chacao, 2013a). Salud Chacao provides free primary 
healthcare to all local residents (following registration); it also provides ambulance 
and paramedic services. Budget expenditure contributes to the operational costs of 
the various health centres; equipment and community education outreach 
programmes (Alcaldía de Chacao, 2013a; b). 
 
Another social programme that has generated considerable support from the 
community and municipality is Techo Chacao. This aims to provide a three-step 
programme to get homeless people off the streets by providing them with access to 
hostels, psychological treatment and skills to obtain employment through 
volunteering initiatives with the municipality and local businesses (C001; Techo 
Chacao director speech, observation 2013). The success of the programme led to 
its expansion into the neighbouring municipality of Baruta. 
 
During the López administration the Municipal Theatre and Cultural Centre were 
inaugurated. One interviewee (C007) demonstrated concern that the director of 
Cultura Chacao is López’s sister implying that there was a level of nepotism 
occurring during these years. Nothwithstanding these concerns, CLPP ST staff 
(C001; C002) argued that the wide range of programmes and events that Cultura 
Chacao provided was unprecedented in most of Venezuela. 
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6.2.4 Economic context 
 
Several multi-national corporations’ headquarters, as well as a number of shopping 
centres - including the largest (reputedly) in South America (Sambil) – are located in 
Chacao. The municipality benefits considerably from revenues generated from local 
taxes accrued from the private sector. The revenues generated provide over 80% of 
the municipality’s income (Alcaldía de Chacao 2013a; b). Under 3% of the 
municipality budget comes from national government - which is provided on a per 
capita basis19 (Alcaldía de Chacao 2013b; LOPPM 2010). The remainder of income 
comes from local taxes on property, vehicle registration, licenses and investment 
interest (Alcaldía de Chacao 2013b; LOPPM 2010). 
 
Given Chacao’s unique situation – small resident population, high income and 
subsequent high per capita spending potential – the municipality has little economic 
dependence on national government. This unique position has generated criticism 
from pro-government commentators. One such commentator argued that 
inhabitants of Chacao benefit from business taxes, despite considerable proportions 
of the local revenue being generated in businesses whose employees live outside 
Chacao (Rojas D’Onofrio, 2009). 
 
Unlike other large cities and metropolises, there is no governing body for the entire 
city of Caracas. Until national government made reforms in 2009, the AMC did have 
certain level of competencies in this regard. The AMC receives 9% of municipal 
budgets from the five municipalities in the city (AMC001). However, national 
government implemented a mechanism provided in the constitution which enables 
the President to appoint a head of government for ‘Caracas’. As such, national 
government re-established the Gobierno del Distrito Capital (GDC) which occupies 
the same territory of the municipality of Libertador. It does not extend to the other 
four municipalities which comprise the AMC. At the same time as creating the GDC 
several competencies of the AMC were withdrawn by national government. 
Nonetheless, even prior to the 2009 reforms, there were no governing bodies able 
to redistribute taxation generated by municipalities like Baruta and Chacao to areas 
with greater need for basic infrastructure and services (Sucre and Libertador).  
 
                                                
19 The composition of municipal budgets are stipulated in the Local Administration Law (LOPPM, 
2010) 
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6.3  LIBERTADOR 
 
6.3.1 Geographical and demographic context 
 
Libertador is the largest municipality in the AMC, in terms of both population and 
territory. The municipality has a population of 1,943,901 (INE, 2013). The 
geographical area of the municipality covers half of the AMC; and in terms of its 
population it comprises 67% of the AMC. As shown in figures 6.1 and 6.2, 
Libertador is located in the western half of the AMC. Because of its large size, 
geographical locations of the municipality make reference to its parishes, of which 
there are 23. To put this number into context, the AMC has a total of 32 parishes 
(Chacao has only one, Baruta, the pilot study, three). 11 of Libertador’s 23 parishes 
have larger populations than Chacao. 
 
Libertador is characterised by its informal settlements, barrios, which form the 
majority of the municipality. The “centre” of Libertador is its administrative and 
commercial hub. It is surrounded by urbanizaciones which are developed, as 
opposed to informal settlements. They range from lower working class to upper-
middle class households. Census statistics show that approximately 60% of 
Libertador’s residents live in barrios compared with 3% in Baruta and less than 1% 
in Chacao (INE, 2013). 
 
Because of the geographical size of Libertador, my fieldwork for CCs focused on a 
barrio called La Silsa. As opposed to Chacao where CCs covered the entire 
municipality, those in Libertador were located only within La Silsa. The barrio had 
an approximate population of 14,000 (Posani 2012). It is located near to the sub-
centre of Catia in the parish of Sucre (see figure 7.2), one of the 23 parishes in 
Libertador. Sucre has the largest population of all parishes. 
  
6.3.2 Political and administrative context 
 
Libertador is renowned in Venezuela for its reputation as a Chavista stronghold. 
During fieldwork, Mayor Jorge Rodríguez (2008- ) was a key figure in the PSUV and 
national politics. Rodríguez was head of the April 2013 presidential election 
campaign for the PSUV. The previous mayor (2000-2008), Freddy Bernal, was also 
Chavista (MVR/PSUV). During fieldwork 11 of Libertador’s 13 councillors belonged 
to the PSUV. Hence, the CM had little problem implementing municipal by-laws in 
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line with national government policies or laws. Given Libertador’s support for 
Chavismo, observation during fieldwork showed that the municipality was often 
seen and referred to in pro-Chavista media as a hotbed of experimentation and a 
key part of the “process” in developing, and moving towards, “21st Century 
Socialism” (L001). 
 
The political landscape in the geographical area covering Libertador is complex. As 
noted in the previous section, confusingly, Libertador is also referred to as 
“Caracas” for historical and, more recent, political reasons. The political discourse of 
Libertador and GDC, also help to perpetuate and sustain political support at national 
level from a citizenry and organised community which actively seek to support the 
Bolivarian revolution. This political discourse and support is not as prevalent in the 
other four municipalities in Distrito Metropolitano or at mayoral level in the AMC (see 
fn17). During fieldwork, plans and actions deriving from the AMC were rare due to 
many of its competencies being taken away in 2009. Many actions implemented by 
the AMC were often derided or rejected by Libertador, the GDC or national 
government (AMC planning department 2013; AMC001). 
 
The complexity of political and geographical demarcations of Caracas show not only 
political differences, but also myriad approaches to social and political processes. 
Libertador is overtly Chavista, pro-national government and pro-Bolivarian 
revolution; the other four municipalities (Baruta, Chacao, El Hatillo and Sucre) were 
happy to work together as part of the AMC, with varying degrees of opposition or 
affiliation to national government.  
 
In addition to the municipal budget, the LA’s planning department, in conjunction 
with Fundacaracas and the GDC, created “Plan Socialista Caracas”. The plan 
aimed to consolidate efforts of a number of initiatives and programmes created in 
Libertador into a coordinated ‘political’ plan (Fundacaracas 2013a; b). The plan had 
four key themes of action: Integral Barrio Transformation (TIB); small public works 
groups (cayapas socialistas) that, for example, can undertake repairs or implement 
water pipes, stairs or walkways; barrio rehabilitation; and “new socialist 
communities” that focus on the development of social housing (ibid; L003).  
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6.3.3 Social context 
 
The majority of Libertador’s citizens are working class. A majority of citizens live in 
precarious physical and social conditions. Most middle class citizens live in the 
north-east of the municipality. Libertador inhabitants have a much lower proportion 
of young adults in tertiary education; only 45% attend in Libertador compared with 
65% of young adults in Chacao (INE 2013). Libertador’s percentage of inhabitants 
attending tertiary education is also lower than the AMC and Venezuelan averages, 
as shown in table 6.2. Educational attendance at secondary level is also slightly 
below city-wide averages, 85% compared to 86% (ibid); Chacao’s attendance at 
secondary level is 92% (ibid). Table 6.2 shows attendance is much lower in Sucre 
parish where La Silsa, and many other barrios, are located. 
 
Libertador has invested heavily, over the course of Rodríguez’s mayoralty, in a 
number of initiatives to improve the cultural and social quality of the municipality. 
Considerable effort has gone into improving public squares, creating boulevards 
and pedestrian areas, as well as providing children’s play areas (Alcaldía de 
Libertador 2013; Lugo 2013a; b). Libertador hosted an international book fair, a 
theatre festival, film festivals and a number of free concerts with Venezuelan and 
international acts. 
 
Following electoral victory in April, 2013, President Maduro began a tour of the 
country speaking to organisations and citizens in what was called Gobierno de calle 
(street government). The objective was to hear directly from communities about 
what wasn’t being dealt with in each of the states and cities visited. Solutions 
(policies and programmes) would be drawn up shortly after (or on occasions on the 
spot) (Fiaschi 2013; observation 2013). Libertador, including La Silsa, received a 
visit from the Mayor, and later from the president, as part of this initiative. As a 
result, the efforts of La Silsa’s comuna were recognised and extra funding was 
offered from both Libertador municipality and national government (Arteaga 2013; 
Cantillo 2013; Lugo 2013b). La Silsa was apportioned 58 million Bolívares Fuertes 
(USD 9.2 million) to fund 12 key projects, including social housing, infrastructure 
improvement, and support for local businesses (Cantillo 2013; L001). Libertador 
also agreed to extend the “Bulevar Catia”, one of the municipality’s emblematic 
public realm improvements, so that the main thoroughfare from the centre of Catia 
would be connected to La Silsa. A new plaza was also proposed (López 2013; 
L003).  
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6.3.4 Economic context 
 
Libertador’s “centre” is the financial, administrative and commercial hub of 
Venezuela. Most of the national government ministries are located in Libertador. A 
number of international banks and corporations are also located in the centre. There 
are also a couple of shopping centres containing international brands. As such, the 
municipality benefits from business taxation like Chacao, but given its extensive 
population the municipality has less per capita spending capability than Chacao or 
Baruta. Libertador has a number of thriving centres with smaller shops and 
extensive working-class markets.  
 
La Silsa is located on the periphery of two-sub centres within the parish of Sucre. 
Catia has numerous small businesses and markets; Propatria, to the west of La 
Silsa, has a medium sized shopping centre. There are very few services within La 
Silsa itself other than small convenience shops that local residents operate. As part 
of the emerging comuna La Silsa’s CCs are trying to develop community-owned 
businesses that will contribute to the comuna’s finances. These are promoted by 
national government’s initiatives and are referred to in national plans and legislation 
as Empresas de Propiedad Social (EPS), community owned businesses. At the time 
of fieldwork, La Silsa’s comuna en construcción had EPSs comprised of shoe 
making; brick making, carpentry, ironmongery and a communal cafe/restaurant 
(Cantillo 2013; Echavarría Quiñones 2013).  
 
6.4  CONCLUSIONS 
This short chapter has provided contextual information on the diverse differences 
between Chacao and Libertador, particularly with reference to their respective 
territorial size, geography, and political, social and economic contexts.  
 
The municipality of Chacao is considerably small in both territorial size and 
population (70,000), but it is wealthy due to high municipal revenues as a result of 
the high number of businesses and corporations. Municipal revenue has enabled 
successive mayoral administrations implement social programmes (such as health 
centres and helping the homeless), improve public realm and cultural centres, 
independently of the budget national government transfers which amount to just 3% 
of overall municipal revenue. The municipality is predominantly middle and upper 
middle class with very small pockets of informal settlements and poverty. 
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The municipality of Libertador, on the other hand, is a very large municipality, with a 
large population of approximately 1.9 million residents. It also has a majority of 
residents living in barrios. As a result of the population size and high number of 
informal settlements municipal government has historically much less per capita 
spending power than Chacao. Basic infrastructure needs are greater in barrios, as 
are the levels of poverty. 
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CHAPTER 7 CLPPS 
 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, CLPPs were introduced as a mechanism for municipal 
planning emerging in the 1999 constitution. CLPPs were enacted in national law in 
2002 with reforms in 2006 and 2010. Each CLPP comprises the mayor, local 
councillors and community members, elected from community organisations. CLPP 
reforms have principally altered the definition and composition of community 
members in accordance with other mechanisms that have emerged over time such 
as CCs and comunas. Another fundamental change in the latest reform was the 
removal of members of the Parish Councils from the CLPP following the dissolution 
of JPs in 2010. The latter were intended to be replaced with Communal Parish 
Councils (JPCs). To date JPCs have been adopted with mixed success across and 
within municipalities. This change caused considerable upheaval in the composition 
of CLPPs and how participants within CLPPs saw their agency and acted as a 
result. This will be explored in more detail in this chapter. Unless specified, 
reference within the chapter to the CLPP’s roles, responsibilities and composition 
follow the 2010 reform, which was the current law during fieldwork (2013).  
 
To recap, CLPPs are responsible for designing the ‘municipal development plan’ 
(PMD), as well as other municipal level plans, “programmes” or “actions”. PMDs 
should adhere to the National Economic and Social Development Plan. At the time 
of fieldwork this was the 2007-2013 plan (MINCI 2008), but has subsequently been 
superseded by the 2013-2019 plan (MINCI 2013). PMDs should ensure citizen 
participation in their ‘formulation, execution, monitoring, evaluation and control’ (ibid, 
article 2). The law emphasises that the PMD should link with CCs’ and comunas’ 
plans. In doing so, CLPPs should promote identification of community needs, 
deficits, potentials and aspirations within the municipality. Using a participatory 
budgeting (PB), plans or projects emerge to be submitted later to the Consejo 
Federal de Gobierno (CFG), which will then transfer funds where appropriate. At the 
municipal level, CLPPs can approve internal budget allocations and provide opinion 
for the municipal government’s annual budget (POA).  
 
The chapter follows Bevir and Rhodes’ (2003; 2006; 2010) position that participants 
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can be understood as situated actors (community members and councillors) 
confronting ‘dilemmas’ (ideas being conflicted by encountering new evidence or 
practices) which are underpinned by each individual’s ‘traditions’ (ideas, organised 
in ‘webs of belief’, which provide historical and social frames of reference). As 
discussed in chapter 4, focus will also be placed on institutional factors (‘rules in 
use’ and ‘rules in form’) providing an approach which goes beyond the interpretive 
analysis. The framework (table 4.2) enabled the analysis of the differences in views, 
understandings and situated agency of councillors and community members within 
the CLPPs studied.  
 
Section 7.2 describes the general historical context of CLPPs and points towards 
the traditions behind the creation of the CLPP initiative as a mechanism for 
participation. Section 7.3 describes each of the key members of the CLPPs in 
Chacao and Libertador. Section 7.4 uses the concept of dilemma to describe three 
key factors that shaped the way the CLPP worked. The section highlights that 
dilemmas were generated from: 1. the 2010 reforms and the need to substitute JP 
with JPC members; 2. electoral processes and/or lack of elections; and, 3. the roles 
and remit that respective members within CLPPs held about themselves and other 
participants. Section 7.5 reflects on how the dilemmas and traditions shaped the 
beliefs that participants had about the CLPP and its processes. Conclusions to the 
chapter are provided in section 7.6.  
 
7.2  TRADITIONS AND THE CLPP 
 
This section seeks to look at CLPPs, as a local government reform mechanism, 
using the concept of ‘tradition’. As discussed in chapter 4, ‘traditions’ are one of 
three concepts used by interpretive scholars in order to understand actors’ agency 
situated within contingent contexts (Bevir and Rhodes 2003; 2006). Hay (2011 pg 
170) described traditions as actors’ locus of ideas and meanings (at that given time) 
that provides guidance and a way of ‘making sense’ of the experiences that they 
encounter in the world. Traditions are considered to be ‘starting points’ from where 
actors’ will first draw upon to provide meaning and understand these contexts. 
Traditions are not inevitable but an ‘initial influence on people’ (Bevir 2004 pg 618). 
To provide indication of how this concept can be applied to the study of CLPPs, I 
rely on Bevir’s (2010 pg 122) argument that ‘we may understand… reforms better if 
we identify the historical traditions that have inspired them’. In order to establish the 
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root of actors’ beliefs and dilemmas, discussed below, this section provides a 
summary of the origin of CLPPs, drawing from chapter 2, and how it is embedded 
within political and government traditions in Venezuela.  
 
While reforms in the late 1980s increased direct elections for political 
representatives (governors, mayors and JP representatives), citizens had little 
influence over public policy (Lander 2005). JPs were seen to be a sub-municipal 
level entity that would foster citizen participation. Nonetheless, as seen in chapter 2, 
economic and political problems culminated in social unrest. Citizens voted for Hugo 
Chávez in 1998 because they sought to break away from the two party system and 
neoliberal economic policies in order to seek for some form of alternative. 
 
The 1999 constitution established that, in addition to the existing government 
arrangements (federal republic), CLPPs would be introduced at the municipal level, 
incorporating citizen participation into municipal planning. It is unclear why 
Chavismo specifically sought to introduce such a new mechanism into the 
constitution, as opposed to introducing it via legislation which was required in any 
case. According to a manual produced by the then Ministry of Planning and 
Development, Chavismo incorporated CLPPs into the new constitution, as a 
demonstration of reducing the deficit of poor citizen engagement from previous 
government programmes and away from the political system that had been 
established in 1961 (Ministerio de Planificación y Desarrollo 2002 pgs 8-9).  
 
Two interrelated strands of traditions became apparent in participants’ interview 
responses. Inserting the CLPP concept into the existing political and municipal 
governmental structure prompted institutional change. The second strand reflects 
participants’ own political views. Chavismo, once in power, sought to bring people 
further into these new government arrangements via additional reforms (Popular 
Power laws) to encourage participation and change state-civil society relations. At 
the time of fieldwork, Chavismo had been in national government for almost 15 
years, and had become increasingly radical in its move towards “socialism”. Thus, 
my research focused on participants’ views as a way to elicit political traditions. 
These were grounded in whether they were in favour or against the ideology, 
rhetoric and discourse of Chavismo. 
 
Chapter 2 also described that CLPPs had a mixed experience in how they were 
adopted; not all municipalities implemented one. One of the key reasons is that 
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elected political representatives saw the CLPP as an encroachment on their role in 
existing municipal level institutions (Wilpert 2007). During fieldwork, interviewees 
identified that it was the 2010 reforms and new Popular Power laws that caused 
problems within CLPPs. As discussed below, the 2010 CLPP and ‘Popular Power’ 
reforms raised issues regarding what was a valid structure of government and what 
constituted valid and legitimate representation. 
 
Unlike political representatives, community members did not have a precedent 
within an institutional tradition. Prior to the CLPP, other than becoming a political 
representative within the JP or CM, there was no formal incorporation of community 
members in municipal-level councils. Some community members, in both Chacao 
and Libertador, demonstrated affiliation or activism for political parties. Several 
community members in Chacao supported VP, the same political party as the Mayor 
of Chacao. In Libertador, community members were openly supportive of the PSUV.  
 
Both mayors and councillors are designated in the constitution as elected 
representatives within the federal structure of government. The figures of mayor and 
councillors are therefore a part of the conceptual apparatus of Venezuela’s 
representative democracy. More widely, representative democracy can be 
understood as a tradition within modern government that emerged in the 
Enlightenment and persists as the dominant form of democracy, including Latin 
America (De Sousa Santos 2005; Held 1996; Macpherson 1977; Manin 1997; 
Pateman 1970).  
 
Rhodes (2011b pg 4), referring to government elites in the UK, stated that a 
‘tradition is a set of understandings someone receives during socialization. So, a 
governmental tradition is a set of inherited beliefs and practices about the 
institutions and history of government’. Rhodes refers to how those who take 
government positions will be trained by some form of permanent staff member 
about their political role (showing ‘how things are done around here’), in addition to 
the formal remit and role set out in written rules and legislation. Councillors in 
Chacao and Libertador demonstrated having a clear idea of what their role as an 
elected political representative entailed. Councillors defined and demarcated 
hierarchical priorities within their remit: the CM came first and the CLPP was of 
lesser importance (C020; C025; C026; L025; L026; L027). Interviews with CM 
permanent staff members indicated this too (L023; L024).  
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Unlike councillors, community members had no tradition to fall on. The role of 
community members created by the CLPP was new. The implications of the 
demarcation of institutional definitions and remit between political elected 
representatives and community members in the CLPP will become apparent in later 
sections. The way in which these respective members of the CLPP saw and 
understood one another’s roles in the CLPP generated dilemmas. 
 
7.3  SETTING THE SCENE: CLPP MEMBERS IN CHACAO AND 
LIBERTADOR 
 
This section aims to provide a description of the composition of those involved in 
the CLPPs in Chacao and Libertador, derived from interviews and observation. This 
is compared and contrasted with the formal composition and legal definitions set out 
in the relevant laws and bylaws to unpack the differences, if any, of how the two 
CLPPs operate in practice (potentially showing informal rules) compared with the 
formal rules. The section aims to identify the institutionalist components of the 
framework established in table 4.2. Section 7.4 discuss the beliefs and dilemmas 
(the interpretive components) in more depth.  
 
7.3.1 Mayors 
 
Mayors in both Chacao and Libertador had very little direct involvement, despite 
being identified in law as presidents of the CLPP. During fieldwork, Chacao’s Mayor 
Graterón attended two extraordinary meetings. The first of which was organised to 
present the findings from the PB process held in July 2013. The second, which was 
convened at just 24 hours notice, was for the municipal government (and CLPP) to 
present the municipal urban development plan (PDUL) to the CM. In the case of 
Libertador, Mayor Rodríguez did not attend any of the CLPP’s meetings during the 
fieldwork period. Furthermore, CLPP participants, both community members and 
councillors, noted that the mayor had virtually no involvement. Based on findings, 
later discussed, it was not the mayors’ direct involvement in the CLPP process, but 
mayors’ absence that had negative implications. 
 
Previous mayors were responsible in both Chacao and Libertador for implementing 
the CLPP in their respective municipalities. In Chacao, Leopoldo López installed the 
first CLPP in 2006 (Chacao 2007). Similarly, in Libertador, Freddy Bernal was 
identified as being key to setting up the CLPP in Libertador in 2004 (L001; L021).  
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7.3.2 Councillors 
 
Like mayors, councillors in office are automatic members of the CLPP. As described 
in chapter 2, councillors in Venezuela are elected on four year terms. During 
fieldwork the councillors in both cases (as well as the rest of the country) had been 
in office for almost eight. National or state level elections and referenda postponed 
municipal level councillor elections for four years. The National Electoral Council 
(CNE) provided extensions to councillors’ terms. Their extended period in office 
caused some friction for participants, such as mayors and community CLPP 
members in Chacao, elected in the interim period. Dilemmas arose regarding CLPP 
member legitimacy, which were brought about by questions over elections and 
electoral processes (or lack of). Observation during fieldwork showed the two 
dilemmas outlined above (questions about elections and lack of attendance) had 
serious implications for the operation of the CLPPs and their capacity to fulfil the 
roles and responsibilities set out in the national law. Councillors – present or absent 
- played a key role in how the CLPPs in Chacao and Libertador operated in the way 
that they did.  
 
7.3.3 Community members 
 
Libertador’s community members were elected in the autumn of 2005; community 
member re-election was long overdue at the time of fieldwork (community members 
serve two-year terms and are re-electable). Libertador had around 15 tenacious 
community members (approximately 20% of the total CLPP membership) that 
continued to attend the monthly plenary meetings and make the CLPP work. These 
members were generally retired or had the time and availability to contribute to the 
CLPP. All those I observed and interviewed during fieldwork were self-declared 
supporters of Chavismo.  
 
CLPPs have the ability to create the figure of a 'vice-president', a person from the 
community section of the CLPP, who will act as president when the mayor (the 
automatic president) is not available. The CLPP in Libertador did not designate a 
vice president. The secretarial role in the CLPP in Libertador was one of four 
‘working groups’ (committees). However, the four working groups did not really 
operate at the time of fieldwork.  
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Chacao’s community members had all been elected in 2011 (some re-elected) and 
were coming to the end of their two-year term. Though there were no elections 
programmed, they were expected to be held after the December 2013 municipal 
elections (for mayors and councillors) (C001). Politically, the community members 
supported opposition parties; several of the members were aligned to VP (C001; 
C005; C012; C022). This included the vice-president, who was the JPC 
representative in Chacao. Those that were interviewed were professionals or small 
business owners; none of whom were retired but each had the flexibility in their 
workplaces required to dedicate time to their CLPP responsibilities. 
 
7.3.4 CLPP Secretary  
 
The national law requires municipal governments to appoint a CLPP secretary, a 
role that involves co-ordinating the general administration of the CLPP by informing 
members of meetings, ensuring quorum at plenary meetings, producing minutes of 
CLPP meetings, and maintaining an archive of CLPP documentation. The role of 
secretary is a paid, public servant post.  
 
During fieldwork the CLPP secretary in Chacao had been appointed via public 
tender in 2011 at the same time as the staff of the Sala Técnica (ST). The secretary 
was an architect but was also involved politically with VP, the Mayor’s political party 
(C001). Unlike the ST there is no requirement for the secretary to be a municipal 
resident. The secretary worked full time and was located within the CLPP office in 
the municipal government headquarters. 
 
Chacao’s CLPP secretary’s opposition to Chavismo was no secret due to his 
political party activism which was apparent on his twitter account. Furthermore, he 
described during the interview that he had studied at the local business school, 
IESA, which - he acknowledged - prepared new political leaders. Coincidentally, 
IESA supported the organisation of PB in 2012 and 2013 (C001). Perhaps reflecting 
his business administration background, he described that during the two years that 
he had been in the role, he had been keen to ‘innovate’. He cited creating new lines 
of communication, or community engagement techniques as examples. He noted 
that Chacao had been unique in the way it implemented its PB, and since its 
inauguration the CLPP had continually sought to improve the way it liaised with 
local residents. But he emphasised that this was a cumulative process given that he 
and the ST were building on an initiative started during the López administration. 
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Libertador’s CLPP secretary was a retired lady, with a higher education degree, 
who worked in the afternoons (2pm-6pm) in the CLPP’s office. She was one of the 
community members of the CLPP and had been active in the CLPP since 2005. 
She described herself as a volunteer and formed part of the committee within the 
CLPP that dealt with secretarial and administrative matters. She was only able to 
claim basic travel and sustenance expenses as community member roles were ad 
honorem, according to the law (L001).  
 
Libertador’s secretary noted that her key role was as liaison between the municipal 
government and communities that had projects being dealt with by the CLPP. Her 
role was to ensure the community projects identified in the municipal government’s 
annual budget were being implemented (an informal check and balance of the 
municipal administration) (L001). Her other tasks included providing CCs with 
support when they needed to undergo elections, helping other municipalities 
establish CLPPs, and providing local schools, universities and organisations with 
work experience (by helping with CLPP administration). When asked about her role 
and why she continued to work as a volunteer for so many years she replied that 
this was her way of providing ‘a small contribution to the “process”’ [of Chavismo 
and its move to 21stC socialism] (L001). 
 
The two cases showed different levels of commitment towards the CLPP. In Chacao 
the secretary has been employed on a full-time basis, whereas Libertador relied on 
a volunteer. Where Chacao complied with the rules specified by national law, 
Libertador had not.  
 
7.3.5 Sala Técnica 
 
The CLPP law states that the ST is a multidisciplinary unit of three to four people, 
selected via public tender, which will design and implement the methodology for 
creating the PMD and support the CLPP in its functions. Establishing a ST is 
obligatory and the mayor and councillors have the responsibility of doing so within 
120 days of the law’s enactment (approximately April 2011), or potentially face 
financial sanctions. 
 
The CLPP in Libertador, unlike Chacao, did not have a ST. A committee comprised 
of CLPP community members ran the day-to-day administration. Any technical 
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advice needed to be sought from relevant departments within the municipal 
government. In effect, this procedure required the CLPP to fill out a report that 
described the project's viability and highlighted any specific matters that should be 
taken into consideration. The CLPP then passed this project proposal on to the 
relevant municipal government department or community where it would be 
checked for accuracy and, if needed, revised (L001).  
 
Community members did not raise the lack of a CLPP ST in Libertador as a 
particular issue. But councillor García (L026) considered that the mayor’s focus on 
creating comunas meant that he neglected the CLPP. She argued this was 
demonstrated by Fundacaracas (municipal government agency) installing STs in 
five neighbourhoods instead of establishing a ST for the CLPP, as required by law. 
Given that the mayor, or municipal government, had not received any sanctions, 
there was no incentive to change this practice.  
 
In 2011, Chacao established a ST of four staff members comprising two technical 
staff (architects), an administrator and a coordinator, all of whom were appointed via 
a competitive application process, as required by the CLPP law. The ST was 
located within the municipal government building. The ST’s activities in Chacao met 
the requirements of CLPP laws and municipal by-law. The staff, in conjunction with 
the CLPP secretary, organised the agenda and minutes for each plenary meeting, 
and assisted CLPP community members and local residents with smaller projects 
and revisions to project financing, which needed to be discussed and approved at 
the monthly CLPP plenary meetings. In the spring of each year, the ST began 
organising the logistics and dates – a time-consuming task – for the year’s PB. 
Following each PB meeting, the ST collated the information and began processing 
the information into the final report that synthesised the outcomes and community 
feedback of the PB meetings (Alcaldía de Chacao 2010; 2011b; 2012b; 2013a). The 
report was then submitted to the Finance department where the proposals were 
checked and funding allocated according to the forecast budget for the forthcoming 
year (Alcaldía de Chacao 2013b).  
 
Mayor Graterón in Chacao complied with the national law and had established a 
ST, unlike Mayor Rodríguez in Libertador. By giving the ST an office in the 
municipal government headquarters, Mayor Graterón had also assured that the 
CLPP’s ST was not isolated from other municipal government departments with 
which it needed to liaise closely. Libertador’s mayor and municipal government 
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showed less commitment towards the CLPP by not establishing a ST. The volunteer 
community members that worked on behalf of the CLPP were geographically 
isolated from the municipal government’s main buildings and had to rely on 
establishing and maintaining contact with the municipal government’s departments 
out of their own initiative. 
 
Chacao showed commitment to render the CLPP a formal institution. It worked both 
as a department (ST and secretary) located within the municipal government 
building, and as a plenary at a municipal council level. Libertador’s CLPP did not 
show the same level of institutionalization. As opposed to Chacao, it lacked an 
office within the municipal government building, a ST and a formal secretary.  
 
7.4  DILEMMAS WITHIN THE CLPPs 
 
Following Bevir and Rhodes, Gibbs and Krueger (2012 pg 370) state ‘dilemmas 
come about when new ideas stand in opposition to existing beliefs and practices. 
Dilemmas force a change in beliefs and practices, such that individuals and 
institutions have to take action to address them’. As this section will discuss, during 
fieldwork, the way in which CLPPs operated was the result of a series of inter-
related dilemmas. These dilemmas were created by changes in legislation, which 
prompted participants to take action in order to comply with the law. There was a 
change in the way CLPPs were structured, which required participants to be re-
elected.  
 
In the case of Libertador, lack of elections (for community members and councillors) 
led to the CLPP members’ questioning one another’s legitimacy (especially 
community members versus councillors). In Chacao, councillors questioned the way 
in which community member elections were held, leading to accusations that these 
were biased (targeting specific candidates) resulting in unfair community 
representation. Overall, dilemmas were generated in both CLPPs about the roles, 
remits and legitimacy between community members and councillors. Although this 
section focuses on dilemmas, actors’ traditions and beliefs also influenced the 
generation of these dilemmas (as discussed in subsequent sections). As a result of 
these dilemmas, during fieldwork, CLPPs adopted practices deviating from the 
CLPP legislation (rules in form). Participants’ response to dilemmas widened the 
gap between formal and informal rules.   
137 
 
 
7.4.1 Dilemma 1: Changes to CLPP composition 
 
As described in chapter 2, national government dissolved Parish Councils (JP) in 
2010 replacing them with Communal Parish Councils (JPC). Though the intention 
was for the JP presidents to be replaced with JPC spokespeople, the transition from 
one structure to another encountered variation and difficulties in practice. The 
removal of JP presidents from the CLPP resulted in a removal of members of the 
CLPP with no immediate replacement. This generated a dilemma for the remainder 
of those involved. The way Libertador was able to respond to the change in CLPP 
structure was limited principally due to the complexity and size of the municipality. 
Chacao required the replacement of just one JP president in its CLPP. This proved 
much easier than the 23 changes required in Libertador.  
 
At the time of fieldwork, Libertador’s CLPP had not complied with the CLPP reform. 
The CLPP operated only because of the participation of community members. 
Councillors only contributed by approving the municipal budget once a year. 
Libertador councillors described the CLPP’s lack of JPC representation as partly 
responsible for why they failed to participate more regularly. They considered that 
this was failing to comply with the law.  
 
Community members in Libertador were unable to provide any explanation why 
there was little momentum to comply with the CLPP reform. Interviews with 
councillors highlighted the beliefs they held, which provided insight about the origins 
of the dilemmas - lack of conformity to the law. Two of Libertador’s councillors, prior 
to being elected, were presidents of their respective JPs (L025; L026). Councillor 
García considered that the CLPP was more active when JPs were involved (L026). 
Councillors Fernández and García argued that the presence and then removal of 
the JPs was a result of the ‘speed at which the revolutionary process [Chavismo] is 
going’. As a consequence JPs were eliminated to make space for, or be replaced 
by, CCs and comunas (L025; L026). Both councillors considered that the way in 
which JPCs have not been elected as a replacement for JPs has created a 
‘vacuum’ of representation (L025; L026). While, councillor Fernández 
acknowledged that JPCs should have been incorporated into the CLPP, following 
elections in the different parishes, he ignored why this had not happened (L025). 
Councillor García, on the other hand, considered that the problem lay with national 
government because it had not specified the appropriate mechanism [such as 
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elections] of incorporating JPCs into the CLPP (L026). Overall, the three councillors 
believed that another reason was the mayor’s involvement with national government 
and party politics [the mayor also served as the national director of the PSUV], both 
of which had their focus on consolidating CCs and creating comunas rather than 
enhancing older mechanisms such as CLPPs (L025; L026; L027). Councillor López 
described this as follows: 
 
The country is involved in a big debate about the ‘big commune’ and how 
this should be distributed politically and geographically. And what does it [the 
debate] consist of? Before the political division were states, local authorities 
and parishes. …we considered JPs the [form of representative] government 
closest to the citizen. This concept has changed completely because of our 
president of the republic, Hugo Chávez, with the people, [stated] that [now] 
its the people who are in charge, in an ‘organised’ form [mechanisms of 
popular power]. For this reason we talk of laws, and now the CLPP [sic, I 
believe he meant comunas] and CCs20. (L027). 
 
Following the 2010 reform, Chacao’s CLPP was paralyzed for a year and a half, 
because the JPC had not yet been established. It was community members that 
revived the CLPP in Chacao. According to David, the person who eventually 
became the JPC representative in Chacao, the creation of the JPC and the 
reconstitution of the CLPP were achieved because community members were 
‘preoccupied with their community and desired to construct a better municipality’21 
(C005). He also described that these proactive members of the community sought 
the mayor’s support in order to re-establish the CLPP. In order to establish the 
CLPP a JPC was required, which involved getting members from constituent CCs to 
vote in David’s favour (ibid).  
 
As will be explored in detail in chapter 8, CCs in Chacao were established for 
specific reasons. The first was for CCs to become another type community 
organisation that could liaise with the municipal government. The second was so 
                                                
20 Hay un gran debate en el país, este, establecido sobre la gran comuna y división política territorial. 
Y en que consiste, que antes la división política estaba constituida lo que eran los estados y 
municipios, y parroquias. Ahora, entonces aquí se denominaba que el gobierno más cercano a los 
vecinos eran las Juntas Parroquiales. Ahora ese concepto cambió totalmente porque como está 
establecido con nuestro presidente de la Republica Hugo Chávez de que con el pueblo, el pueblo 
manda en una forma organizada. Por eso se habla de esas leyes, ahora de los CLPP [sic], y la ley de 
los Consejos Comunales. 
21 preocupados por su comunidad y por poder construir un mejor municipio 
139 
 
that local residents, in favour of opposition parties, could prevent Chavistas creating 
CCs and undertaking activities that they disagreed with. CCs were a way to occupy 
and participate within the political spaces defined in national law, but without 
accepting or contributing to the political ideology underpinning the creation of those 
mechanisms (establishing 21st Century socialism/ communal state).  
 
CLPP participants in Chacao openly expressed that they were opposed to 
Chavismo and the ideology behind the communal state. Chacao participants did not 
describe the CLPP as an entity linked to Chavismo’s ‘communal state’ (unlike CCs 
and comunas). They were keen to ensure its continuity because they expressed 
belief in the CLPP’s capacity for citizen participation without being linked to 
Chavismo’s ideology per se. Thus, community participants’ actions to create the 
JPC were effectively contrary to their beliefs (political) and their general support for 
the JPs that had been removed (institutional tradition). According to CLPP 
community members, Chacao’s CCs only voted in favour of a candidate to create a 
JPC to enable the CLPP to comply with the requirements of the 2010 reform, but 
not to create a JPC with the aim of establishing the “communal state” (C002; C012). 
Paradoxically, by forming a JPC, Chacao’s CCs had, in their desire to comply with 
CLPP legislation, inadvertently contributed to the creation of the “communal” 
structures in Chacao. 
 
7.4.2 Dilemma 2: Frequency of elections 
 
As Manin (1999) highlighted, one of the key principles of representative democracy 
is the need for regular elections to ensure that the legitimacy of the representative is 
maintained. Voting in regular elections is one of the main ways representatives are 
held accountable by the electorate. As described in chapter 2, CLPPs are 
composed of two types of members both of which are elected. Political 
representatives, mayors and councillors, elected in traditional municipal elections 
held countrywide and organised by the CNE. Community members are elected from 
local organisations and/or CCs within the municipality (by elections normally 
administered by the municipal government). 
 
During fieldwork, mayors had been elected in 2008 and were in the final year of 
their terms in office. Councillors had been elected in 2005 and after having their 
elections postponed for various reasons, and extensions to their terms granted by 
the CNE, had effectively been in office for two terms without election. Community 
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councillors should be elected for two-year periods. In Libertador, community 
councillors had been involved since 2005 with no re-election. Chacao’s community 
members had been elected in 2011 after the CLPP was restarted following the 2010 
reform. This shows another example of the gap between the formal rules set out in 
legislation and the rules adopted in practice.  
 
Community CLPP members in both municipalities were very aware of the fact that 
councillors had served for almost two terms in office without re-election and were 
keen to point this out whenever the opportunity arose. Though the reason for this 
fell with national government and the CNE, interviewees’ views reflected the 
weaknesses of representative democracy in Venezuela. As will be explored below, 
the ongoing extensions to councillors’ terms in office generated further dilemmas 
within the CLPP.  
 
The CLPP in Chacao had, for all intents and purposes, complied with the 2010 law 
reform: the CLPP had elected a representative for the JPC and re-elected the 
community members. Councillors were under CNE extension and the mayor was in 
the third year of his term in office after being elected in 2008. The mayor and 
municipal government had also installed a ST and employed a CLPP secretary (see 
section 7.3.4). But my observation of the CLPP plenary meetings, reading of news 
articles, and interviews with CLPP participants raised a recurrent issue: councillors 
questioned community members for the way in which they were elected (see 
below), and also because several community members shared political party 
affiliations to VP. In turn, community members challenged these councillors’ views 
because lack of elections, and extensions of their terms in office, were not fulfilling 
their ‘representativeness’ of local residents either. 
 
Councillor Martínez described the situation as follows: 
Elections were called on a Saturday, and on the Sunday a group of local 
residents went and voted [for the community members]. The same people, 
[and] their local group of neighbours chose their candidates. This was the 
root of the problem. And it was only those that were there that got elected, a 
group of people, shall we say, most of who are [politically] aligned with the 
mayor. So that’s another factor. It’s just not [politically] representative of the 
community [and support for other political parties in Chacao]. This is the root 
of the matter. For this reason none of the councillors attend the CLPP 
[plenary]. Are they [community members] illegal? Well, look, …how do I say 
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this… I just, simply, don’t turn up to these meetings22. (C023). 
 
Councillor González similarly argued that community members’ close links to the 
mayor were problematic: 
…there is no true [political] representation [of community members in the 
CLPP] because if they only come from 2 organisations. Well, they elected 
their community members from these two organisations; [ok] there were a 
few more than 2. Let’s be clear, this was an election that was supervised by 
the mayor and the municipal executive, who failed to recognise whether any 
of these institutions were legal or not…but that’s another matter… 23 (C025) 
 
When asked how the process should have been carried out, councillor Martínez 
emphasised the need ‘to follow the law’, involve the CNE for greater transparency 
with a clear chronology of the electoral process, and for elections to be publicised 
widely in the community (C023). Councillor González highlighted that, in her view, 
the differences of ‘first grade’ and ‘second grade’ elections were problematic: 
 
…What I believe is that the national law needs to change to have a more 
democratic process of choosing members. It’s a matter of…if you want to 
have efficient and effective participation it needs to be done in a much more 
direct way, not [through] second grade elections [as opposed to ‘first grade’ 
elections such as councillors or mayors] which is what the law requires. 
Obviously now with the reform there is not much change in this matter, we’re 
still [stuck] with second grade elections 24 (C025) 
                                                
22 Y vale unas elecciones que llamaron un sábado, un domingo entonces fueron grupos de vecinos 
que los escogieron. Ellos mismos, un grupo más de vecinos escogieron sus electos. Esto es el 
problema de fondo. Y quienes están allí justamente salen electos, un grupo de personas, digamos, 
este, en su mayoría de ellos de la corriente del alcalde. Entonces esto es otro factor, pues. Que no es 
representativo de lo que es la comunidad, pues, como tal. Entonces allí es donde radique el asunto. 
Por eso ningún de los concejales asistan al CLPP. Me explico. Porque no tienen esa legitimidad. 
¿Que son ilegales? Pues, fijate. Esto...como explicarte...Ehh, yo simplemente, este, no participo en 
esas reuniones.  
 
23 …no hay una verdadera representación, porque si resulta que solamente hay 2 organizaciones, 
pues de esas 2 organizaciones, que no fue el caso no, fue un poco más, de ahí se escogen a todos 
los consejero del, del CLPP… además vamos a estar claro, que esa fue una elección tutelada por el 
alcalde, por el ejecutivo municipal, desconociendo algunas de estas instituciones que estuviera 
legalizadas o no, ese es otro tema… 
24 …lo que creo es que la ley nacionalmente en cambio de hacer más democrático el proceso de 
escogencia, …es un tema de…si tú la quieres hacer eficiente y efectiva la participación tiene que ser 
de manera mucho más directa, no elecciones de segundo grado que es lo que está planteado por la 
ley. Claro, ahora dentro de la nueva reforma de la ley, este, no dista mucho de la que está 
actualmente, seguimos en una elección de segundo grado… 
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In effect, councillors were indicating the way elections had been undertaken using 
informal rules and practices, which favoured community members, the mayor and 
VP. They also implied that councillors’ “first grade” elections were more appropriate, 
and more valid, than community member elections. My interpretation is they were 
stressing that the councillor electoral process (despite elections being postponed) 
was more ‘representative’ of the community than the way community members had 
been elected.  
 
Nonetheless, community members believed that they were more representative of 
the local community (C005; C012; C023). They maintained that because their 
elections had been held in 2011 (as opposed to councillors elections in 2005). 
Community members found it galling that local politicians accused the community 
members’ electoral process as unfair and non-transparent when councillors were, in 
their view, well past serving as valid representatives of the community (C012; C017; 
C021; C022). These questions about the frequency of the electoral processes led to 
the dilemmas about who constituted a valid representative. 
 
Community members in Libertador had been part of the CLPP since it was created 
in 2005. CLPP members were nominated by civil society organisations in each 
parish. These elections were undertaken in accordance with the first CLPP law 
(2002).  Observation of the CLPP during fieldwork, gave a general sense that it was 
in limbo. Both councillors and community members were waiting for new elections 
to be held. Yet, it was still uncertain when the community members would have their 
elections. This, again, depended on how the CLPP would conform to the law 
reform, and the integration of the JPCs, CCs and the emerging comunas. CLPP 
members were aware of the need for the CLPP to comply with the new law but were 
uncertain how this would be done or when (L001; L020; L022; L026).  
 
My observation during CLPP meetings showed that a group of around 15 
community members regularly attended (the number and specific people varied 
depending on the meeting). Councillors in Libertador, like Chacao, did not attend 
these meetings. Libertador’s community members found the matter frustrating, not 
because of councillors’ extended term in office, but because of the councillors’ lack 
of attendance to the CLPP meetings (more below).  
 
In addition to the issues surrounding the removal of JPs, councillors told me that 
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they thought that the CLPP, as it was operating during fieldwork, was non-compliant 
with the 2010 reforms (L025; L026; L027). The community members continued, 
albeit needing (re)election, running the CLPP, but with a very minimal level of 
acceptance from councillors.  
 
Councillors Fernández and López stated that the lack of community member 
elections was a key factor for them not attending the CLPP plenary meetings (L025; 
L027). Councillor García, on the other hand, recognised that even though 
community members had not been re-elected or renewed they continued working 
admirably on behalf of the CLPP:  
 
I value the community members we have at the moment a lot. Why? 
Because despite the CLPP not having complied with the modifications [in the 
new law]…they have stayed in their, how do we say it, place of combat. 
They give everything they can…to supervise the [municipal government’s] 
public works. Because [the CLPP] is more than just approving funds for 
projects. It’s also about supervising and overseeing the projects[‘s 
development and implementation]. Furthermore, Petra [the secretary] has 
great influence, because in a certain way she’s been the link between the 
local authority directors, the community, and us as councillors, ensuring that 
we are informed of any obstacles that arise. It’s amazing.25 (L026). 
 
Yet councillors (including councillor García above) noted that they were no longer 
invited to the CLPP plenary meetings (L025; L026; L027). During interviews, it was 
stated that councillors were not informed, nor did they seek to find out, when CLPP 
plenary meetings would be held (L025; L026; L027). Councillors recognised that 
meeting the quorum was difficult, particularly since the removal of the JP. But 
ironically they were unwilling to attend the CLPP plenary meetings. As discussed 
above, councillors stated the need for community members to be renewed within 
the CLPP. They believed these elections needed to ensure conformity to the 
composition of the CLPP stipulated in the 2010 reform.  
 
                                                
25 …yo le doy muchísimo valor a esos miembros de ese CLPP que tenemos en este momento. ¿Por 
qué? Porque a pesar de que…no sea adecuado a las modificaciones [de la ley]…ellos permanecen en 
su lugar, como se dice, de combate. Hacen todo un esfuerzo, ehh, impresionante para supervisar las 
obras porque el tema no es nada más la aprobación. Es la supervisión de las obras, la contraloría de 
las obras. E inclusive, este, [la secretaria] tiene un peso.. porque ella de una manera sirve de bisagra 
entre la alcaldía, sus directores, la comunidad, y de una manera y otra mantener a nosotros como 
concejales informados de cuáles son las trabas que tiene. Es impresionante.  
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7.4.3 Dilemma 3: Community member and political representative roles 
and remit 
 
The two sets of dilemmas described above (substitution of JPs for JPCs) and the 
need for accepted, transparent electoral processes for both community members 
and councillors, generated a third set of dilemmas about who has the role and the 
remit to make decisions. Chacao provided an instance where councillors did not 
participate in the CLPP because they questioned the legitimacy of community 
member elections as opposed to ‘first grade’ elections. Libertador provided a 
scenario where councillors did not attend the CLPP meetings because of the lack of 
community member elections, which lacked compliance with the reforms of the 
2010 law. Consequently, as this section will explore, the concepts of 
representativeness and legitimacy between councillors and community members 
were contested.   
 
Councillors adopted a view of their role that reflected the traditional role of local 
politicians in the western world: legislating in the municipal chamber, approving 
budgets, and in the best scenarios, scrutinizing the decisions and actions taken by 
the municipal executive. For the dilemmas generated in Libertador (lack of 
conformity to the law) and Chacao (questions over the legitimacy of community 
members), councillors failed to have regular input in the CLPP; instead councillors 
in both municipalities limited their involvement to approving only their budget. 
Community members, who saw the CLPP as an important mechanism for 
community engagement, were determined for the CLPP to continue operating as 
‘normal’. Yet, as a consequence, further dilemmas were generated with regards to 
who has the capability and responsibility of making (CLPP) decisions. 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, the CLPP remit allows its members to make decisions 
about approving funding for community organisations, CCs and comunas’ plans and 
projects ‘of minor importance’. PB is identified as the mechanism to allow citizens 
and community members to have a voice in the annual municipal budget and 
investment plans. Decisions can be made on the annual budget for the CLPP, but 
the plenary can only ‘provide an opinion’ on the municipal budget (CLPP law 2010). 
Furthermore, the law specifies:  
 
The decisions of the CLPP will be carried out by the majority of its members. 
It is the responsibility and obligation of the president [mayor] to ensure and 
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guarantee that approved decisions are carried out26. (Article 25, CLPP law 
2010) 
 
Community members in both municipalities noted that, since councillors and mayors 
generally did not attend CLPP plenary meetings, it was the community members 
who provided the quorum and majority in order to take decisions (C012; C021; 
C022; L021; L022). Observation at meetings showed that the municipal government 
sent officers to present certain projects to the plenary in order to get specific 
municipal budgets signed off by the CLPP. It should be noted that this is more of a 
procedural formality rather than of citizen power because, as discussed below, the 
role of the CM is more significant.  
 
In Chacao, councillors recognised that the CLPP was an important mechanism for 
meeting with community representatives, but that this was undermined by the fact 
that their election was of a ‘second grade’ and in the mayor’s interests (C020; 
C023). Because of this, councillors maintained that community members were 
assuming roles and competencies, and making decisions, that they should not be 
doing (C020; C023; C025). In addition, councillors also alleged that the community 
CLPP members did not respect councillors or the CM (C020; C023; C025). Two 
quotations summarise Chacao councillors’ positions clearly (see pg136 for 
community member view). Councillor Martínez described: 
 
The CLPP…is a very important municipal mechanism. Because as its 
members we have the scope to make decisions? Right? It’s where we meet, 
exchange opinions, revise some aspects [of projects or plans], [and] listen to 
the community. [But] basically the election [of community members]…wasn’t 
undertaken with all possible legality and transparency.27 (C023) 
 
Similarly, Councillor Gómez, linking the dilemmas of legitimacy and election, 
argued: 
 
First of all they [community members] haven’t respected the CM. At times 
                                                
26 Las decisiones del Consejo Local de Planificación Pública se tomarán por mayoría calificada de sus 
integrantes. Corresponde al Presidente o Presidenta ejercer su función de garantizar obligatorio 
cumplimiento de las decisiones aprobadas 
27 el CLPP…es una instancia muy importante para el municipio. Porque es el ámbito en donde 
quienes tomamos decisiones ¿verdad? nos encontramos. Para intercambiar opiniones, para…revisar 
en unos aspectos, para escuchar a la comunidad, básicamente…[la] escogencia no tuvo toda la 
transparencia y toda la legalidad posible.  
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they have made decisions; that is not their responsibility, but a responsibility 
of the CM. And [we question this more] because we have serious doubts 
about the legitimacy of their election to the CLPP. The ‘second grade’ 
election is important with the municipality but they divided [the electoral 
areas in] the municipality in a way they shouldn’t have. We have serious 
doubts…and, at times, they approve…crazy things that we do not agree 
with28. (C020) 
 
Contextualising these quotations, Chacao councillors considered CLPP community 
members approved things, for example the municipal urban development plan 
(PDUL), which was beyond their remit. The municipal government in conjunction 
with external consultants had prepared the PDUL over a four-year period. With just 
24 hours notice, an extraordinary CLPP plenary was convened where the PDUL 
was presented and ‘approved’ by the CLPP plenary, which on this only occasion 
included the mayor. The plenary stated publically that they hoped the CM, which 
had the final decision, would assess and approve the PDUL within the 60 days 
stipulated in legislation. Councillors claimed that making a ‘decision’ within the 
plenary about the PDUL was beyond the CLPP’s responsibility, and making a public 
display of the fact was disrespectful towards the CM (C020; C023; C025). However, 
community members and the CLPP Secretary in Chacao argued that the CLPP was 
a horizontal structure, which meant that all members were equal in their decision-
making capacities (C001; C005; C012; C021). Community members asserted that 
councillors had just as much opportunity (and requirement in their eyes) to form part 
of a project’s deliberative process. But councillors overturning a project approval at 
a later stage, without having taken part in the deliberation offered by the CLPP 
plenary, was deemed unacceptable. Over time this manifested in grievances 
between community members and councillors 
 
Unlike Chacao, Libertador’s councillors did not state that the community members 
were deciding matters beyond their remit. They felt, nevertheless, that those 
members needed to be replaced via elections. Libertador’s PB culminated in a list of 
projects for each parish, which in turn was included in the annual municipal budget 
                                                
28 Primero no han respetado el CM, a veces toman decisiones que no les corresponde, que son cosas 
que corresponde al CM, y porque, ehm, nosotros tenemos dudas serias sobre la legitimidad de 
elección de ese CLPP. En la alcaldía es fundamental la elección de segundo grado, este, dividieron 
como no deberían dividir el municipio y tenemos serias dudas de... y a veces aprueban cosas... locas. 
Con lo cual nosotros no estamos, este, de acuerdo. (C020) 
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and investment plan. Councillors stated that their role in approving the municipal 
budget and investment plan was the key and most substantive action that they can 
undertake (L025; L026; L027). Thus, CLPP plenary decisions involved approving 
the funds specified in the municipal budget to specific projects were ready to be 
transferred to the relevant project team. Effectively, the CLPP plenary checked that 
projects’ criteria were met (L001; L002; L022; L026).  
 
Despite councillors’ concerns over the lack of compliance with the 2010 CLPP law 
in both municipalities, the final decision of approving substantive matters – 
municipal plans, budgets, bylaws – was made by councillors in the CM not the 
CLPP. It is clear that councillors, from both municipalities, attributed greater 
meaning to the decision making in the CM than in the CLPP, which they understood 
as a means of inclusion. This is again likely to be a view that is grounded in the 
remit bestowed (institutional tradition) to councillors through legislation. As such, the 
role of councillor as political representative shows that this remains fully 
institutionalised, despite the intention of Chavismo to promote other forms of non-
traditional representation.  
 
7.5  CLPP PARTICIPANTS’ BELIEFS 
 
Both community members and councillors argued that the CLPP was an important 
space for deliberation; yet practice indicated otherwise. Councillors in both Chacao 
and Libertador failed to regularly attend their respective CLPP plenary meetings. 
This was underpinned by how the two sets of councillors responded to the changing 
legislation, and how they saw, or understood their own role as well as that of 
community members.  
 
Councillors asserted that their legislative and scrutiny mandates were their key 
functions (C025; C026; L025; L026; L027). Councillors’ staff members also reflected 
this view29 (L023; L024). Councillor García stated: 
 
What is the role of a councillor in Venezuela? The role of councillor is [to be] 
the first representative for communities following a popular, direct election. 
[To be] a direct spokesperson. The role is to legislate on behalf of the 
                                                
29 Although this point may seem to state the obvious, it was quite interesting that whilst speaking with 
public servants they did not consider the CLPP as one of the key roles of a councillor. 
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municipality. Other roles include approving budget for the mayor [and 
administration] so that he/she can transfer this to the community. We 
[councillors] also undertake scrutiny of that [municipal] funding. That is all of 
our remit.30 (L026). 
 
This quotation provides a good example of how councillors really saw themselves 
and their role: legislating, approving municipal budgets and scrutiny. Noticeably, the 
quotation and remit described made no direct reference to the councillors’ role in 
the CLPP. Councillors implied that because they approved funding for the yearly 
budgets in the CM – including CLPP projects from the PB - they had implicitly 
contributed to the CLPP (L025; L026; L027).  
 
However, councillors’ limited involvement in the CLPP created dilemmas for 
community members. Compared with councillors, community members were not 
torn between different roles in the CM and CLPP. For community members the 
CLPP was their single focus31 and one in which they sought to advance their 
community preferences as much as possible. In practice this meant that community 
members were the only ones to regularly attend CLPP plenary meetings.  
 
Elizabeth, a Chacao community member, argued that the concept of the CLPP as a 
shared space between councillors and community members was ‘excellent’ but that 
in practice councillors’ absence, and their scepticism of projects which were 
approved by the ST and community members, undermined this understanding 
(C012). Another Chacao community member defended their election and the work 
they did within the CLPP as ‘legitimate’. Nicolás was adamant that the community 
members were valid CLPP representatives: 
 
There’s a reality [that] the community members come from communities and 
we represent those communities directly, but we’re not politicians. 
Councillors are eminently politicians. And political factors, at times, are not in 
                                                
30 ¿Cuál es la gestión de un concejal en Venezuela? La gestión de un concejal es el primer 
representante de las comunidades por ley a través del voto popular, directo. Un vocero directo. La 
gestión viene de legislar en materia del municipio. Luego viene de aprobar los recursos al ciudadano 
alcalde para que sea un alcalde de respuesta hacía comunidades. Luego somos contralores de esos 
recursos que damos al alcalde. Hasta allí nuestra gestión. 
31 Several of Chacao’s CLPP community members had affiliations to their neighbourhood’s CC. 
However, as will be described in chapter 8, CC meetings and activity were not frequent. Furthermore, 
it was not guaranteed that the community member would be the same person coordinating CC matters 
with the municipal government and/or CLPP. 
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harmony with the wishes of the community. And they [councillors] don’t 
attend. Where are they? We [community members] never fail to turn up and 
achieve quorum on our part. If they come or don’t come is their problem, 
because we don’t need them [at the plenary] because they have to approve 
funding later on. They don’t approve projects. The projects are approved in 
the CLPP and they have to approve and assign the [corresponding] funding. 
But this has been an issue. This was our fight with them. They wanted 
changes and for funding to be spent on other things, and so they cut the 
funding [for projects]. But they should be saying “here’s the money for this”.32 
(C022). 
 
This quotation raises a number of controversial points. The first is that Nicolás was 
defiant that community members are ‘closer’ to the community than councillors and 
are therefore more representative of the community. What is noticeable here is that 
there is a clear distinction between ‘us’ [community members] and ‘them’ 
[councillors], which may be part of the explanation why the community member 
conflated levels of representativeness. 
 
From the interpretive institutionalist framework (chapter 4), councillors’ beliefs can 
be understood to come from two sets of traditions: their own idea of what a 
councillor’s role entails, and any forms of learning about the ‘ways things are done 
around here’ which may be taught by public servants. Rhodes (2011b) described 
this as a form of ‘socialisation’ into a given parliamentary or ministerial role (see 
section 7.2). The issues that councillors encountered in practice meant that the 
formal rules set out in law combined with the councillors’ individual understandings 
generated dilemmas. Not only can the role of the councillor be considered a 
tradition, but also councillors’ particular experiences will mean that dilemmas 
contingent to their own background and beliefs will be encountered. These in turn 
manifest as councillors’ actions (or reactions) to the tradition as a role in conjunction 
with their other personal traditions and beliefs. Put simply, councillors had to 
                                                
32 Porque hay una realidad, los consejeros que venimos de las comunidades representamos a las 
comunidades directas y no somos políticos, los concejales son eminentemente políticos y los factores 
políticos a veces no están muy cónsonos con los sentimientos de las comunidades como los 
quieren…Pero ellos no asisten… ¿dónde están? …nunca falta quórum por nosotros,…si ellos vienen 
o no vienen ese es su problema, no nos hace falta, ellos tienen que después aprobar los recursos, 
ellos no aprueban los proyectos, los proyectos los aprueba el CLPP pero ellos tienen que asignar los 
recursos y esa ha sido la pelea, porque ellos los recursos los tienen para otros fines políticos, como 
pasó este año pues, que ellos cambiaron los recursos a otras cosas y le recortaron a la inversión 
municipal hacia los vecinos, entonces nuestro peleíto [sic] con ellos es que no bajan los recursos, 
ellos son los que tienen que decir aquí están los Bolívares para eso.  
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interpret these two sets of traditions and act accordingly. Data showed councillors’ 
gave more emphasis toward the CM than the CLPP, which granted them more 
power. As noted in section 7.2, community members did not have a tradition (of 
their role) to which they adhered to or were socialised with. Instead, in addition to 
the CLPP laws, the community members acted according to their own, and shared 
with other community members, beliefs about how to develop their new role 
introduced by law.  
 
Community members in both Chacao and Libertador held the belief that, within the 
CLPP, community members have the same political and decision making rights as 
the mayor and councillors. The legislation, however, does not give community 
members decision making rights; it simply provides community members with an 
opportunity to deliberate within a forum and recommend projects that contribute to 
municipal planning; it is these deliberation rights within the CLPP that are non-
hierarchical. A way of differentiating what the two sets of members can do is to 
consider a two-stage process: matters can be approved in the CLPP plenary; 
however, councillors undertake the final decision and budget allocation in the CM.   
 
Assuming that the deliberative space in the CLPP plenary operated adequately, 
councillors would still have greater decision making capacities, and power, than 
community members. In this sense Chavismo’s push for ‘popular power’ is limited 
within the CLPP framework. Interviews with councillors showed that they were 
perfectly aware of this difference, and had no interest or intention of changing it 
(C025; L025; L026; L027).  
 
7.6  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The chapter provided an account of CLPPs in Chacao and Libertador through the 
lens of an interpretive institutionalist framework, using the concepts ‘dilemmas’, 
‘traditions’ and ‘beliefs’ introduced in chapter 4  (Bevir and Rhodes 2003; 2006; 
2010; Hay 2011). CLPPs were the first type of mechanism created by Chavismo 
that tried to bring traditional elected representatives together with members from 
community organisations into a municipal council as an expression of citizen 
participation. Chavismo saw the CLPP as a move towards breaking away from an 
entrenched political system dominated by elites which existed for 40 years prior to 
1998. Section 7.2 set out that the CLPP is a new mechanism of participation to be 
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understood within the context of different traditions. The first of these was the 
tradition which regard the historical legacy and continuity of a representative 
democratic government. It includes the figures of councillors, mayors and their 
associated administrations. A second tradition was identified: Chavismo brought a 
new participatory toolkit and ideological baggage which encouraged a move 
towards increased citizen participation and “21st Century Socialism” in Venezuela’s 
political landscape. The mechanisms that Chavismo introduced may be accepted or 
rejected by individuals depending on their own political beliefs.  
 
Section 7.3 provided an account of the CLPPs in Chacao and Libertador and their 
respective members during fieldwork. It highlighted that Chacao had adhered more 
to the requirements of the 2010 reform, whereas Libertador’s CLPP failed to 
address most legal requirements. Consequently, it can be concluded that the 
practices in Libertador were more akin to the informal ‘rules in use’ perspective 
mentioned in the institutional components of the thesis theoretical framework (table 
4.1).  
 
Section 7.4 described three sets of dilemmas faced by participants in the CLPP. 
Although these have been separated, it should be acknowledged that the dilemmas 
were inter-related. In summary, the dilemmas were: 
 Changes to the CLPP composition, as a result of the 2010 reforms. 
Chacao complied with the law by establishing a JPC, despite that the JPC 
was a component of the “communal state”, which community members 
opposed (another dilemma originating from the political beliefs they held). 
Libertador failed to incorporate JPCs in its structure, although its mayor 
favoured the idea of the communal state.  
 Election (type, procedure and administration): Community member 
elections in Chacao were contested by councillors as being too narrow, and 
unrealistically favourable towards the mayor’s political party. Libertador’s 
councillors lamented the lack of elections (for councillors and community 
members). Community members highlighted councillors’ serving almost two 
terms in office as a poor element of ‘representation’. This was clearly a 
failure of national government and the CNE in addressing the problem. 
Further dilemmas were created, particularly for community members, where 
councillors failed to turn up because elections either had not happened 
(Libertador) or were contested (Chacao). 
152 
 
 Roles, remit and legitimacy between political and community 
representatives: This dilemma has clear links with the previous dilemmas. 
Data showed that councillors see their role as defined by legislation, with 
minimal input in the CLPP. In particular, Chacao’s community members 
questioned the councillors’ ability to overturn the plenary’s decisions about 
projects. They lamented that a space for shared deliberation existed, but it 
did not achieve its full potential because councillors often failed to turn up 
(as a result of the second dilemma).  
Section 7.5 provided an account of the beliefs of CLPP participants which was 
derived by reflecting on the context, traditions and dilemmas described in previous 
sections. It reiterated that councillors perceived and held more decision making 
power than community members. Empirical results in Chacao and Libertador 
showed that this shared space was subject to dilemmas due to these uneven power 
balances in decision making, and these arose due to inadequately defined and 
enforced electoral and procedural matters.  
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CHAPTER 8  CONSEJOS COMUNALES 
 
8.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, consejos comunales (CCs) first emerged in with 
the 2006 law which was superseded with the organic law (LOCC) in 2009. The 
organic law was understood to be a demonstration of the importance that CCs 
played in Chavismo’s move towards creating “21st Century Socialism”, which would 
be underpinned by the creation of the “communal state”. CCs were the base unit in 
the communal state structure (see figure 2.2) closest to the community given that 
they were sub-neighbourhood level organisations. Furthermore, because CCs were 
sub-municipal level organisations with links to national government via registration 
and funding processes, they were either understood by advocates to be 
expressions of ‘popular power’ or by critics as tools of Chavismo subject to 
clientelism (Brewer Carías 2010; García Guadilla 2008b; Goldfrank 2011b). CCs 
were considered to be more direct expressions of citizen participation because of 
the lack of formal political representation in their structure (such as mayors or 
councillors). As the findings in chapter 7 showed, CLPPs generated conflicts of 
interest between community members and elected representatives. 
 
Like chapter 7, this chapter applies the concepts of traditions, beliefs and dilemmas 
(Bevir and Rhodes 2003; 2006; 2010) to elicit how CC participants - from 14 CCs in 
Chacao and 11 in La Silsa, Libertador - understood and acted within their respective 
CCs. Section 8.2 presents the origins of CCs in Chacao and Libertador. It aims to 
describe, from CC participants’ perspectives, the reasons why and how CCs 
emerged in their respective neighbourhoods. It also provides an account of how 
CCs formally established, if at all. Furthermore, given the political context in which 
CCs emerged, participants’ understandings of CCs are presented in the context of 
whether they embrace, accept or reject the ideology of Chavismo. This can be 
understood to be citizens accepting or rejecting certain ideas or ways of interpreting 
CCs, which depend on the traditions and beliefs they draw upon.  
 
Where section 8.2 establishes the ideational dilemmas rooted in participants’ beliefs 
and traditions, section 8.3 explores in detail ‘how things work around here’, i.e. how 
did participants understand and describe the way in which their respective CCs 
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operated? The section also includes a discussion of why participants take part, CCs’ 
projects and funding arrangements, and the relationship that CCs have with public 
authorities. Thus the chapter discusses how participants see and understand state-
civil society relations, and CC participants’ beliefs and understandings regarding 
citizen participation in community planning practices and processes. The chapter 
closes with conclusions in section 8.4.  
 
8.2  BELIEFS AND THE ORIGINS OF CONSEJOS COMUNALES 
 
The origins of CCs differ according to when, where and who decides to form a CC. 
The basic structure is stipulated by the LOCC (see chapter 2). During fieldwork, 
there were over 40,000 CCs in the country. In Chacao there were 22 CCs33 and in 
Libertador, approximately, 1200 (C001; Libertador webpage). In La Silsa, there 
were 14 CCs during fieldwork (with an additional 6 in the process of being set up for 
the first time). 
 
Participants in Chacao regarded the local municipality to have a strong civil society; 
many Chacao CCs were borne from existing neighbourhood associations [ADVs] 
(C009; C007; C013; C018). Although some ADVs had been around for over 40 
years, national government’s push to establish CCs throughout the country, with 
associated legal backing and funding, meant that local residents in Chacao felt the 
need to establish CCs in addition to ADVs. Interviewees argued that the motivation 
for this was underpinned by the need to establish a CC which would reflect 
neighbours’ interests and avoid being established by Chavistas in the area (C007; 
C010; C012; C019). At the time of fieldwork recent invasions of abandoned 
buildings and subsequent squatting was occurring in Chacao (and many other parts 
of the country). National government was not critical of squatting, nor did it create 
any form of response. Locals, however, saw the potential for squatters setting up 
their own CCs in their local neighbourhood if they did not. Ana María summarised 
this perspective as follows: 
 
The neighbours in this municipality decided, even though they are not 
agreeing with whatever is happening politically, it is a must to make 
organised [sic] the consejos comunales to keep..umm.. I don’t know if the 
                                                
33 This number comes from the list of CCs provided by the CLPP. As discussed later in the chapter, it 
is not a true reflection of registered/active CCs. 
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word would be control. But to keep their territoriality. So that’s how it got 
started. Most of the consejos comunales, not all, in Chacao were born out of 
the neighbourhood associations. That’s why we here are very linked.34 
(C009) 
 
Caterina noted that participating in her CC was important, despite being politically 
sensitive: 
 
We have to take part in everything there is to participate in because we want 
the community to benefit. Most of the consejos comunales in Chacao don’t 
work, because they are only focused on the politics [of Chavismo]…the CCs 
in Chacao are too polarized35. (C016) 
 
Many participants interviewed in Chacao continued to be active in other civil society 
organizations in addition to participating in their respective CCs (C004; C007; C010; 
C011; C013; C018; C012). Participants noted that they saw their CCs as a means 
of channelling community interests, promoting cultural and recreation activities, and 
looking for solutions to local issues when they arose; but their CCs often did this in 
conjunction with other civil society organisations (C004; C009; C011; C012). 
Elizabeth noted that she conceived starting her CC as a means of overcoming the 
exclusive and entrenched membership in her local ADV. Hence newcomers could 
not join or participate (C012). Chacao participants indicated that CCs existed 
alongside the considerable presence of other community organisations and active 
civil society that were not promoted by government.  
 
Chacao participants’ responses point to an initial interpretation: CCs were 
established, not because they believed in the move towards, or creation of, 
Chavismo’s communal state and/or 21st Century Socialism. This was a political 
tradition and ideology that all but one interviewee denounced. Instead they saw CCs 
as an additional form of community advocacy with government. Participants in 
Chacao understood CCs to be a form of local community organisations like ADVs. 
They were a means of channelling community matters with municipal government. 
                                                
34Quotation derived from a section of an interview where with the interviewee talked in English for 
approximately 10 minutes before changing to Spanish. 
35 Tenemos que participar en todo lo que tenemos que participar porque nos preocupamos con lo que 
beneficia la comunidad. Y la mayoría de los consejos comunales de Chacao no funcionan [por]que 
[se] enfocan solamente en la política…consejos comunales de Chacao están demasiado polarizados. 
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Participants described the establishment of CCs in Chacao as a protective exercise 
to prevent Chavistas (whose ideology and vision they disagreed with) taking control 
of CCs in their local area. The creation of CCs point out one of the dilemmas that 
residents encountered: should local communities formalize the establishment of a 
mechanism which has close links to Chavismo and its ideology that the large 
majority of local residents did not believe in? As noted above, participants argued 
that they had to.  
 
CCs in La Silsa emerged in two stages: those which formed shortly after the first CC 
law in 2006 and those formed in the post 2010 period resulting from the popular 
power laws and the national government’s push towards creating comunas. Six 
interviewees in La Silsa described that their CCs began in 2006 (L006; L009; L010; 
L011; L013, L016). Four CC participants noted that their CCs started in 2007 
(L019), 2009 (L015; L019), and 2010 (L012), respectively. One participant 
exaggerated stating that the CC started ’10 years ago’ around 2003/2004 (L006) – 
which would be impossible. 
 
Interviewees identified that, because they had been involved in other organisations 
or community level organisations promoted by Chavismo, they were encouraged to 
get involved in CCs (L006; L009; 2010; L012; L013; L014; L015). Many of these 
organisations were precursors to CCs, such as Urban Land Committees (CTUs) 
and Barrio Adentro (see section 2.3). Their participation in these precursor 
organisations provided residents with knowledge about community matters and the 
barrio’s deficits. When Barrio Adentro or CTU committees were incorporated into 
CC structures in 2006, participants realized that it was a logical step to establish 
and take part in CCs (L006; L009; L010; L013; L015). CCs which started after 2010 
were created with the intention of establishing a comuna in La Silsa (L012; L014, 
L016).  
 
The principal reason participants in La Silsa became involved was to try and tackle 
the many problems that the barrio faced and to find solutions or mitigation measures 
(L006; L007; L008; L009; L014; L015; L019). Cristina described that she enjoyed 
working on behalf of the community and working towards solutions for the barrio:  
 
The barrios, like this one, of Caracas are humble, and it’s where you will find 
the areas [with] most problems [and need of help] in Venezuela. These 
problems include [lack of suitable] housing, hunger, stairs [to get up and 
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down the steep hill], pipes, recreational facilities…everything really. 
Everything36. (L008). 
 
Participants believed that the Sala Técnica (ST) had been instrumental in guiding, 
educating, organising CCs, helping them become registered with Fundacomunal, 
either for the first time or by holding elections for (re)electing spokespeople (L009; 
L010; L011; L012; L014). The ST in La Silsa was set up specifically by 
Fundacaracas (Libertador municipal government agency for housing and habitat). 
This ST had no relation to the one that should have been established for the CLPP 
(see chapter 7)37. The ST was established in 2012 and sought to group CC 
spokespeople who provided access to the barrio and coordination among residents 
alongside architects and engineers who would help design Fundacaracas projects, 
and advise on the design of projects chosen by CCs. ST staff were paid via 
Fundacaracas.  
 
Andrea described the ST’s positive involvement as follows: 
 
Interviewee: For us, the Sala Técnica is something completely new. It’s an 
innovation. It’s helped us a lot… Am I explaining myself? 
Interviewer: Did your CC get any help before the ST was established? 
Interviewee: No, no there wasn’t any. It’s for this reason that CCs had so 
many disasters before. Because they didn’t have any technical knowledge 
[to get projects approved and implemented].38 (L012). 
 
Similarly, Daniel noted that when CCs emerged people did not really know what 
they were for. He conveyed how the laws implied different stages of CCs’ 
development within the process advocated by Chavismo: 
 
Look, CCs started around 2006…participation at this time was really low. 
Right? It was just the start for CCs…When President Chávez started to 
                                                
36 En los barrios que son humildes aquí de Caracas, donde verdaderamente encontramos las 
necesidades venezolanas. Cuando te hablo de necesidades…es de casas, hambre, escaleras, 
tuberías, o sea recreación…todo, pues. Todo.  
37 Hereon where there is potential for ambiguity of the term “ST” reference will be made as “La Silsa 
ST” or “CLPP ST”, as required. 
38 Interviewee: La Sala Técnica para nosotros es algo totalmente nuevo. Es una innovación que se 
hizo. Se ha favorecido mucho…¿me explico? 
Interviewer: ¿Había apoyo para el consejo comunal antes de la Sala Técnica? 
Interviewee: No, no había. No había. De hecho es por eso que viene el fracaso de los consejos 
comunales anteriores [sic]. Porque no tenían ningún tipo de conocimiento de nivel técnico. 
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promote and encourage CCs, communities, the people, started to get 
involved and participate little by little…now we are in a third stage of the CCs 
[referring to the CC’s third cycle of electing spokespeople for two year 
terms]. We’ve got new people and a revolutionary vision.39 (L011) 
 
The above quotation shows Daniel summarising how participants in La Silsa 
understood the role of CCs: as a means of working for the community whilst 
contributing towards the vision of ‘21st Century Socialism’ advocated by Chavismo. 
Through observation and interview responses, Chavismo’s ideology and vision was 
something La Silsa’s CC participants bought in to, supported and actively sought to 
maintain (L006; L008; L011). In other words, participants can be said to have 
believed in the creation of these community level organisations, which prior to 
Chavismo, had not existed. Those in La Silsa understood CCs as a means of 
engaging with forms of participation offered by the process of Chavismo. Over the 
years, participants in La Silsa have been involved in other mechanisms promoted by 
government and have showed willingness to continue to do so, such as showing 
interest/enthusiasm in establishing the comuna and 21 Century Socialism.  
 
8.2.1 Registration of consejos comunales 
 
The LOCC outlines the process by which CCs need to register with the national 
government At the time of fieldwork the agency for registering CCs was 
Fundacomunal, part of the Ministry of Popular Power for Communes (MPComunas).  
 
CCs are required to create a ‘promoter’ team, which in turn elects a provisional 
electoral committee at an assembly with at least 10% of the inhabitants within the 
CCs’ geographical remit (see chapter 2). The provisional electoral committee then 
organises elections within a ‘constituent community assembly’, which elects 
spokespeople for each of the units within the CC; if the CC is new this includes a 
permanent electoral committee. To register, CCs need to provide ‘constitutive 
minutes’ that comprise the following details: the name and geographical remit of the 
CC; date, place and time of the constitutive assembly; confirm how the assembly 
was convened and the quorum present; the identity, numbers and signatures of 
                                                
39 Mira, el consejo comunal comienza en el 2006, 2006…Este, comenzó con una participación 
realmente...poca ¿no? En el inicio los consejos comunales …Ehh, realmente cuando el presidente 
Chávez, este, empezó a promoverlos, los consejos comunales, la participación en las comunidades y 
el pueblo, este, empezaron a asomarse, poco a poco… [ahora] tenemos un tercer período del CC. 
Gente nueva, gente que viene con una visión revolucionaria. 
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everyone at the assembly; and the results of the elections identifying who was 
elected as spokespeople to each unit. 
 
The LOCC also provides two reasons where the ministry can abstain from 
registering the CC: 1. The CC has different objectives than those set out in the law, 
and 2. The CC was not constituted exactly in the geographical boundary or where 
another CC exists within the same area (or part of). 
 
Unlike Chacao, participants in La Silsa stated that they encountered no difficulties 
with registering with Fundacomunal. Although, they described that the process was 
particularly arduous and bureaucratic (L008; L009; L010; L015). Participants 
highlighted that prior to the ST, they found the process more difficult. The ST helped 
CCs in La Silsa undertake censuses40, prepare electoral materials, and the electoral 
register (L008; L009; L010; L011; L012; L013). 
 
Participants in La Silsa understood that by registering with Fundacomunal enabled 
CCs to secure funding from government [national, state and/or municipal] (L006; 
L009). During fieldwork the main motivation to get La Silsa’s CCs registered (or new 
spokespeople elected) was for the comuna to become formally established. As 
described in chapter 2, comunas require every CC that forms part of it to be fully 
registered (L006; L009; L010; L011; L013; L014; L015; L017). During fieldwork CC 
participants, who also worked as part of the ST, admitted that coordinating the 
registration of 16 different CCs was difficult (L009; L010).  
 
Interviewees in Chacao described that CCs in the municipality had experienced 
difficulties with Fundacomunal. These can be differentiated into two stages, 
attributed to the pre and post LOCC eras. In the first era (2006-2010), CC 
participants noted that they were able to fulfil the requisites and secure registration 
without any problems (C004; C007; C010; C016). But because of scepticism about 
what CCs meant in the political context, many residents didn’t want to create CCs 
(C004; C007). As mentioned above, this can be understood by participants’ beliefs 
and traditions disagreeing or rejecting Chavismo’s socialism. Consequently, 
                                                
40 Barrios can be notoriously difficult for authorities to enter. Local residents can provide information 
more easily. Providing a census is therefore a way of providing government with detailed statistical 
information. In turn, this means government programmes can be more specifically targeted to those 
with greater needs. Critics, however argue that the census is an infringement on private matters (it 
asks for details of household income, condition and materials used for household construction; types of 
furnishings etc). 
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whether to establish CCs in Chacao was the first dilemma for local residents. A 
second dilemma was how far to progress into the registration process.  
 
Following the enactment of the LOCC, existing CCs were required to reapply for 
registration. This required submitting additional information and updated censuses. 
It was also the period that interviewees identified as most problematic for Chacao 
CCs. There was no clear difference in how CCs were able to become registered 
with Fundacomunal whether by forming CCs for first time in the post LOCC period 
or by updating information and complying with the new law. A number of CC 
participants alleged that despite having complied with the LOCC’s prerequisites, 
Fundacomunal failed to issue/re-issue the registration (C006; C007; C010; C011; 
C013; C016). Some participants observed that their CCs were not registered 
despite submitting information to Fundacomunal 18 months beforehand. 
Participants considered this unacceptable given that each period of registration 
lasted two years (C004; C010; C012; C013; C017). In some cases, the registration 
was finally given but with only 6 months left before it expired. Frustrated CC 
members questioned the lengthy process and the pointless 6 months granted, 
which meant CCs had ‘lost’ 1.5 years worth of CC validation (C012). CC participants 
also described how they had to visit Fundacomunal regularly, once a week, 
sometimes twice weekly, to try and get answers and/or spur things along (C004; 
C010; C012; C013). 
 
A number of different views emerged when I asked participants why CCs had 
difficulties registering with Fundacomunal. The first of these views was that 
Fundacomunal was disorganised and that papers were consistently lost requiring 
CCs to resubmit documents (C004; C007; C009; C010; C012). The second of these 
views considered Fundacomunal to be a politicised state organisation that 
discriminated in favour of those supporting national government (C004; C007; 
C010; C012; C013; C021). The third was that civil servants in Fundacomunal were 
not well trained and experienced a high turnover of staff as well as constant office 
transferrals. Regularly, CCs often had to try and raise their concerns with new 
employees that knew nothing about their case (C004; C009, C010). The fourth was 
that Fundacomunal representatives failed to witness CCs’ elections, which was a 
requirement for registration (C012).  
 
An interview with Antonio, a Fundacomunal officer familiar with Chacao CCs’ 
concerns, stated that to his knowledge no official complaint had been filed: 
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I don’t know of any specific case [relating to CCs in Chacao], but I’m going to 
show you exactly what the official response letters state we send out [to 
CCs]. In all our letters, the part at the bottom states that we [Fundacomunal] 
have to give a response within 15 days. Ok? And we are obliged legally to 
do so. So [the case you mentioned] might be an isolated incident…or there 
is some sort of anomaly. Because we are obliged to ensure that we declare 
and certify what the situation is… Maybe what has happened is a case of, 
ehm, something that we are not aware of. Obviously if we find out about it 
we’ll go straight away to sort it out41. (NG001) 
 
Antonio also argued that he recognised that biased positions were often taken due 
to political differences: 
 
Sometimes what happens is that we justify or vilify things because of our 
political beliefs… But that sectarianism unfortunately exists. You see? It 
[sectarianism] arises … because of extremists42. (NG001) 
 
I interpreted that the officer was highlighting that perhaps the many difficulties faced 
by Chacao’s CCs were not entirely due to the bureaucratic process (which he did 
not negate) but might be indicative of their general reluctance to establish CCs 
completely as a result of their political beliefs. This interpretation can perhaps be 
validated given that not all CCs in Chacao encountered difficulties in conforming to 
the LOCC or renewing their registration certificate. This was the case of two CCs 
interviewed: a CC formed of purely ‘opposition’ members and another with a ‘mixed 
chavista/opposition’ composition (C018; C016). Interviewees from both CCs 
recognised that the process was not easy and the major challenge was getting local 
residents to participate. Despite participation problems, one of these two CCs had 
its RIF [Registro de Identificación Fiscal, tax code] (C018). The RIF enabled the CC 
to apply for and obtain state funding. A participant from another CC (that did have 
                                                
41 Tampoco conozco de ningún caso así específico, pero ya ahorita te voy a mostrar precisamente los 
oficios que nosotros manejamos directamente, todos nuestros oficios dicen en la parte de abajo que 
tenemos nada más 15 días para dar respuesta, ok? Y nosotros jurídicamente tenemos 15 días según 
las leyes… puede que exista un caso aislado o puede que haya sucedido lo que lo que te estoy 
diciendo,… [si existe] algún tipo de anomalía…obligatoriamente nosotros tenemos que mantener ese 
certificado hasta que aclaremos cual es la situación…puede que haya sucedido ese caso o puede ser 
este, eh, algún caso aislado del que no estemos enterados, que obviamente que si nos enteramos 
vamos al campo, pues. 
42 …a veces lo que sucede es que a veces justificamos o satanizamos en base a una tendencia 
política… Ehh pero lamentablemente el sectarismo [existe] ¿ves? Viene… por aquellas personas 
extremistas. 
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problems) argued that many CCs in Chacao did not want to get to the RIF stage 
because they feared that receiving funds, especially from national government, 
would be used against them in the future43 (C010). 
 
8.2.2 Dilemma 1: Supporting or rejecting the ideology of Chavismo 
 
The Chacao CC participants were, apart from one PSUV supporter, opposition 
supporters and vocal critics of Chavismo (C006; C007; C009; C010; C012; C015; 
C016). A group interview (three women) of one Chacao CC described the sentiment 
and general conflict of views that were shared among many CC participants. 
Although they considered CCs to be part of the national government’s political 
project and processes, they asserted that CCs should be politically neutral:  
 
Interviewee 1: let me tell you, let’s be clear, our CC isn’t even of the 
opposition because it’s not political, ok? We are not pro-national government 
but our members are mainly independent, we don’t belong to a political 
party. We are not political activists. Logically we all have a heart, almost all 
of us, well, we all have our little hearts with the opposition. 
Interviewee 2: Mine is this big! [demonstrates a large size with hands spread 
wide] 
Interviewee 1: Ok ok. But you can’t say [that the CC] is of the opposition… 
the majority of people are not political activists for any political party.  
Interviewee 2:  I signed [the revocation petition] against Chávez. I’ve signed 
everything there has been to sign [against Chavismo]… 
Interviewee 1: What is the fundamental thing? The fundamental thing is that 
the majority of people [in Chacao] that belong to CCs are completely against 
[not friendly] national government. This gives them a particular political 
characteristic…they [Chavismo] know it. 
Interviewee 3: We needed to occupy [political] space. You can’t have a 
community where at most 10%, which is high, agrees with national 
government policy and that 10% dominates and imposes the other 90% with 
its policies. It’s not fair. You have to occupy [political] space in order to 
defend yourself. 44 (C010) 
                                                
43 Luís Tascón (former minister of interior) released a list of all those who had signed in favour of 
revoking Chávez from office in 2004. It has been purportedly used since then as a means of identifying 
opposition members, and removing people from public and state authorities (Carroll, 2013). 
44 Interviewee 1: te digo, vamos a estar claros, nuestro consejo comunal ni siquiera es de oposición 
porque no es político ¿ok? No somos oficialistas pero está compuesto de gente principalmente 
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Several Chacao interviewees described their concern of the LOCC requiring CCs to 
‘construct a new socialist society’ (article 2) and how national government was not 
interested in helping CCs which did not follow that world view (C004; C010; L012; 
C014). CCs in Chacao, according to interviewees, were subject to ideological 
determination and for this reason those based in Chacao were told by national 
government that they were not ‘socialist’. Participants emphasised that CCs in 
Chacao were not created to form part of the national government’s ideologised 
political project, rather CCs were understood to be a mechanism to resolve local 
problems (C004; C014; C011, C017; C018).  
 
During a group interview with five women in a CC, one of them, a pro-government 
supporter, started a monologue about the Plan de la Patria [national government 
plan 2013-2017], and ‘what our comandante told us…’. The rest of her CC members 
laughed, as they weren’t Chavistas. The group’s reaction wasn’t discriminatory, but I 
observed this as a collective understanding that meant: we can tolerate political 
views to a certain extent, but we’ll tell you when enough is enough. Furthermore, it 
was obvious that the group of women were friends. There was a strong sense of 
camaraderie among them (C016). 
 
While the majority of participants in Chacao indicated they were not in favour of 
Chavismo and its ideology, the opposite can be said for those interviewed in La 
Silsa. The way in which participants in La Silsa responded to the issue of politics 
and party politics within their respective understandings of the role of CCs reflected 
the polarized nature of Venezuelan national politics and how they saw their position 
within this context. Participants’ traditions and beliefs in Chacao can be interpreted 
as focused towards maintaining their strong civil society-municipal government 
                                                                                                                                       
independiente, no perteneciente a partido político.No militantes políticos, lógicamente todos tenemos 
el corazón, casi todos, bueno, todos tenemos el corazoncito de oposición. 
Interviewee 2: El mío es así de grande. [demonstrates with hands] 
Interviewee 1: ok ok. Pero no puedes decir es de oposición…la gran mayoría de los integrantes no 
militan en ningún partido político 
Interviewee 2:  yo he firmado en contra de Chávez, he firmado todo lo que ha habido. 
… 
Interviewee 1:¿Cúal es la señal fundamental? La señal fundamental es que la mayoría de la gente 
conforma esos consejos comunales pues simple y llanamente no amiga del gobierno, eso le da una 
característica política, o sea, ellos la saben.... 
Interviewee 3: Necesitamos ocupar espacio. Si tu quieres una comunidad donde tienes como mucho 
un 10% pa decirte mucho, que está de acuerdo con las políticas del gobierno, tu no puedes permitir 
que la mayoría de ese 10% sean los que te domine el 90% que no está de acuerdo y que imponga 
una serie de cosas a toda una comunidad, eso no es justo, tu tienes que ocupar espacio aunque sea 
para defenderte.  
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relationship; they did not see Chavismo and its political project as something from 
which they would benefit. In fact, they expressed concern that Chavismo was 
detrimental to both municipal relations but also the wider socio-political context 
within the country. Participants believed that the communal state was being 
constructed with the eventual aim of removing and replacing municipal 
governments. Conversely, the opposite can be said for residents and participants in 
La Silsa.  
 
Participants in La Silsa noted that on the whole CCs worked to resolve community 
problems on behalf of local residents regardless of political affiliations, particularly 
because La Silsa had basic infrastructure needs, and securing projects via CCs to 
tackle these, would benefit the whole community (L006; L007; L008; L009; L012; 
L013; L015). Nonetheless, as will be seen below, more specific questions to 
interviewees regarding the ‘opposition’ generated views that showed elements of 
discrimination between Chavistas and non-Chavistas. 
 
Several participants said that opposition supporters could take part in their CCs, but 
only on the condition that they did not come to ‘sabotage’ the process (L006; L011; 
L014; L016; L019). Where CCs had opposition supporters, interviewees stated that 
these members needed to either tone down their political ideas or ‘come around’ to 
the revolutionary way of thinking (L012; L011; L019). There were also interviewees 
who aimed to convey that Chavismo worked on behalf of the whole community, 
whereas other parties or political ideologies did not (L006; L016). This is perhaps 
rooted in Chavista propaganda: I observed that Chavismo constantly denounced the 
opposition on state radio, TV channels and newspapers as doing everything they 
could to derail the process. Thus the maintenance of electoral support within 
Chavismo’s key areas, such as La Silsa, is essential. Within La Silsa participants 
expressed this as a need to prevent their own CCs being taken over or derailed by 
those with political leanings favouring opposition parties.  
 
Andrea described this in a way which implied that other residents need to 
understand that funding comes from Chavismo, not some other apolitical source: 
 
In the end they [opposition supporters] have had to [understand that 
Chavismo has funded projects], for their own welfare, for their own benefit, 
because they are poor people. But as they are of the opposition they have 
had to give way to us [Chavistas]. We are the ones that want to help them, 
165 
 
independently of their political ideology. They have to put up with this 
because we have to talk about politics. Because everyone in the barrio 
needs to know where our funding comes from and who provides it. It doesn’t 
just fall out the sky45. (L006) 
 
Unlike Andrea’s (L006) radical position, other participants framed the shared history 
and commonalities of the neighbourhood rather than any political differences that 
might have existed among residents (L008; L009; L010; L012; L013). Carmen, 
stated that the CC did not discriminate on political beliefs and worked as long as it 
benefitted the community:  
 
…now we’re working [in a way] that doesn’t matter what colour or race you 
are. Nothing. We all work together, respecting one another and their 
ideology. Everyone’s ideology at that moment. Let’s see, they [opposition 
supporters] give [us] respect only because we are the ones [Chavistas] that 
provide solutions for our community46(L010). 
 
The majority of La Silsa’s CC participants ultimately saw CCs as a mechanism for 
improving their neighbourhood. Chavismo had provided residents with this space 
and opportunity. In turn, this meant participants were willing to support Chavismo 
which they considered worked on their behalf. However, for certain interviewees 
CCs were a space for Chavistas and the process towards creating socialism. 
Furthermore, CCs were spaces that required protecting from opposition (L011; 
L016). Javier described this as follows: 
 
Interviewer: How do you incorporate people with different [political] 
tendencies in the CC? 
Interviewee: We’re radical. Why? The comandante [Chávez] said “look, 
we’re going to turn a page, we’re going to sit down with the opposition”. And 
what did they do? An oil strike [2002-3]…which affected everyone… you 
                                                
45 Pero al final ellos han tenido que, por el bienestar de ellos mismos, por sus propios beneficios, 
porque son personas de bajos recursos. Pero son opositores. Y ellos han tenido que ceder. Ceder 
ante de nosotros [Chavistas] porque nosotros, este, queremos ayudarlos. E independiente de su 
ideología política. Y tiene que soportar porque nosotros tenemos que hablar de política. Porque todo 
el barrio tiene que saber, la comunidad en pleno tiene que saber de donde vienen los recursos, 
quienes los baja. Porque no caen del cielo. 
46 …ahorita estamos trabajando así, no importa color ni creaciones, razas ni nada. O sea trabajamos 
todo en conjunto. Respetándonos esa ideología. O sea la ideología de cada quien en ese momento. O 
sea se respeta porque solamente trabajamos para darles una solución en nuestra comunidad. 
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see? We have this experience… we’re not going to debate with the 
opposition knowing that they are coming to sabotage and we know that they 
have no interest… They just want to create a plot to defeat the socialism that 
our comandante started. We are not going to debate in our space, our space 
that was won for revolution. A space won for socialism. A space won by our 
comandante Chávez. And we’re not going to take one step backwards from 
the bourgeoisie that just wants power. What they want is the oil to keep 
meeting their own needs, just like they did in the 4th Republic [pre 1998].  
Interviewer: But does the opposition participate in the CC? 
Interviewee: Yes, they participate. But…I’ll repeat, [we don’t tolerate] those 
that want to be involved to sabotage the CC and ensure that it doesn’t make 
any advances, or so that the CC is in turmoil, or that they provoke situations 
where the CC is viewed negatively.47 (L016) 
 
8.3  CONSEJOS COMUNALES AT WORK: ESTABLISHING ‘RULES IN 
USE’ 
8.3.1 Taking part 
 
During fieldwork, only one of the newer CCs (established 2010) in Chacao had 
regular meetings every Tuesday. The CC comprised 15 principal members and had 
approximately 11 members that turned up regularly (C014). Other CCs in Chacao 
met infrequently (C012; C021). Participants described that their respective CCs only 
organised meetings or assemblies when there was a specific issue to discuss. 
Examples observed were: writing an open letter, which was later covered in local 
media; denouncing discrimination of Chacao CCs; campaigning against local 
developers; and meeting with municipal government officers and municipal police 
regarding anti-crime measures due to a spate of local murders and kidnappings.  
                                                
47 Interviewer: ¿Cómo se trata de incorporar gente con visiones diferentes en el consejo comunal? 
Interviewee: Somos radicales. ¿Por qué? El comandante dijo “bueno, vamos a pasar la página, vamos 
a sentar con las oposiciones” [sic] ¿Y que hicieron ellos? [Oposición] Un paro petrolero [2002-3]...que 
afectó al pueblo…¿Ves? Y nosotros con esta experiencia…no vamos a debatir con la oposición 
sabiendo que ellos vienen a sabotear, sabiendo que ellos no les interesa al... que ellos lo pasan en 
complot para derrotar la parte del socialismo que impulsó nuestro comandante…no vamos a debatir 
en nuestros espacios, espacio ganado por la revolución. Un espacio ganado por socialismo. Un 
espacio ganado por el comandante Chávez. Y nosotros no vamos a...a... un paso atrás en contra de 
esta burguesa que quieren el poder. Lo que quieren es el petróleo para seguir satisfaciendo sus 
necesidades como hacían en la cuarta republica. 
Interviewer: ¿Pero al nivel del consejo comunal hay participación de la oposición? 
Interviewee: Sí, hay participación. Pero.... repito, ellos quieren estar en los consejos comunales para 
el saboteo, para el saboteo para que el consejo comunal no avanza, para que el consejo comunal 
queda en pelea, para que la pelea provoque, ehhh, diferentes situaciones que el consejo comunal se 
vea negativo. 
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Some interviewees said that their CCs met infrequently because of registration 
problems, which led to member despondency, and general public safety 
concerns/insecurity (C006); or, in most cases, participation fatigue because CCs 
required lots of work, time and meetings with little immediate benefits (C009; C010; 
C012; C015; C016; C018). The time consuming nature of CCs was considered by 
some participants to affect their personal and family life (C009; C016; C018). Two 
interviewees highlighted that although their CCs did not meet very often some of its 
members worked within, or in conjunction with other local organisations such as the 
church and ADV (C007; C011). A further, compelling reason was people did not 
want to formalise their participation because of the Tascón list that was released in 
200448 (C015).  
 
The consequence of the above was that on average CCs in Chacao had a small 
core 4-8 people that did all of the day-to-day work and met regularly (C010; C014; 
C018). Participants highlighted that the lack of participation and motivation was not 
the same as lack of interest. Interviewees described that residents were very keen 
to keep up with current issues or gossip in an informal manner, whether via 
telephone, email or on the street (C006; C009; C010; C012; C015). 
 
Members of a CC, in one of Chacao’s working class neighbourhoods, described that 
despite having secured funding for a considerable housing rehabilitation project 
interest declined dramatically once residents found out which houses were to be 
included and those that were not. One participant, of the group of women in the CC 
mentioned above, described that there was a considerable element of self-interest 
and lack of will from people in their neighbourhood to work unpaid on behalf of the 
wider community: 
 
Why is there apathy? Local residents want you to resolve problems, that you 
work, and they are at home watching TV. Why? Because they are lazy! 
(laughs) Laziness! In reality it’s a lack of commitment. If you’re a person who 
commits to something, as a human not just a CC spokesperson, it’s your 
level of personal commitment that makes you do it. If I commit to something, 
I do it because it’s my reputation on the line. But there are people that don’t 
see it like that. [They say] “ If others are getting benefit and I’m getting 
                                                
48 See footnote 43, page 148.  
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nothing, why am I going to work for free?” Because what we do is voluntary. 
If you tell people that it’s voluntary, they don’t take part. It’s lack of 
commitment49. (C013) 
 
Notwithstanding the challenges to CC participation in Chacao, participants did 
highlight the support from a particular local resident, who had subsequently been 
employed by the municipal government to promote community engagement. His 
advice was significant in providing CCs with information about the registration 
process (C007; C012; C010; C017; C019). 
 
In contrast to Chacao, CCs in La Silsa were considerably more active. Though a 
majority of participants were unclear of the differences between CC and comuna 
meetings. Participants mentioned that CC meetings generally took place in the 
evening, usually after 7pm, or at weekends, to allow those who work or study to 
participate (L007; L008; L009, L012; L013; L019).  
 
Participants stated that assembly meetings attracted around 40-50 people on 
average. However, this number was mainly formed of CC spokespeople who were 
elected to lead the CC on behalf of the community. On occasions where specific 
projects were being discussed, funding was being received or accounts presented, 
a much wider audience of local residents attended these meetings (L006; L019). 
Participants also described that levels of participation increased with the delivery of 
projects (or the potential of ‘seeing results’) with support from La Silsa’s ST (L006; 
L007; L009; L010; L011; L012; L015; L016; L017).  
 
The LOCC requires CCs to create various sub-committees. In Chacao, due to very 
low numbers taking part on a frequent basis these sub-committees were not 
operating. Interviewees in La Silsa noted committees existed within their respective 
CCs. They also told me that members would not be confined to working in the 
committee they were assigned to; they would also help other committees when 
needed (L009; L012; L016; L019).  
                                                
49 ¿Por qué la apatía? La gente pretende que resuelves el problema, que tu trabajes, y ellos están en 
su casa viendo televisión ¿Y por qué eso? Flojera! (risas). Flojera! En realidad es falta de 
compromiso. Cuando tu eres una persona que te comprometes con algo tu nivel de compromiso, 
como ser humano ni siquiera como vocero del consejo comunal, es tu nivel de compromiso personal 
que te exige…Si yo me comprometo lo hago porque es mi nombre que está en juicio. Pero hay gente 
que no lo vea así. “Si otros benefician, y si a mi nada, ¿Por qué voy a estar trabajando gratis?”. 
Porque eso es ad honorem. Si dices que es trabajo gratis, la gente no la hace. Es falta de 
compromiso. 
 
169 
 
 
Some CCs in La Silsa established internal rules to ensure that assembly 
participants have a right to speak with time limits (3 or 6 minutes). Meetings were 
facilitated by a nominated person, which was agreed upon by the assembly (L012; 
L013; L014; L015; L016). Participants in La Silsa described their respective CCs 
made decisions either by consensus (L006; L008; L014) or by simple majority 
(L012). Nonetheless, having observed meetings in La Silsa, voting was the 
preferred decision making method. Should conflicts arise, these were managed by 
holding a separate meeting with those involved in the dispute to avoid affecting the 
assembly. Any serious matter would be dealt with at the spokespersons’ meeting 
with the aim of trying to secure resolutions (L012; L013; L016). 
 
I observed CCs presenting their accounts at the comuna’s assembly. Participants 
confirmed that this was done to ensure transparency and accountability. They also 
stated that accounts were presented within their CCs as well as at the comuna 
assembly (L015; L011; L016). Javier, Fundacaracas officer and local resident, 
argued the need for transparency in managing funds and other resources, making 
reference to requirements for this in the LOCC and comuna laws. He also noted that 
in the past CCs, not necessarily in La Silsa, were involved in low level corruption 
(funds going missing, non-implementation of projects). He argued that to avoid this, 
cultural change was required. He saw his role as a municipal government staff 
member seeking to establish better links between the municipal government and the 
community, principally via workshops and training (L016). 
 
Despite the overall level of activity in CCs, La Silsa spokespeople, like those in 
Chacao, noted that other residents in the community only tended to get involved in 
CC meetings or the CC when projects were being implemented and when they 
could potentially be beneficiaries. Interviewees observed that participation tended to 
decline when there were no tangible results (L006; L007; L009; L019). But 
interviewees felt that this changed since the ST was established. The ST, combined 
with the impulse towards creating the comuna, became a vehicle to produce clearer 
proposals and implement projects. This in turn encouraged increased participation 
(L006; L007; L009; L010; L012; L017).  
 
Participants were conscious that those who worked, studied or had family 
commitments would find it difficult to commit to the CC on a regular basis. 
Participants interviewed, for example, were retired or unemployed (L012; L013; 
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L015; L019); self-employed with time flexibility (L012) or worked in conjunction with 
their CCs and the comuna (L009; L010; L011; L016). As a result, participants 
lamented that CCs had problems of ‘the same old faces’50 and ‘too many meetings’ 
(L006; L009; L010; L012). However, the CC law, which requires re-election of 
spokespeople every two years, was understood to be a positive step in trying to 
prevent this dynamic from occurring (L007; L010). Participants also noted that 
generally young people were less likely to participate (L009; L010; L012). But during 
fieldwork initiatives were being implemented which sought to increase levels of 
youth participation in community activities (L010; L012; L015).  
 
8.3.2 Projects and funding 
 
The LOCC outlines that CCs can obtain funds from six sources: 1. National, state or 
municipal governments; 2. national government decentralisation funds (FIDES and 
LAEE); 3. public agencies; 4. funding generated internally by the CC; 5. donations; 
and 6. any other financial activity permitted by law and the constitution 
 
Despite the general lack of participation, continuity and regular meetings, CC 
participants in Chacao still described achievements, projects and activities that their 
CC had been involved with, either on its own, with other CCs or civil society 
organisations. Though in most cases projects undertaken directly by Chacao’s CCs 
were very limited. Participants of two CCs described having secured national level 
funding for respective housing and piped gas projects (C016; C018). Participants of 
another CC noted that their council secured funding from the State of Miranda to 
lease a community hall (C005; C021). In most cases, due to lack of formal 
registration, CCs were used as a platform for campaigning and sharing sub-
municipal level concerns with the municipal government to try and direct municipal 
spending towards their residential area (C004; C005; C006; C007; C010; C011; 
C012; C013; C014; C015; C018; C019).  
 
As noted in the previous chapter, the PB in Chacao was one of the CLPP’s key 
processes seeking community opinion where the municipal government’s budget 
should be spent. The CLPP also accepted proposals from the community 
organisations such as CCs and, if approved, implemented projects. Though there is 
                                                
50 Here interviewees wished to emphasise that it was still a relatively low number of residents that 
actively took part. Many other residents were unable or uninterested to participate to the same extent 
as those with the ability or motivation to take part. 
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opportunity for CCs to be involved in CLPP processes, it is not automatic or 
guaranteed; several participants noted that their CC had taken part in the CLPP’s 
PB, but with mixed response. 
 
Interviewees from three CCs were content with the CLPP’s PB process and results 
(C010; C011; C012; C018). Conversely, several interviewees described repeating 
petitions in several PBs (different years) without seeing any results. Those who had 
not received funding from the CLPP held a critical view, or expressed 
disappointment with the PB process (C006; C007; C015; C016). 
 
I observed that two CC participants who argued in favour of the CLPP had either 
direct involvement or had a family member in the CLPP (C012; C010). Thus, it could 
be argued that their CCs had an ‘advantage’ in CC-CLPP relations over other CCs 
that did not. Nonetheless, another participant stated that he considered that the 
CLPP had ‘excellent’ communication with the community, and the projects were a 
positive result of this relationship (C014). Similarly, another CC member also 
considered that the CLPP works well because of its community members. For this 
reason the community was able to express its concerns and look for solutions 
(C018).  
 
Those who were more critical of the CLPP argued that certain areas within Chacao 
were prioritised more than others, or that some CCs with close links to CLPP were 
dealt with first (C015). Others argued that communication between the community 
and CLPP was poor (C006; C007). Ana considered that the CLPP should be more 
open and accessible, implying that it was a closed circle of friends. This circle 
orchestrated the projects that the CLPP approved and where those projects were 
delivered (C013). 
 
Interviewees in La Silsa described that the barrio had significant problems which 
had been tackled in a piecemeal fashion by residents’ over the years, and in many 
cases this was not sufficient. As will be discussed in more detail in the next section, 
participants also believed that prior to Chavismo, La Silsa received very little help 
from previous governments, whether national, state or municipal. At the time of 
fieldwork, La Silsa had become a recipient of both municipal (Fundacaracas) and 
national government (Misión Barrio Nuevo Barrio Tricolor51) programmes to improve 
                                                
51 A national government programme targeting chosen barrios with 7 objectives: establish a comuna, 
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barrio conditions. A couple of participants identified that funding came from other 
sources such as the National Police College (UNES) (L012) or the CFG and GDC 
(L016). As discussed in previous section, the new relationships established between 
the community, the ST and the municipal government/Fundacaracas enabled more 
projects to secure funding. 
 
As described in chapter 6, La Silsa is an informal settlement, on a steep hillside 
location. As such, key projects identified by interviewees included those tackling 
basic infrastructure needs such as paving streets (L007, L009, L010, L015); 
creating sufficient drainage channels - the steep hill and heavy tropical rain can lead 
to landslides and water entering houses lower downhill (L007; L008; L010; L014; 
L015); improving potable water and/or sewage connections to houses (L007; L009; 
L015); and retaining walls, again to prevent landslides.  
 
Unlike Chacao, very few participants in La Silsa could identify what the CLPP was 
and its purpose. The PB process undertaken in Libertador was not necessarily 
associated with the CLPP but the municipal government. Three participants 
described that their CC attended meetings regarding the PB to hear about how 
budgets would be allocated or project submissions accepted for the forthcoming 
year (L007; L009; L016). Interviewees described that CCs were able to think about 
projects they considered appropriate; these were presented in assemblies at the 
comuna where different proposals were discussed and prioritised. One or two CC 
proposals were submitted each year to the municipal government. Hence, it was 
unlikely that CC projects were prioritised via the PB process (L006; L007; L009; 
L016). 
 
Javier52, who coordinated municipal government-community matters, summarised 
how the CCs, comuna, CLPP, and municipal government were interlinked: 
 
Interviewer: Have La Silsa residents taken part in many participatory 
budgets over the years? 
Interviewee: No. It’s at the level of Caracas [Libertador/ GDC] but before the 
participatory budget was managed by CCs which have more people 
                                                                                                                                       
promote inclusiveness, improve living conditions, improve security, generate a communal goods 
distribution system, construct a “communal economy”, and ensure assembly decision making is 
established and made permanent (SIBCI 2013).  
52 Javier was a CC spokesperson in La Silsa as well as municipal government employee. 
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[involved] because of their open assemblies. [They] don’t take into account 
or give much importance to what neighbourhoods are most vulnerable with 
different problems. They gave more importance to those with power. More 
power to influence funding decisions. Now it’s different, the participatory 
budget is deliberative. First…[at the level of] CCs…[then] they deliberate 
within the different comunas that they are developing in different spaces 
[areas]. There…they look at the big, macro-sized projects which will benefit 
various neighbourhoods. Beforehand funding only benefitted one CC, [or] 
one [sub] neighbourhood. Now all the projects are done at a general level 
[which encompassed various areas]. 
Interviewer: Is there any relationship with the CLPP? 
Interviewee: We don’t work directly with them. They work from the municipal 
government …and they discuss the approval of the different projects [which 
have arisen] from the participatory budget, as well as other. 
Interviewer: So the [projects identified by CCs in the] participatory budget 
process get passed to the CLPP and then to the municipal government, 
which transfers the funds? 
Interviewee: Correct. There are budgets that the Alcaldía Libertador 
[municipal government] manages, but there are other budgets that need to 
be discussed with other institutions like the CFG, like the CLPP…the 
Ministry of Comunas among others. 
Interviewer: With the support that comunas are receiving from 
Fundacaracas, is this helping to strengthen CCs? 
Interviewee: Yes, definitely. Right now we are at a stage where the CCs are 
managing a lot of funding. And these are from projects that were discussed 
[planned] 4 years ago.53(L016) 
                                                
53 Interviewer: ¿Han participado en el presupuesto participativo durante muchos años en La Silsa? 
Interviewee: No, eso es a nivel de Caracas [Libertador] pero anteriormente el presupuesto participativo 
que maneja los consejos comunales que llevan más gente por medio de asamblea abierta. No 
importa, sin importar realmente cuales son los sectores que son vulnerables a diferentes 
problemáticas sino que allí sea él que tiene más poder. Más poder para que llegara los recursos. 
Ahora no, ahora el presupuesto participativo se discute, primero…en los consejos 
comunales,…[luego] se discute en las diferentes comunas que se están desarrollando en los 
diferentes espacios. Allí…se estudia los proyectos macro que beneficia a los diferentes sectores. 
Anteriormente no, anteriormente solamente se benefició un consejo comunal, un solo sector. Ahora 
no, ahora los proyectos son a nivel general. 
Interviewer: ¿Hay alguna relación con el CLPP? 
Interviewee: Nosotros no trabajamos directamente con ellos. Trabajan desde la Alcaldía Libertador 
donde hacen ese trabajo…y se discute la aprobación de diferentes proyectos del PP, y otros pues. 
Interviewer: Ese proceso del presupuesto participativo pasa al CLPP y luego a la Alcaldía para 
transferir los recursos ¿verdad? 
Interviewee: Verdad. Hay recursos que maneja la Alcaldía Libertador, pero hay recursos que tienen 
que ser discutidos con otras instituciones como el CFG, como el CLPP… el Ministerio de las Comunas 
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The above quotation provided insight on how CCs in La Silsa were beginning to 
obtain support from different governmental levels: the national government 
programme and national government funding agencies, as well as GDC and 
municipal level such as the municipal government and its agencies. Chacao’s 
community engaged primarily with the municipal government, and very rarely with 
state or federal level government and agencies. The next section explores how, and 
if, state-community relations have changed in Chacao and Libertador as a result of 
the agency of those involved in CCs. 
 
8.3.3 Traditions and beliefs: Relationship with government and agencies 
 
On the whole, despite the disappointment with PB or CLPP processes, Chacao CC 
participants considered that the municipal government, over various administrations, 
had responded well to the community’s demands. Interviewees noted that they were 
informed sufficiently (some noted the website was a good source of information) 
and consequently participated in the municipal government’s programmes and 
consultations (C005; C006; C010; C011; C013; C015; C018). 
 
Alejandra, a former municipal government officer, argued that during the period 
2001-2008 the municipal administration made considerable efforts to increase 
participation. In the following quotation it is interesting to note that the participant’s 
language resembles a similar logic to Chavismo despite coming from a distinct 
ideological background.  
 
One of the things that citizen participation does is to raise citizens’ 
consciousness about the right to participate. Right? So [Mayor Lopéz] 
wanted to break the old models of doing things [paternalist government, see 
Alcaldía de Chacao 2007; Valero Alemán 2009]. But it’s also a question 
about what the state’s institutions can do…It’s a policy that demonstrates 
transparency and gives [citizens] confidence [in their municipal government].  
This is fundamental for all local governments. Or all national governments… 
We can see that this link in the policy to [encourage citizen] participation. It’s 
                                                                                                                                       
y otros pues. 
Interviewer: Con el apoyo que ya tienen las comunas con Fundacaracas ¿eso está ayudando los CC 
fortalecer? 
Interviewee: Sí, claro, ahorita estamos en una etapa que los consejos comunales están manejando 
muchos recursos, ehm, de proyectos que están discutiendo desde hace 4 años. 
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the way that citizens can participate and that they are beside [holding the 
municipal government to account/ being involved] with their local 
government. In this way you create positive municipal development because 
they [citizens] have collaborated in the process of social participation.54 
(C006) 
 
The above interview provided considerable insight into the way in which municipal 
government community-relations in Chacao were established since 2001. Elements 
of these had continued into the Graterón administration and could be observed 
during fieldwork. The clearest example was the way in which CLPP carried out its 
PB process. The PB was introduced in Chacao in 2000 and linked with the CLPP 
when this was formed (Valero Alemán 2009). 
 
When Chacao CC participants were asked if they observed any changes between 
mayors and their administrations in how they engaged with community, participants 
talked very highly of the Irene Sáez period (1990s), and the López administration 
(2000-2008), but were less enthralled with the Graterón administration (2008-2013). 
Political differences between Mayor Graterón and local councillors, and Graterón’s 
inefficient and unresponsive administration were attributed by participants as factors 
in shaping their negative views (C006; C011; C013; C015; C018).  
 
Certain interviewees were aware that the municipal revenue diminished in recent 
years, so the Graterón administration did not have as much spending capacity as 
previous administrations (C011; C018). Despite this, some CC participants still 
considered that they had the ability to influence in what their municipal government 
spent money. They considered that this was a form of recognition of their CC by the 
municipal government despite the lack of registration with Fundacomunal (C010; 
C018). Alejandra, pessimistically, warned that there is always a danger for 
administrations or politicians susceptible to applying clientelism and a risk of 
populism (C006). 
 
                                                
54 Con la participación ciudadana una de las cosas que se da también es la conciencia ciudadana que 
es el derecho de participar ¿no? Entonces va rompiendo con otros modelos y va transformando…el 
entorno. También eso lleva cuestionamiento de lo que pueden ser las instituciones del estado…Es 
una política que mostraba la transparencia y daba confianza. Eso es fundamental en todos gobiernos 
locales. O todo gobierno nacional...Porque veíamos también esa bondad en esa política de 
participación. En la medida que los ciudadanos participan y que están a lado de su gobierno local. En 
esa medida tienes la fruta del desarrollo municipal porque ellos colaborarían en la labor de la 
participación social…  
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Chacao interviewees considered that the municipality was the form of government 
closest to the citizen, not the emerging comuna structure pushed by Chavismo. 
Participants cited suspicion of communism, or state relations resembling 
communism, which they argued was the goal of national government. As a 
consequence they were against the new communal state and the move towards 
reducing the municipal government’s capabilities or importance (C004; C006; C009; 
C010; C012; C013). 
 
La Silsa’s CC participants were in the process of consolidating, registering and 
actively seeking to form a comuna. In comparison to Chacao’s participants, they 
had no qualms in contributing towards the construction of the communal state. As 
noted in section 8.2.2, this was based on participants support, underpinned due to 
their traditions [community marginalization by previous governments] and beliefs 
[pro-Chavismo]. 
 
Participants described that in the past La Silsa had little relationship with the 
municipal government, and politicians only appeared at election time, which resulted 
in the community trying to resolve matters on their own. Andrea noted that there 
were occasions where the problem was too big or complex and required external 
expertise and funds, which were not available (L006). Participants also described 
that previous administrations were simply not designed to help barrios due to the 
considerable bureaucratic structures and procedures. Furthermore, the municipal 
government did nothing about issues or projects identified by the community (L009; 
L010; L011). Teresa described that beforehand people had to wait in queues, were 
fobbed off, and had to return on a later occasion. She believed that CCs could now 
operate and implement their own projects resolving community issues in La Silsa, 
which had previously been ignored by the municipal government: 
 
They had every type of excuse [before]. Now they meet with us and there 
are more results. [CCs] get funding given to our hands so that we can 
manage and implement [projects ourselves] 55(L009) 
 
Several participants stated that the current relationship with the municipal 
government was positive and supportive which was considerably different from 
                                                
55 tenían una excusa de por medio. Ahora nos atendemos. Ahora hay mas respuesta. Llegan los 
recursos a nuestras manos [CCs] y nosotros mismos los manejamos y ejecutamos. 
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municipal administrations in the pre-Chavez years (L006; L009; L010; L011). The 
municipal administration supported CCs by regular attendance at meetings and 
events, and providing materials, information and workshops with the aim to 
strengthen CCs (L006; L009). Participants also recognised the importance of other 
municipal government agencies such as Fundacaracas and IMGRAD [risk 
management] (L006; L009; L010; L011; L015).  
 
Participants described that liaising with IMGRAD meant that areas of substantial risk 
(landslides or unstable ground) became a key part of project development. This had 
improved CC participants’ understanding, because of the propensity of landslides in 
La Silsa, it was not worth investing valuable resources into projects in these areas 
(L009; L011). Because the municipal government, and ST, provided technical 
support, CCs were able to follow a logical process in creating project proposals 
which were based on accurate costing and appropriate materials. Consequently, 
CCs’ proposals were better prepared and more likely to be approved by the 
municipal government56 (L006; L009; L010; L011; L016).  
 
Participants in La Silsa demonstrated a sense of confidence provided by the shift in 
government-community relations. Andrea described this in relation to how the 
mayor was perceived: 
[The mayor] is a comrade like us. The difference is massive because before 
mayors didn’t give anyone participation. Nor did they say take the money 
and manage it [yourselves]. 57(L006) 
 
Carmen expected that the municipal government’s response would now be 
guaranteed: 
 
…I think now that with all the information about the comuna everything is 
going to be much more positive. Because the process is much quicker. For 
example, if we submit a project [to municipal government] we now know that 
we will get an answer the next month. Now we can give our community a 
guarantee that we will have a project [to improve] paving or drainage 
                                                
56 Funds had been allocated to CCs by the CFG but it was the municipal government who transferred 
them to CCs when their proposals were approved. 
57 [El alcalde] es un camarada más que nosotros, o sea que la diferencia es demasiado grande 
porque antes los alcaldes no te daban la participación ni te decían toma la plata y maneja 
recursos.(L006) 
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channels.58(L010) 
 
Participants described that all levels of government were now required to work 
together with communities rather than simply acting in a top-down dynamic (L009; 
L011). Daniel stated that Chavismo provided a shift in government-community 
relations beyond the municipal level: 
 
We’ve seen a change from the municipal government and the ministries. 
We’ve seen a change in the relationship [between] the national government 
and communities. The comandante showed us…that it’s the [local] 
communities that need to [come up with their] proposals, not the 
government. So, it’s not to start from the top-down but rather from the 
bottom-up. 59(L011) 
 
Teresa, on the other hand, stated that given the close relationship between the 
community and the municipal government, between the community and those with 
specific expertise [such as IMGRAD or the ST] a fruitful dynamic already existed. 
There was no need to dismantle the concept of the municipal government as the 
discourse of the communal state advocated (L009). To qualify her position, she 
described a relationship where it was municipal responsiveness that was key to the 
community’s development and should not be lost: “We can’t lose it. We can’t lose 
this link between the community, the municipal government, and the ST. We can’t 
lose it” 60(L009).  
 
In comparing both municipal governments, participants in Chacao developed 
different views of CCs and their role within project planning and implementation. 
Interviewees indicated that this was due to the historical legacy and traditions of 
municipal government-community relations in each municipality. La Silsa 
participants were ignored by previous administrations prior to Chavismo, the 
                                                
58 …creo que ahora, con toda la información de la comuna, todo va a ser mucho más positivo. Porque 
es mucho más rápido el proceso. Si presentamos un proyecto por decir algo en lo que va del mes ya 
sabemos que para el mes entrante ya nosotros tendremos una respuesta. Ahora nosotros podemos 
garantizar a nuestra comunidad que tenemos un proyecto de caminaría, o de torrenteras, ya por lo 
menos nosotros en un mes tendremos respuesta. 
59 Hemos visto el cambio en la alcaldía [y] los ministerios. Hemos visto un cambio en el gobierno 
central hacia las comunidades. El comandante nos enseñó de que...son las comunidades que tiene 
que dar su propuesta, no el gobierno que da su propuesta. O sea no empezar de arriba abajo, sino de 
abajo hacia arriba.[original emphasis]. 
60 No se puede perder, ese vínculo no se puede perder, entre la alcaldía, la Sala Técnica y la 
comunidad. No se puede perder” (L009). 
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community via CCs and the emerging comuna felt that they now had a key role in 
shaping the development of their neighbourhood. Chacao participants felt that the 
municipal government had generally performed well and were proud of the 
achievements that the municipal government had secured over a decade. Hence, 
they saw no need for a complete overhaul in state-society relations. Chavismo’s 
advocacy for a communal state was understood by La Silsa’s participants to be part 
of a system where they played a central role in shaping their local area. They 
‘bought’ in to the vision of Chavismo, its move towards socialism and the communal 
state. The opposite could be said of Chacao participants: they saw the communal 
state as depriving them of the very system that had supported them well. The 
communal state, on the other hand aimed at redistributing wealth across 
geographical inequalities, which for Chacao, would mean that their municipality 
would not be front and centre of governmental policy. As discussed in section 8.2, 
many CCs in Chacao were established to ensure that Chavistas did not take hold of 
these mechanisms of political participation. Participants occupied these political 
spaces with the aim of preventing further penetration of Chavismo in Chacao. This 
practice resulted from the political beliefs of over 80% of the local population (CNE 
2013). 
 
8.3.4 Dilemma 2: state-civil society relationship summary 
 
CCs, in both Chacao and Libertador, materialized in a context where national 
government had implemented numerous spaces for participation in the first five 
years of Chavismo. These included (but are not exclusive to) CTUs, Missions such 
as Barrio Adentro, and CLPPs. As Chavismo increasingly sought to move towards 
creating a socialist state it also sought to overcome some of the obstacles it 
encountered in spaces such as CLPPs (lack of implementation; differences between 
community and political representatives), whilst also consolidating other 
arrangements, such as Barrio Adentro into the CC structure.  
 
Participants in Chacao and La Silsa, drawing on their respective political beliefs and 
different traditions, recognised that CCs were born out of Chavismo’s ideologised 
and politicised background and consequently CCs worked as political spaces. 
Libertador participants understood CCs to be spaces with agency, provided to them 
by Chavismo, enabling community development. Given that La Silsa had a weak 
civil society in the past, CCs provided participants with a space for advocacy with 
government. They understood CCs to have been brought about by Chavismo. As a 
180 
 
result, participants were grateful, supportive of Chavismo and promoted the move 
towards the communal state and socialism. Chacao participants, on the other hand, 
were suspicious of CCs and understood that they emerged and were conceived with 
an ideological purpose (moving towards the communal state). Paradoxically, despite 
being opposed in principal to communal state mechanisms, participants felt that 
they needed to create CCs to prevent spaces being taken over by Chavistas, which 
they felt would not represent the core political beliefs of their respective local 
neighbourhoods. Furthermore, Chacao participants sought to frame their CCs as 
just like any another community organisation prevalent in Chacao, such as ADVs, 
which were understood as a means of channelling community concerns.  
 
8.4  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The chapter presented two key findings. As a result of CC participants’ beliefs and 
traditions, two dilemmas were encountered: 1. CCs’ links with Chavismo; and 2. 
changes in state-civil society relationships and structure. Participants’ beliefs, 
traditions and response to the dilemmas they faced were shown to have influenced 
the way CCs operated and the ‘rules in use’ that they adopted.  
 
Section 8.3 described in detail how participants understood how their respective 
CCs and their respective processes worked. Despite different understandings and 
the dilemmas identified above, participants in both Chacao and La Silsa described 
CCs as spaces for community activism and improving their respective communities. 
Chacao participants, for the main part, were not fully registered with Fundacomunal 
and were therefore restricted in the projects that could be implemented or 
undertaken by their respective CCs. Participants indicated that the municipal 
government was willing to accept CCs as a local community organization. Like the 
CLPP-PB, CCs were invited to the municipal government’s engagement processes. 
Participants in Chacao defended the role of the municipal government as the key 
provider of services and municipal public works; they were suspicious and critical of 
Chavismo’s intended move towards the communal state where municipal 
government’s future may be jeopardised. This was a state-civil society relationship 
that they were determined to preserve; they saw Chavismo as a potential threat.  
 
La Silsa CCs were encouraged to register fully because they sought to formalise the 
area’s comuna. Participants considered that establishing the comuna would lead to 
more projects being implemented, and therefore obtain more neighbourhood 
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improvements. As La Silsa became a target for the municipal government (via 
Fundacaracas) and national government’s barrio improvement programmes, the 
installation of a ST meant that CCs received considerable support in meeting the 
requirements of Fundacomunal. The ST provided support to develop CCs’ 
capabilities to present coherent and viable projects to the municipal government. 
Chacao’s CCs did not have a ST catering specifically to them, although they did 
have a municipal government staff member who was able to provide general advice 
and information. 
 
La Silsa CC participants were significantly motivated to engage with the difficult 
registration process because there were clear benefits in doing so: the possibility of 
receiving funding and implementing projects. Without that motivation, projects would 
not be implemented in areas such as La Silsa (barrios). The response to these 
opportunities generated an inverse type of dilemma in La Silsa compared with 
Chacao. The dilemma was that if people did not take part in CCs, and the comuna, 
they would not see improved state-civil society relations. Participants in La Silsa 
therefore felt compelled to register their CCs, actively take part, and promote the 
emerging comuna and Chavismo’s move towards the communal state. 
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CHAPTER 9 INTERPRETING PRACTICES OF 
VENEZUELAN PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 
 
9.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides further analysis of the empirical findings presented in 
chapters 7 and 8. These chapters described the experiences of two cases of 
participatory mechanisms in Venezuela, CLPPs and CCs, both of which have been 
implemented in different ways in the two municipalities studied. Chapter 7 identified 
that CLPP participants described three main sets of dilemmas. These were 
generated as a result of changes to the CLPPs’ composition, questions over the 
absence of elections or the way elections were held, and the ways that community 
members and political representatives understood their roles and remit. Chapter 8 
described that CC participants in Chacao and La Silsa, drawing on their beliefs and 
traditions61, understood their agency as a form of state-civil society relations. The 
political traditions experienced before and after Chávez played a key role in how 
participants in La Silsa and Chacao interpreted CCs and their subsequent agency. 
Chacao participants were more reluctant to accept CCs as anything other than as 
neutral community organisation (i.e. not linked to a political party/ Chavismo). La 
Silsa participants saw CCs as a form of improved state-civil society relations, and 
felt compelled to register their CCs, actively take part, and promote the emerging 
comuna and Chavismo’s move towards the communal state. 
 
Section 9.2 provides an analysis of the key findings with regards to the components 
of the analytical framework. The institutional dimension (‘rules of the game’; ‘rules in 
form’, ‘rules in use’) is discussed first, followed by the ideational dimension 
(traditions, dilemmas, beliefs). This section builds upon Hay’s (2011) interpretive 
institutionalist model by seeking to provide an account of how the model was 
operationalized in relation to the findings discussed in chapters 7 and 8. It is 
identified that there is scope to accentuate the concept of ‘tradition’ in the model. 
 
Section 9.3 provides further discussion on where the findings of the research about 
citizen participation in CLPPs and CCs sit within wider democratic theory. The 
                                                
61 See definitions in table 4.2. 
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section discusses how the dilemmas that occurred in CLPPs and CCs are 
consistent with empirically-based scholarship related to democratic innovations. The 
uncertainty of successfully increasing citizen participation within existing traditions of 
representative democracy is also consistent with Bevir and Rhodes’ interpretivist 
theory – which plays a key role in Hay’s model. Conclusions to the chapter are 
provided in section 9.4. 
 
9.2  REFLECTION ON THE INTERPRETIVE INSTITUTIONALIST 
APPROACH  
 
This section unpacks Hay’s (2011) interpretive institutionalist model, drawing from 
the empirical study of CLPPs and CCs in Venezuela. It builds on the experience of 
operationalizing a model that seeks to combine two bodies of theory which have 
traditionally been seen to be ontologically and epistemologically incompatible. In 
summary, Lowndes and Roberts (2013 pgs 66-67) argue that many institutionalists 
(such as HI and RC, see chapter 4) typically seek explanations by centring their 
analysis on institutions. They remain sceptical of how new constructivist theories are 
‘institutionalist’ because of their focus on actors and agency rather than ‘institutions’. 
However, there is recognition that constructivist and SI approaches have potential to 
provide enhanced explanations of actors’ agency (Hay 2006; Lowndes and Roberts 
2013). Interpretivists have staunchly opposed institutionalism because it ‘reifies’ the 
concept of ‘institutions’ and downplays the importance of actors’ individual beliefs 
and agency (Bevir 2010; Bevir and Rhodes 2010). However, (Bevir and Rhodes 
2010 pg 20) have conceded that constructivist institutionalism has the potential to 
break away from ‘modernist-empiricism’ and provide explanation of ‘the beliefs and 
desires of actors’.  
 
Hay’s (2011) model sought to capitalise on this convergence between two theories, 
particularly between the ideational explanations of interpretivism and the 
‘opportunities and constraints’ (typically through ‘rules’) provided by institutionalism. 
Hay's model leads to an ontology which perceives reality as something developed 
by agency as well as shaped by external forces (structures) that go beyond agency. 
Hay’s model enables structures and/or institutions to be conceptualised as socially 
constructed, therefore providing reconciliation for interpretivists, such as Bevir and 
Rhodes, who have argued that such concepts lead to a ‘reification’ of actors’ 
behaviour. Hay’s model also helps constructivist strands of SI make linkages 
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between agency and structures/ institutions, particularly by understanding the way 
individual actors’ ideational reasoning shapes structures/institutions and vice versa. 
The remainder of the section explores in detail the interfaces between the 
institutionalist and interpretive dimensions of Hay’s model. It is identified that the 
concept of ‘traditions’ has greater overlap between the two dimensions than Hay’s 
model currently offers. 
 
9.2.1 Institutional dimension 
 
Hay (2011) conceives institutional contexts to be the configurations of ‘opportunities’ 
and ‘constraints’ that actors are faced with (see diagram 4.1). The framework of this 
thesis adopted additional components for the institutional dimension drawing from 
institutional theory. Chapter 4 established that the definition of institutions adopted 
in the thesis was “rules of the game”, which is then sub-divided into two further 
components of “rules in form” and “rules in use”. New institutionalist scholars 
consider that discerning the difference between how rules are played out enables 
an understanding of how institutions shape the agency of those involved (Lowndes, 
Pratchett and Stoker 2006; Leach and Lowndes 2007; Lowndes and Roberts 2013). 
Leach and Lowndes (2007) emphasise that the rules in use may be considerably 
different from those set out in form. 
 
Findings presented in chapters 7 and 8 showed that in addition to the formal rules 
set out in legislation, actors also conducted alternative practices (informal rules in 
use). These are summarised in table 9.1. With regard to the units of analysis, we 
can understand the following: CLPPs and CCs have their remit, membership and 
operational capacity defined in law. For institutional ‘designers’62, the ideal scenario 
would be that these “rules in form” would be interpreted and understood by CLPP 
and CC participants and carried out in a specific way. This would mean that the 
rules in use would be equivalent to the rules in form. However, as the findings 
showed, when CLPP and CC actors demonstrated conduct that was not defined by 
law, informal practices and ‘rules in use’ emerged. One would consider that 
scenarios such as these do not comply at all with the ‘rules in form’, and could 
potentially lead to a reconfiguration of the rules in form to constrain these practices 
or to adopt them as the new rules in form. This would result from actors’ 
understandings and responses to them (dependent on ideational factors, see 9.2.2). 
                                                
62 Term borrowed from Lowndes and Roberts (2013). It signifies any person involved in public policy 
making that seeks to provide definitions about how ‘institutions’ should be formed and operate.  
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Since 1998, Venezuela has been undergoing deep, fast structural changes. During 
such periods of change, rules in form might not suffice to deal with new scenarios. 
There is the need for rules in use to be adopted to try out new possibilities in 
periods of transition. These transitional rules in use may crystallize into rules in form 
with time.  
 
Currently Hay’s model states that, within any institutional context, the dynamic that 
will lead to a process of change is dependent on what Hay terms ‘governance 
failure’. It is at this point that the model creates an interface between the institutional 
and ideational dimensions. Hay adopted this term from interpreting Bevir and 
Richards (2009 pg 7 cited in Hay 2011 pg 179) where they linked ‘dilemmas’ to 
‘problems and failings in existing institutional arrangements’. The model enables a 
way of understanding, and conceptualising, how different, contingent configuration 
of rules in use versus rules in form in practice may generate a dilemma. Instability 
may occur where more dilemmas are generated, and actors seek to act in ways 
other than those envisaged by the ‘rules in form’. This may also present a moment 
of change. Conversely, stability may occur where fewer dilemmas are being 
generated. Although dependent on a number of factors, this may be a result of 
institutional arrangements being stable and/or actors interpreting and understanding 
these arrangements as sufficient – according to their beliefs. 
 
Five main dilemmas (discussed in 9.2.2) were identified in the findings. One 
example that we can briefly draw on from the findings was the way participants 
interpreted the 2010 CLPP reform. In Chacao, participants were able to comply with 
the 2010 law. Participants in Libertador had not made the necessary changes to 
comply with the reform. Libertador’s CLPP structure was out-dated (according to the 
reform). Furthermore, the municipal government had failed to set-up the ST and 
employ a secretary, as required. As a result, community members in the Libertador 
CLPP had to undertake roles and responsibilities that those in Chacao did not. From 
the institutionalist concepts of the model, we can say that, in practice, Libertador’s 
CLPP employed considerably more informal ‘rules in use’ than Chacao. Because it 
had not conformed to the 2010 law, and continued to operate, I interpreted this as 
demonstrating ‘informal rules in use’. The findings provided another example, which 
showed that CCs in Chacao demonstrated considerably more informal ‘rules in use’ 
(infrequent meetings, coordinating with the municipal government despite lack of 
registration) compared with La Silsa where practices showed more conformity to the 
rules set out in legislation. Consequently, in each of the cases, dilemmas were 
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generated for participants and influenced how they acted and responded to the 
context within which they were situated. The next sub-section will explore the way 
actors’ interpreted matters in more detail.  
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Case/ 
Analytical 
component 
 
Chacao CLPP Libertador CLPP Chacao CCs La Silsa CCs (Libertador) 
Rules in form  2010 CLPP law;  
 2011 Municipal by-law 
 2010 CLPP law;  
 2008 Municipal by-law (out of date) 
 2009 Organic CC law  2009 Organic CC law 
Rules in use  Councillors failed to turn up to 
plenary meetings; approve 
budget (both CLPP and 
municipal). 
 Community members in ‘office’ since 
2006 without re-election (law stipulates 
2 year terms). 
 Councillors failed to turn up to plenary 
meetings; approve budget (both CLPP 
and municipal). 
 No ST or CLPP Secretary employed; 
community members adopted these 
roles. 
 CCs meeting less frequently than expected 
(greater than every 2 weeks). 
 CCs able to engage with municipal 
government despite not being fully registered. 
 
 
 Generally compliant with law. 
 Some merging of activities/ 
coordination between CCs and 
La Silsa’s comuna. 
Traditions 
(see also 
table 9.2 for 
more 
traditions) 
 Roles and remit of councillors 
remained strong in local 
governance decision-making 
and influence. 
 Most community members 
professionals (architects, 
accountants, teachers) 
 Roles and remit of councillors remains 
strong in local governance decision-
making and influence. 
 Most of community members retired. 
 Many CC participants had strong links with 
other civil society organisations. 
 
 Little or no civil society 
participation prior to Chavismo. 
 CCs emerged from other 
mechanisms introduced by 
Chavismo (Barrio Adentro; Land 
and Water committees). 
 
Beliefs  Ideologically opposed to 
Chavismo/socialism. 
 However, CLPP not expressed 
as being explicitly linked to 
ideology of Chavismo/socialism. 
 
 Ideologically supportive of Chavismo/ 
socialism. 
 CLPP understood to be a mechanism 
introduced by Chavismo. But Chavismo 
now directing its attention to newer 
mechanisms linked with communal state 
(CCs/Comunas). 
 Ideologically opposed to Chavismo/socialism 
(except one interviewee). 
 CCs understood to be a key component of 
creating Chavismo’s communal state/ 21stC 
Socialism. 
 CCs understood to be akin to other civil 
society organisations. 
 
 Ideologically supportive of 
Chavismo/ socialism. 
 CCs understood to be a key 
component of creating 
Chavismo’s communal state/ 
21stC Socialism. 
 
Dilemmas  Councillors questioned the 
adequacy of the electoral 
process – and subsequent 
composition and legitimacy – of 
community members. 
 Councillors’ ability to over-turn 
CLPP plenary decisions (made 
by community members).  
 
 
 Councillors and mayor have given very 
little support to CLPP; attended once a 
year at municipal budget approval. 
 Community members left to deal with 
day-to-day running and coordination of 
CLPP and its activities 
 Lack of elections (community members 
and JPC). 
 Lack of conformity to 2010 law. 
 Lack of/difficulty registering with 
Fundacomunal. 
 Deciding to what extent to participate/utilise a 
mechanism that is contrary to ideological 
beliefs and understood to be constitutive of 
constructing a ‘communal state’ which 
participants expressed opposition to. 
 CCs established as a defensive action 
preventing Chavistas create CCs in a local 
area dominated by opposition supporters. 
 Fear that the political agency 
obtained through CCs – granted 
by Chavismo - would be taken 
away from participants if the 
mechanisms were not 
continually used and defended 
from the perceived threat of 
losing them via opposition 
parties. 
 
Table 9.1 Thesis framework components with examples drawn from findings 
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9.2.2 Ideational dimension 
 
Interpretivists and SI institutionalists alike highlight that agency is important to 
understand because actions are a result of actors’ interpretation of the opportunities 
and constraints. Lowndes and Roberts (2013) describe actors’ agency compliant 
with the institutional context or in contestation of it. As described in chapter 4, Bevir 
and Rhodes (2003; 2006; 2010) consider actors to engage in ‘situated agency’ that 
is dependent on actors’ traditions, beliefs and dilemmas.  
 
By looking at the findings from chapters 7 and 8 (table 9.1), we can see why the 
ideational components taken from interpretivism were useful heuristics. We 
understand that actors came to their respective CLPPs and CCs from different (and 
multiple63) traditions. Bevir and Rhodes emphasise that traditions are mere starting 
points in the way participants will interpret and understand their respective CLPP or 
CC. We need to look at how participants have interpreted contexts and respond to 
dilemmas, according to their beliefs and traditions, in order to understand how and 
why participants acted in a certain way (see table 4.2 for definitions). Although 
discussed in detail in section 9.2.3, my findings show that the component ‘tradition’ 
may incorporate ‘informal rules’ or practices. Institutionalists would consider these 
informal rules or practices a form of ‘institution’. Consequently, this points to an 
additional link between institutionalism and interpretivism. I consider that this is a 
matter that has potential to improve the operationalization of Hay’s model. I argue 
that ‘tradition’ is a conceptual tool that institutionalists need to take more into 
account, especially for those using Hay’s model.   
 
The findings showed that the ideational components of the model were useful in 
eliciting how CLPP and CC participants understood the wider political context within 
which they were situated. Participants expressed their views about politics, about 
local and national governments, and the way in which other participants acted within 
their respective CLPPs and CCs. Based on this, a picture was established about 
why these participants had decided to take part in their respective mechanisms in 
the first place, and how they conceptualised the processes they were involved in. 
The findings exhibited linkages between the institutional and the ideational 
dimensions. These linkages were not linear but cyclical (as per Hay’s model, see 
figure 4.2). The following provides a more detailed account of the three ideational 
                                                
63 Educational, political, socio-economic status, family, cultural, or religious traditions, for example. 
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components of the thesis framework. The concepts of beliefs, traditions and 
dilemmas are discussed in turn. Discussion of the relationship between the two 
dimensions is also developed in the remainder of the section.  
 
Beliefs 
Bevir (1999; 2010a) and Bevir and Rhodes (2003; 2006; 2010) emphasise that 
beliefs and webs of beliefs that participants hold are individual and personal. The 
findings show that eliciting beliefs from participants was fruitful. Participants were 
very keen to share their beliefs about the case studies being explored and the wider 
context within which they were situated (particularly the political setting). 
Furthermore, we know that the benefit of identifying beliefs is contingent on actors’ 
traditions. These two components will then be drawn upon when actors encounter 
‘dilemmas’.  
 
Chapter 7 found that beliefs about participation in CLPPs were closely related to the 
opportunities provided to sets of actors by the formal rules. Namely, councillors saw 
their role as municipal legislators first and foremost (a tradition). Their role in the 
CLPP was of secondary importance. Furthermore, because they had interpreted 
their role in the CM as their primary role, and because they had undergone ‘first 
grade’ elections, they saw themselves as more important than community members. 
Community members believed the CLPP provided them with equal participation 
(equal deliberation rights) and decision-making rights (although councillors retained 
final decision making powers). The findings showed that the different sets of actors 
interpreted and understood their respective roles differently. These led to practices 
that generated dilemmas. These dilemmas were also underpinned by power 
imbalances between councillors and community members (which were a result of 
the way their respective roles were defined in legislation/rules in form, and later as 
traditions). This provides weight to interpretivists’ assertion that practices are 
contingent on actors’ beliefs and traditions.  
 
Chapter 8 found that CC participants’ beliefs were generally grounded in whether 
they supported Chavismo or not, and whether they were participating in a process 
moving towards socialism and the communal state. The consequence of 
participating in favour (La Silsa CCs) or against (Chacao CCs) this political process 
generated dilemmas. However, in accordance with the interpretivist view, we can 
make sense of these based on actors’ traditions. 
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As the findings demonstrated, incorporating beliefs within Hay’s model enables 
scholars to look at the way rules and practices are understood by actors and 
provide explanation why they acted in a certain way. An institutionalist account does 
not place as much emphasis on this dimension. Conversely, a purely interpretivist 
approach would not necessarily acknowledge the different rules (institutional 
opportunities and constraints). Hay’s model enables both dimensions to be taken 
into account. 
 
Traditions 
When explaining change, Bevir (1999 pg 197) argues that the focus of analysis 
should lie on individuals who extend and modify traditions by drawing on their own 
‘webs of belief’. To avoid reifying traditions, Bevir stresses the need to ensure that 
traditions are understood to belong to individuals. Although there may be many 
traditions which are shared among others, the myriad traditions that an individual is 
exposed to is unique. The tradition should emanate from the particular ‘webs of 
belief’ being studied (Bevir 1999 pg 210). Bevir (2004 pg 618) considers that 
change comes from individuals’ reasoning based on their beliefs and personal 
conception of agency, whether in practices, traditions and/ or institutions. 
Explanation of social change is possible because the concept of tradition permits 
the operationalization of ‘situated agency’. These patterns of reasoning are 
personal, particular and contingent to individual’s experiences. Furthermore, Bevir 
emphasises that change comes from processes that are neither random nor fixed. 
 
Through analysis of interviews, observational data and documentary review, three 
sets of traditions were identified in relation to CLPPs and CCs. These were political, 
governmental and state-civil society traditions. These are summarised in table 9.2. 
Although these traditions are presented as collective traditions, it is understood that 
participants interpreted these traditions according to the context and their own 
beliefs and traditions. Furthermore, it should be iterated that traditions can be 
considered in a collective manner insofar as ‘people are not autonomous’ (Bevir, 
Rhodes and Weller 2003; Bevir and Richards 2009 pg 10) and because ‘traditions 
may be widely shared’ (Bevir and Rhodes 2001 pg 109). However, one must 
remember that despite the existence of traditions, no one idea is shared by each 
participant in the same way (ibid). Hay summarises this characteristic of traditions 
as ‘inter-subjective’ but, like Bevir and Rhodes, does not provide any further 
explanation. A gap therefore remains regarding conceptualising the relationship 
between individual and collective (shared) traditions. Further discussion is provided 
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in sub-section 9.2.3. 
 
Tradition/ Location Chacao Libertador/ La Silsa 
Political Anti-Chavismo; Voluntad 
Popular (social democratic); 
Primero Justicia (centre 
right) 
Chavismo 
Governmental Support traditional, federal 
republic and government. 
Also support JPs which were 
removed in 2010. 
Favour construction of the 
‘communal state’ if citizens’ 
agency is maintained and 
expanded; less support to 
maintain federal governmental 
system. 
State-civil society relationship Good traditional municipal 
government - civil society 
relationship. See no need for 
fundamental institutional 
change. 
Previous political and social 
marginalisation; increased 
inclusiveness with Chavismo. 
See institutional change as a 
positive shift in government-
community relations. 
Table 9.2 Summary of traditions identified in Chacao and Libertador 
 
Political Traditions 
Chapter 2 provided an account of the move towards Chavismo. Thus following 40 
years of stormy economic and political strife, the two party system – and its links 
with neoliberalism – were voted against with a country seeking change. In 1998, 
however, Chavismo was not openly radical; it was over time in government that the 
policies became increasingly radical, advocating both the move towards “21st 
Century Socialism” and the “communal state”. Old political parties still existed, but 
had to make way to new political parties, which quickly became more dominant in 
the new political landscape. In Chacao, both CLPP and CC participants (with one 
exception) identified that they rejected Chavismo and its advocacy of socialism. 
CLPP participants in Libertador and CC participants in La Silsa described that they 
were very much in favour of Chavismo.  
 
Government traditions  
Chavismo, as a political movement, increasingly sought to establish alternative 
institutions to the existing federal government with the aim of establishing the 
“communal state” as part of the move towards “21st Century Socialism”. In Chacao, 
CLPP and CC participants expressed scepticism of the motivations behind the 
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communal state and rejected this ideology. Common in participants’ responses was 
the idea of the long-term goal of Chavismo was to substitute the municipality for 
communal state structures. Participants expressed their desire to preserve the 
existing federal state structure. The findings also showed that the role of political 
representative was a government tradition that was given particular importance by 
councillors. Councillors understood their role as a tradition of political representation 
within the system of federal government. This shaped their view of their relationship 
with civil society. La Silsa’s participants highlighted the perceived absence of 
government in their neighbourhood as a defining element why they consequently 
supported Chavismo and its subsequent moves towards building the communal 
state. Supporting Chavismo, and its goals, was understood as a way of continuing 
the new linkages developed with municipal and national governments. 
 
State-civil society relationship 
La Silsa’s CC participants expressed that community links with national and 
municipal governments failed to exist before Chavismo. Participants believed that 
La Silsa was subject of historical community marginalization by previous 
administrations (national and local). CLPP participants in Libertador did not discuss 
this matter other than expressing that they wished for the CLPP relationship to be 
better supported by the mayor and the municipal government.  
 
In Chacao, both CC and CLPP participants stated their relationship with municipal 
government, in particular, was very strong. La Silsa’s CC participants expressed 
more affinity and interest in exploring alternatives to representative forms of 
democracy. Findings showed that La Silsa CCs provided participants with new ways 
of choosing community representatives (in CCs and the emerging comuna); a sense 
of community spirit and belonging; and, most importantly, a means of dialogue with 
municipal and national governments, which enhanced participants’ sense of 
ownership over the way their local community would be developed. These resemble 
Lacabana’s (2009) findings. Chacao’s participants essentially wished for pre-
Chavismo forms of state-civil society relations to be maintained (in Chacao) or re-
established (in places where traditional state-civil society relationships were not 
prevalent). Unlike Chacao, La Silsa participants expressed a desire for taking 
decision making control away from traditional representatives and government and 
putting it in the hands of the community in a form of direct democracy seen to be 
being established. 
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The concept of tradition has been useful in identifying that: 
 Councillors have been socialised64 into their role. Regardless of the political 
party they belonged to, they shared very similar views of their role in relation 
to the community; 
 The previous state-civil society relations provided a solid base to understand 
how participants would then draw on their beliefs with regard to dilemmas 
occurring out of CC and CLPP practices. 
 Actors’ traditions did not determine their subsequent actions. A clear 
example was the way in which community participants in Chacao formed a 
JPC (contrary to their stated beliefs and traditions) in order to re-establish 
the CLPP (discussed further below). 
Critics of Bevir and Rhodes have expressed that the concept of tradition is difficult 
to operationalize (Kjaer 2011; Wagenaar 2012). Kjaer (2011 pg 108) suggests that 
(Bevir and) Rhodes’ concept of tradition needs to be supplemented with additional 
tools for analysis, such as exploring the socio-economic conditions that actors face. 
She argues that it is important to combine institutions and political agency and ask 
how and why political actors live by the rules and how they seek to or succeed in 
affecting them (Kjaer 2011 pg 106). Again, this provides further weight to Hay’s 
model because it does incorporate institutionalist components where the 
interpretivist dimension is fuzzier in this regard.  
 
Bevir and Rhodes (2012 pg 204) state that traditions enable explanation of beliefs, 
actions and practices. But the ‘looseness’ of the concept of tradition is further 
exemplified when Bevir and Rhodes (2012) state that scholars need to choose 
traditions which will provide a narrative for the clearest explanation they wish to 
make. It is likely this level of subjectiveness of ‘traditions’ that critics, particularly 
institutionalists, take issue with. Nonetheless, Bevir and Rhodes (2008 pg 730) 
argue that the concept of ‘structure’ is also vague and embodies a tendency to draw 
causal properties which they feel is unreflective of the ‘fuzziness’ of everyday life.  
 
The findings show that traditions have been particularly important in the way CLPP 
                                                
64 This is derived from Bevir and Rhodes (2006 pg7) definition of tradition: ‘We define a tradition, 
therefore, as a set of understandings someone receives during socialization’. Rhodes (2011b) 
describes how this occurred in the context of civil service and ministerial practices in British 
Government. It refers to how organisational characteristics, practices and knowledge are passed from 
one generation to another – such as a more experienced colleague describing ‘how things work 
around here’ to a new starter. 
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and CC participants have interpreted and acted within these political spaces. As a 
conceptual component within Hay’s model, I consider that there is scope to give 
more emphasis to traditions. The concept encapsulates not only the myriad 
individual traditions that a participant has been exposed to, but also the institutional 
configurations within contexts such as CLPPs and CCs. Their rules, whether formal 
or informal, encapsulate traditions (such as the role of political members, for 
example). The dynamic transition between the individual and collective is something 
that institutionalism and interpretivism do not generally account for: interpretivists 
emphasise the individual, institutionalists the collective. As will be discussed in 
9.2.3, placing greater emphasis on traditions, in conjunction with dilemmas, 
enhances Hay’s model whilst supporting Bevir and Rhodes (2012 pg 202) 
contention that doing so provides a means of explaining how contestable narratives 
and accounts can be for socially constructed matters. 
 
Dilemmas 
Bevir and Rhodes (2003; 2006; 2010) and Hay (2011) use the concept of ‘dilemma’ 
in order to convey where change occurs in the model. For Bevir and Rhodes the 
way actors respond to dilemmas, within a situated context, is dependent on their 
own traditions and (webs of) beliefs. The way actors act is dependent on a) whether 
they change their beliefs as a result of the dilemma and act accordingly, or b) reject 
changing their beliefs as a result of the dilemma and contest the cause of the 
dilemma. The findings described that participants’ encountered dilemmas in CLPPs 
and CCs. The concept was particularly useful in understanding how participants 
interpreted legislation and decided to act either in accordance or in divergence from 
it. During interviews, participants often provided their reasoning in relation to a 
certain dilemma. They did so by drawing on, and expressing, their beliefs. 
 
Dilemmas identified in the findings can be summarised as follows: 
 Dilemmas encountered by CLPP participants: 
1. Legislative reforms affecting CLPP composition 
2. Design and implementation of elections 
3. Roles, remit and legitimacy between political and community 
members 
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 Dilemmas encountered by CC participants: 
1. CCs’ links with Chavismo 
2. Changes in state-civil society relationships and structure 
The first of the three CLPP dilemmas related to the way in which the CLPP had 
been subjected to three legislative changes within a relatively short space of time 
(eight years). Hay (2011) pointed out that Bevir and Rhodes do not pay sufficient 
attention to where new ideas may come from. This has implications for providing an 
account for the origins of CLPP dilemma 1. It is here that drawing from the 
institutionalist dimension in Hay’s model provides some insight. Lowndes and 
Roberts’ (2013 pg 202) argue that by adopting a more holistic view of institutional 
change (as opposed to only one form of explanation) ‘significant change may result 
from internal as well as external drivers’. The impetus for change was not 
dependent on the specific interaction of participants in the CLPPs of Chacao or 
Libertador because the change was a result of a change in legislation coming from 
national government. The origin of the dilemma related to CLPP composition can be 
attributed to the exogenous rule changes brought about by new legislation. 
However, it does not account for how participants responded to the dilemma. For 
this explanation we need to draw on participants’ beliefs and traditions. Hay’s model 
therefore allows for the institutional and interpretive dimensions to be 
accommodated and accounted for theoretically. 
 
The findings provided several examples where this was the case (see section 7.4.1 
for full discussion). The following example is the most illustrative: the way Chacao 
participants negotiated the need to form a JPC in order to comply with the 2010 
reform. JPCs were understood by Chacao participants to be part of the communal 
state, which they opposed. This can be understood to be related to their beliefs and 
traditions (see tables 9.1 and 9.2). This shows that participants had to negotiate the 
dilemma drawing on the other ideational components in order to understand the 
opportunities that the new rules (2010 reform) would enable them to re-establish the 
CLPP, which was a mechanism of participation that they regarded as positive.  
 
CLPP dilemmas 2 and 3 related to introducing citizen participation into arenas 
traditionally composed only of politicians (mayors and councillors). The existing 
roles and remit of councillors and mayors had not changed in the municipal 
legislature (CM) and executive, respectively. From the ideational dimension, these 
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roles and remits could be considered traditions. The transmission of traditions 
established a set of beliefs and practices that councillors adhered to. It did not, 
however, mean that councillors would necessarily conform. This was dependent on 
the dilemmas councillors were presented with. 
 
The introduction of the CLPP provided politicians with an additional council role at 
the municipal level. Given that decision-making powers lay principally in the CM, 
councillors questioned the extent to which community representatives could make 
decisions in the CLPP. One of the most notable findings was that, regardless of 
their political affiliation, there was little difference in the way councillors in Libertador 
and Chacao understood their role. It is clear from the findings, that in terms of 
decision-making capability, councillors wielded more power than community 
members. The interpretive institutionalist model has been helpful in identifying and 
providing an account of why councillors have acted and understood their roles to be 
such.  
 
From an institutionalist perspective, Lowndes and Roberts (2013) consider power 
may be established through practices, regulation (rules), or storytelling (dominant 
narratives). According to Bevir and Rhodes ‘power’ should not be reduced to 
interests people may have beyond the situation within which they are located. 
Accordingly, they state: 
 
power can refer to the way in which traditions impact on individuals' beliefs 
helping to define them, their actions, and the world. Power refers here to the 
constitutive role played by tradition in giving us our beliefs and actions, and 
in making our world (Bevir and Rhodes 2010 pg76).  
 
In this case the tradition can refer to the role of councillors and the CM (as identified 
in chapter 7). Bevir and Rhodes (ibid) also note that power can be drawn from ‘the 
restrictive consequences of the actions of others in defining what we can and 
cannot do’. Political representatives and community members will be restricted in 
their actions in one way or another by what other actors enable them to do. 
Generally institutionalists would state that the agency of participants is constrained 
by institutions, and of the power dynamics among actors within it. Yet, Bevir and 
Rhodes warn that institutionalists often conflate agency fixed by norms and do not 
take into account the contingency of actors’ actions underpinned by their ideational 
interpretations. They are ‘not contingent on the particular beliefs and actions of 
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people at a particular time’ (ibid). Drawing on dilemmas as a result of beliefs and 
traditions enables explanation that is temporal, historical and describing patterns of 
action through time within their specific and local contexts (Bevir and Rhodes 2010 
pg 77). 
 
Hay’s model was useful in identifying the narrative behind councillors’ response to 
the dilemma(s) they faced. It enabled links to be made between the rule changes 
(institutional dimension) and participants’ beliefs and reasons to how they 
responded to them (ideational dimension). The rules in form were important for 
providing participants the opportunities and constraints to take part in the CLPP. 
However, CLPP dilemma 1 showed that Chavismo created rules in form granting 
the ability for elected community members to share a deliberative space for 
municipal planning with local politicians. CLPP dilemma 2 showed that electoral 
procedures were important and needed to be accepted between types of members 
in order to avoid questions of legitimacy. However, both dilemmas generate a 
question that is likely to be ever present in CLPP dynamics: could councillors and 
community members ever consider one another’s roles and remit legitimate?  
 
In relation to these perspectives, we can see that councillors have drawn on their 
traditions (as political representatives and drawing on their tradition of this role in the 
CM) in order to constrain the agency of community members (either by inaction in 
the CLPP; by overturning decisions made in the CLPP plenary in the CM; or by 
revoking funding for projects). Community members obviously sought to maximise 
their agency within the CLPP. However, councillors described that community 
members assumed roles and made capacity for decision-making which they 
considered inappropriate (beyond their duty). Councillors viewed their agency and 
decision making capability above that of community members. This is drawn from 
councillors’ individual actions according to the beliefs, traditions and context within 
which they were situated. In order for the CLPP community members to be 
accepted by political representatives within the CLPP would require political 
representatives to change their beliefs (about their role and what the role of 
community members entails).  
 
The data showed that both of the CC dilemmas were derived from the way in which 
participants interpreted CCs, and the subsequent way in which Chavismo sought to 
change state-civil society relations, with particular emphasis on citizen participation. 
The findings showed that Chacao’s participants, due to their traditions and beliefs 
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(good, historical municipal-community organisation links; political affiliation with 
opposition), initially viewed CCs with scepticism. Their later actions to formulate 
CCs were in response to a dilemma (the ability of Chavistas – a minority locally - to 
establish a CC in their area). Despite their political beliefs, scepticism of Chavismo 
and tradition of good engagement with the municipal government, CCs were 
established. Actors’ actions reflected a response to the specific dilemma they 
perceived. In this scenario, the creation of CCs by themselves was better than 
leaving it to others (Chavistas) who may use CCs for their own (political) ends. An 
institutionalist account may not have focused on the way participants responded 
and acted, particularly in this example where participants acted contrary to their 
stated beliefs. The role of institutional opportunities and constraints play a smaller 
part in explaining actors’ response compared with the ideational components.  
 
Hay’s model has been key to identifying the links between the institutional and 
ideational dimensions, which interpretive or institutionalist theories alone would not 
do. Actors drew on their traditions and beliefs and acted according to their situated 
context. Conversely, the ideational reasoning in La Silsa was that without 
establishing CCs there would be very little improvement of state-civil society 
relations. Participants expressed affinity to Chavismo for providing them the 
opportunity to establish new mechanisms for engagement.  
 
9.2.3 Developing Hay’s model: increasing the role of ‘traditions’  
 
So far, with regard to the findings, I have discussed that the model has been useful 
in identifying: 
 CLPP and CC practices that showed that ‘rules in use’ did not always 
conform to CLPP and CC legislation. From an institutionalist perspective, it 
can be understood that ‘informal rules in use’ were practiced. 
 The model enabled a way of understanding, and conceptualising, how 
different, contingent configurations of ‘rules in use’ versus ‘rules in form’ in 
practice may generate a dilemma. But there is a need to understand the 
relationship with traditions. This supports Hay’s assertion that institutional 
failures, i.e. deviations from the intended rules in form or practice, would 
lead to dilemmas. 
 Five dilemmas from the case studies. Participants acted and responded to 
the context and dilemmas they faced showing accordance with the 
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interpretivist stance that their actions were a result of ideational reasoning. 
 The ideational dimension of the model enabled accounts for explaining how 
actors reacted to contingent contexts, reforms or other moments of change - 
something which institutionalists argue is lacking in many forms of new 
institutionalist theory (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). 
 The ideational dimension enabled the context of the reforms to increase 
citizen participation in Venezuela to be understood and explained through 
participants’ traditions, beliefs and the dilemmas that occurred in practice. 
 Participants presented reasons (e.g. for or against Chavismo) why they 
encountered dilemmas in relation to the practices of CLPP and CCs by 
drawing on their webs of beliefs. Traditions were also identified as being 
important, particularly for providing an explanation of the origin of the 
dilemmas faced by the two sets of actors. 
 
The findings showed the importance of the interplay between the institutionalist and 
ideational dimensions of the model. But what is unclear is the convergence between 
the two dimensions regarding the relationship between the concepts ‘practices’, 
‘institutions’ - ‘rules in use/’rules in form’ - and ‘traditions’. According to Bevir, we 
have no way of knowing how actors will react to a rule or norm because they are 
entirely dependent on their own beliefs and traditions. Consequently, further 
analysis and discussion is required on the following: 
1. The extent to which the concept ‘tradition’ incorporates participants’ actions 
and how these become and/or shape the ‘rules of the game’ (and vice 
versa).  
2. Describing shifts from the individual to collective/ systemic levels of analysis. 
My analysis of the NI and interpretivist literature highlights considerable potential for 
convergence than either body of theory currently gives the other credit for. 
Interpretivists consider that practices, rules and institutions are simply the sum of 
individual actors drawing on their beliefs and traditions; changes occur in response 
to dilemmas. While institutionalists place ‘institutions’ at the centre of their analysis, 
they have also recognised that practices are dependent on actors’ agency whether 
in conformity or contestation of institutional arrangements (Lowndes, Pratchett and 
Stoker 2006; Leach and Lowndes 2007; Lowndes and Roberts 2013). In order to 
understand why ‘tradition’ can be a shared concept among interpretivists and 
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institutionalists, further scrutiny of the concepts ‘rules, ‘practices’ and ‘institutions’ 
seeks to bridge the linguistic and conceptual gap.  
 
Rules: “a norm of rule does not determine how people will understand it, let alone 
respond to it” (Bevir 2010 pg 267). Here Bevir emphasises that institutions do not 
exist outside of people - they exist as social constructions - and are entirely 
dependent on the ideational reasoning of actors. Lowndes, Pratchett and Stoker 
(2006 pg 546) identified ‘actors do not always follow rules, but they do know when 
they have broken them!’ This implies that actors have knowledge and engage in 
reasoning for acting in a certain way – and is clearly something that institutionalists 
are aware of. Furthermore, Leach and Lowndes (2007 pg 185) state: 
 
But, rules-in-use often vary considerably from rules-in-form. Effective 
political institutions are those that are ‘lived’ by political actors: their strength 
does not rely upon pieces of paper or other physical artefacts – they find 
expression simply as the conventions or ‘unwritten rules’ of daily life. They 
are, however, more than personal habits: they are shared among actors and 
can be articulated by them. Rules-in-use are, in short, the distinctive 
ensemble of ‘dos and don’ts that one learns on the ground’ (Ostrom, 1999: 
38). [my emphasis] 
 
The quotation provides another indication that interpretivists and institutionalists 
share similar conceptual apparatus but use different language. It highlights that that 
‘rules in use’ are shared among actors, and from generation to generation, in the 
same way that interpretivists describe socialisation of ‘traditions’.  
 
Practices are defined ‘as a set of actions, often a set of actions that exhibit a 
pattern, perhaps even a pattern that remains relatively stable across time’ (Bevir 
and Rhodes 2010 pg 452). In short, it is what people do by drawing on their beliefs. 
Because people draw on their beliefs and act for reasons of their own, Bevir and 
Rhodes (2010 pg 75) consider that practices cannot provide explanation of actions. 
Nonetheless, there is also indication that this points towards the creation of a 
collective arena: "“Practice” suggests that people act in social contexts: when they 
attempt to perform an action, their ability to succeed often depends on how others 
act’ (Bevir 2010a pg 267). Thus even from the interpretive perspective we begin to 
see the emergence of a transition from the individual to the collective. 
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Institutions are considered ‘contingent and possibly competing webs of belief’ 
(Bevir and Rhodes 2010 pg 266). Because the concept of ‘institution’ can be 
‘decentred’ into traditions, dilemmas and practices – which refer to beliefs - Bevir 
(2010a pg 85) states that ‘institutions’ would be best considered as ‘practices’.  In 
contrast to institutions, which Bevir argues are often considered to have fixed 
content or embody social norms, practices are contingent and embody the situated 
agency of those involved. Bevir (and Rhodes) makes it clear he is averse to calling 
the collective actions of individuals ‘institutions’, as opposed to ‘practices’, but that 
they encompass very similar denotations. Likewise, Leach and Lowndes (2007 pgs 
184-185) argue that political institutions provide frameworks of understandings 
which actors use to identify, compare and select courses of actions but these do not 
determine the behaviour of actors.  
 
Bevir and Rhodes (2010 pg 78) consider that institutionalists have been ‘slow’ in 
recognising the importance of meanings, and for this reason they are ‘not sure how 
they would think of traditions’. They argue if institutionalists emphasise the systemic 
as opposed to an individual level, there is a need for explanation of how meanings 
can exist beyond the individual. Bevir (1999 pg 196) emphasises that traditions 
originate, develop, and fade due to individuals’ beliefs. And traditions are accepted, 
continued with, changed or rejected for individuals’ personal reasons. Yet the 
concept of ‘tradition’, as described by Bevir (and colleagues), suggests that it is 
predominantly a ‘collective’ entity.  
 
Bevir and Richards (2009 pg 10) define a “governmental tradition” as ‘a set of 
inherited beliefs about the institutions and history of government’ [my emphasis]. 
First of all is the acknowledgment from interpretivists that ‘institutions’ exist, 
especially within the context of government. Bevir and Rhodes have typically 
considered that to use the concept of ‘institution’ is to reify individuals’ actions, 
beliefs, traditions and processes within which they are engaged (Bevir 1999; Bevir 
and Rhodes 2010). Again, to reiterate, Bevir (2010b pg 453) states there is a need 
to ‘unpack…[traditions] as systematic extra-individual level meanings, [while 
institutionalists] need an analysis of how meanings can exist apart from for 
individual subjects’.  
 
With regard to this point, Bevir and Rhodes (2010 pg 20) argue:  
…the state arises out of the diverse actions and practices inspired by varied 
beliefs and traditions. The state, or pattern of rule, is the contingent product 
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of diverse actions and political struggles informed by the beliefs of agents 
rooted in traditions. We identify new research topics suggested by our 
decentred analysis under the headings of the ‘3Rs’ of rule, rationalities, and 
resistance. (pg 20) [my emphasis] 
 
Here the identification of practices, and then the incorporation of the concepts ‘rules, 
rationalities and resistance’ brings the interpretivist position, with regards to 
government and the state, closer to recent narratives of new institutionalism which 
advocates incorporating conceptions of agency (Lowndes, Pratchett and Stoker 
2006; Leach and Lowndes 2007; Lowndes and Roberts 2013). The following 
quotation from Lowndes and Roberts illustrates this clearly: 
 
[institutionalism needs] to address the frequent conceptual slippages 
between the notion of practices, or informal rules, and broader ideas of 
norms, culture, beliefs and values. One way ahead is to remember that 
practices share the core characteristics of other modes of institutional 
constraints...Practices are specific to a particular political setting, recognized 
and shared among actors within that setting, and are enforceable. As such, 
they are distinct from actors' personal values or broader cultural or normative 
tendencies within society. Actors' orientation to, and interpretation of, 
specific practices will, however, be influenced by these other elements. 
(Lowndes and Roberts 2013 pg 62) [my emphasis]  
 
Lowndes and Roberts argue here that practices are expressions of shared norms, 
beliefs and values of actors. The underlined sections indicate where Bevir and 
Rhodes have abstracted this in their concept 'tradition'. Figure 9.1 seeks to illustrate 
the linkages between traditions and institutions. The diagram aims to show the way 
actor’s actions can become practices, which in turn can become traditions and/or 
institutions. Bevir and Rhodes have not clearly identified such individual-collective 
linkages. It is envisaged that the boxes for traditions and institutions can shift up and 
down (independently or together) according to their respective level of stability. 
Levels of stability may indicate where actors’ ideational reasoning reproduces 
practices, traditions and/or institutions. The transition from the ideational (individual) 
level to the collective level involves ‘socialization’ to some extent, where one 
generation passes on the ‘way things work around here’ (Rhodes 2011b). 
Socialization may indicate higher levels of stability. To educate future generations 
implies that the properties being communicated have existed for a period of time 
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and are considered stable enough to be transferred to another generation. 
Conversely, transformation may occur where actors’ reasoning leads to a rejection 
or change in the practices and institutional dynamics (as a result of dilemmas). Any 
new tradition is a result of actors’ ideational reasoning (as a result of their beliefs, 
other traditions and dilemmas faced). The aggregative result of actors’ individual 
reasoning and actions will shape the practices and rules in use (institutions) that 
they take part in alongside other actors.  
 
So following this analysis I can identify three characteristics of a tradition: 
1. Traditions are ‘collective’ entities, as they are shared by more than one 
individual or actor 
2. The concept implies that some form of temporal stability occurs, given that 
its properties are transmitted from one generation to another 
3. Transmission involves ‘storytelling’ to communicate its properties from one 
generation to the next. 
 
 
Figure 9.1 Links between traditions and institutions and individual and collective 
dimensions.  
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Figure 9.2 Hay’s interpretive institutionalist model with added emphasis on tradition  
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So how do the above discussion and the characteristics identified provide additional 
nuance to Hay’s model? Figure 9.2 provides an illustration where the additional 
emphasis of tradition would be added to Hay’s model (see dashed box to the left). 
Firstly, we can understand that ‘traditions’, because they are transmitted from one 
generation to another, must be embodied in one way or another. The ‘rules in use’ 
could therefore be considered a ‘tradition’. The rules in use are ‘practices’, which 
have arisen from actors drawing on their beliefs and acting accordingly. Currently, 
Hay’s model indicates that ‘traditions’ are resources that actors draw upon in the 
ideational dimension (see figure 4.2), but it does not sufficiently highlight the link 
between traditions and institutional configurations that may themselves be, or 
comprised of a number of traditions. Secondly, the tradition can allow an additional 
way of conceptualising the link between the individual and collective/ systemic 
levels. The third characteristic of traditions identified the existence of traditions tend 
to imply modes of action or knowledge that has some relative form of stability. It 
therefore provides a way of conceptualising the link between the individual and 
collective modes of actions. This is something that Bevir and Rhodes have been 
particularly poor in describing. Consequently, this link may assist interpretivists and 
institutionalists make the linkages between institutional/structural/systemic levels 
and the individual. Diagram 9.2 illustrates this additional link to Hay’s model. 
 
To reiterate, Hay argues that where Bevir and Rhodes emphasise the contingency 
of ideas actors deal with, they do not explain where these ideas will come from. 
Hence Hay introduced institutional failures as a way of linking to ‘dilemmas’. In 
agreement with Hay, my view is that the interpretive institutionalist model does not 
disavow the concept of ‘institutions’ or the fact that institutions and their 
configurations can influence actors. The institutional configurations are a result of 
actors’ (whether the same or different) previous ideational activity and action. 
However, it has been identified that there is scope for the identification of ‘traditions’ 
to be more important within the model. Just as dilemmas can be said to be 
important where ‘ideas come from’, so too is the nature and content of traditions 
and how these are contested according to actors’ beliefs and dilemmas generated.  
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9.3  CLPP AND CC PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 
 
Scholars have described how Venezuelan politics are highly contested and 
demonstrate significant struggles between elites and non-elites and their respective 
political interests and motivations (Cannon 2004; García Guadilla 2005). The 
findings in chapters 7 and 8 described that these factors remain an extremely 
important dynamic in understanding political understandings and behaviour in 
Venezuela. Yet what can the experience of participants in CLPPs and CCs tell us 
about participatory democracy, citizen participation in public policy and planning and 
the agency that participants have been provided with in these new mechanisms? 
Furthermore, what can this tell us about institutions, institutional design and 
change? 
 
Drawing from Negri (1999), Chavismo considers representative government to be 
‘bureaucratic’ and a form of ‘pseudo democracy’ compared to popular or constituent 
power which in Venezuela’s context is argued to be “real, direct, effective, 
participatory and protagonistic democracy of the people…to control the 
implementation of public policy”65 (Acosta Rico 2012 pg 25). As Negri argues, 
representation suppresses the true democratic spirit and essence of constituent 
power. Chavismo sees its current position as a process towards ‘socialism’ (it 
concedes it is not there yet). Within this understanding, the two concepts, 
constituent and constituted powers, should work in tandem seeking to close the gap 
between citizens and political representatives whilst seeking to transfer increasing 
competencies and powers towards arrangements and instances of constituent 
power (Acosta Rico 2012).  
 
Effectively, Chavismo has sought to set in motion a process which may lead to 
overcoming representative government, which itself was considered undemocratic 
by its founding fathers (Manin 1997 pg 236). Increasing citizen participation, 
therefore, was considered a means to overcome representative democracy’s 
‘undemocratic elements’ (Acosta Rico 2012; Negri 1999). Yet, any process of more 
direct forms of democracy needs to deal with representative governments’ key 
principle of enabling elected members to act independently of public opinion whilst 
undertaking their role as decision makers (Manin 1997).  
                                                
65 democracia real, directa, efectiva, participativa y protagónica del pueblo soberano…para controlar 
la implementación de políticas públicas” (Acosta Rico 2012 pg 25). 
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Manin provides useful concepts to understand the differences between elected 
representatives and citizens or spokespeople within mechanisms such as CLPPs or 
CCs. The difference is one between “absolute representation” and “self 
government”. This also reflects Negri and Chavismo’s “constituted” versus 
“constituent” power. Absolute representation is where citizens secure political 
agency and self expression only through their political representative, whereas self-
government is described as one of citizens being able to act and make 
unadulterated decisions without a political intermediary or representative (Manin 
1997 pgs 172-174).  
 
The following sub-sections provide further discussion regarding the CLPP and CC 
findings within the context of democratic theory. 
 
9.3.1 CLPP discussion 
 
Though CLPPs were not conceived as a mechanism for direct democracy, they was 
certainly regarded as shared spaces between community spokespeople and elected 
representatives. CLPPs sought to bridge the gap between the electorate and the 
electorate’s representation. The tensions and inequalities described in the findings, 
where councillors saw and understood their role to be supported by law (drawing on 
their beliefs and traditions), ensured that CLPPs remained spaces where decision 
making was undertaken by political representatives. Manin’s description of 
representative government as a system of decision making is useful here:  
 
…in contrast to what both common sense and democratic ideology affirm, 
representative democracy is not an indirect form of government by the 
people…is thus the concept of passing judgment that best describes the role 
assigned to the community, whether to the people itself or to its 
representatives. Representative democracy is not a system in which the 
community governs itself, but a system in which public policies and 
decisions are made subject to the verdict of the people. (Manin 1997 pg 192) 
 
Within CLPPs, mayors and councillors are elected as political representatives at the 
municipal level according to the principles of representative democracy outlined 
above. While mayors in Chacao and Libertador met Manin’s (1997) first principle of 
representative democracy (regular election), councillors did not. Because the 
national electoral council had not convened elections for councillors, but instead 
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provided a series of extensions to their terms in office, there was a failure to adhere 
to this first principle of representation. CLPP community members were critical that 
councillors did not undergo re-election, while these councillors also questioned the 
way in which community members were elected, especially in Chacao. Those in 
Libertador stated that councillors could not criticise community members’ lack of 
elections when councillors were in the same position. The fulfilment of the basic 
requirements of representative democracy at the municipal level in Venezuela was 
inadequate, and this led to reproaches (dilemmas) within the CLPPs studied based 
on participants’ individual beliefs and traditions. 
 
Salazar Calderón (2013 pg 33) argues the need for CLPP community members to 
be ‘elected “directly” in free and democratic elections’. She implies that CLPP 
community member elections ‘[are] not fair, democratic or direct’ because members 
are elected from within CCs66 internally and not elections held throughout the 
municipality. González Marregot (2013) calls for community member elections to be 
subject to the procedures set out in the by-laws of each CLPP. While this may 
respect the autonomy of CLPPs and their ability to define their own internal norms it 
is unlikely to resolve the issue of how politicians and community members see 
themselves as distinct types of members. The MUD67 emphasises that the 
constantly changing legislative landscape, and exclusiveness (pro-poor; political 
bias) of Chavismo’s popular power mechanisms, are contributing factors for the 
scant uptake of CLPPs in Venezuela. Identifying this dilemma about elections – and 
ultimately about the nature of representation and who is ‘representative’ – within 
CLPPs is not going to be resolved easily. Furthermore, given that community 
members serve a partial (and voluntary) municipal level function, politicians have 
quite distinct full-time roles and responsibilities: the mayor leads the municipal 
executive whilst the councillors work in the CM and their assigned sub-committees. 
Venezuelan scholars (González Marregot 2013; Salazar Calderón 2013) writing on 
CLPPs fail to address the differences in agency and power that this entails68.  
 
According to Myers’ (2014 pg 239), Chavismo has consistently demonstrated a 
problem with ‘follow-through and the implementation of government 
                                                
66 This is what Salazar Calderón states (2013 pg 29), but it could be any other ‘organised community 
organisation’ as stated in the CLPP law (2010). 
67 Disclaimer: González Marregot is the MUD’s citizen participation policy advisor. 
68 In our correspondence via email on various CLPP matters following my analysis, I sought Miguel 
González Marregot’s opinion (as the MUD policy advisor, leading scholar, and advocate of CLPPs) on 
this matter but he failed to answer. 
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programs…When he [Chávez] turned his attention elsewhere the misiones [social 
programmes] stagnated’. My view underpinned from observing CLPP meetings and 
listening to CLPP participants (informally and interviews) is that CLPPs have been 
largely ignored by national government since 2006. First of all, as scholars and my 
findings show, Chavismo sought to extend citizen participation via CCs. The way 
CCs were designed (direct national-neighbourhood link) would circumvent the 
dilemma that was generated in CLPPs between community and political 
representatives.  
 
The spaces for citizen participation that national government concentrated on during 
fieldwork were CCs and comunas. Comunas were Chávez’s main focus in the 
period 2010 until his death69. My understanding was that since 2006, and the 
emergence of CCs, CLPPs were no longer interpreted as a radical mechanism. 
Municipalities, such as Chacao, have been keen to incorporate CLPPs in their 
institutional repertoire because they can provide an element of citizen participation 
whilst protecting the representative structure and sovereignty of the municipal tier of 
federal government. As the findings showed, the CLPP in Libertador was barely 
operational. Interviews with participants highlighted that CCs and the emerging 
comunas were receiving much greater national and municipal government attention. 
Libertador’s CLPP participants accounts corresponded with Myers’ (2014) 
observation of Chavismo’s tendency to let certain mechanisms or programmes 
languish if its attention is directed elsewhere.  
 
Given that many municipalities in Venezuela have failed to implement CLPPs, or 
where they have they exist with dilemmas (as the findings and previous studies 
show). Some of those implemented eventually stop operating, such as the CLPP in 
the pilot study Baruta, due to political opposition at the demise of JPs within the 
municipal governance structure. This situation raises an important question: Why do 
CLPPs continue to exist? On the side of Chavismo, my interpretation is that CLPPs 
seem to be an innocuous entity for Chavismo; they do provide a space for citizen 
participation to a certain extent. For this reason CLPPs can still be considered to fall 
under Chavismo’s umbrella of ‘participatory and protagonistic democracy’. It is also 
                                                
69 Chávez constantly stated “comuna o nada”, publically. Here he was referring to the need for the 
construction of communes. Without them 21st Century Socialism or the communal state would not be 
created. He also provided a speech, following his presidential win in 2012, referred to as the Golpe de 
Timón. This described his vision for rectifying the slow progress of implementing the communal state. 
It was also transcribed and published and circulated in a little booklet by the government (MINCI 
2012). 
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clear that Chavismo has designed, and is in the process of building, an alternative 
system of mechanisms granting citizen participation (communal state involving CCs 
and comunas).  
 
My understanding is that CLPPs remain within the governance framework at the 
municipal level because, at the time of fieldwork, alternative means of coordinating 
projects had not yet been devised. For example, beyond the national government 
ministry for comunas or CFG there was no body to coordinate community based 
projects. I believe that the CLPP served this purpose. A second reason I believe 
that national government had not revoked CLPPs was that CLPPs were described 
in the 1999 Constitution as a means of citizen participation, and in subsequent laws 
as a component of Popular Power. To revoke an entity of this type, with no clear 
alternative, could be understood to be reneging a means of ‘participatory and 
protagonistic democracy’. The findings showed participants, particularly community 
members, promoted CLPPs as a means of municipal level participation. In addition, 
the MUD (as a coalition of political parties seeking to win elections against the 
PSUV/Chavismo) also continued to support CLPPs. 
 
Why are CLPPs popular in strongholds of the opposition? Firstly, the MUD 
describes the municipality as a space of participation for local residents, CCs, 
technical committees, and other community organisations (MUD 2013 pg 11). The 
MUD election manifesto also states that the CLPP is one of these spaces, which 
can coordinate the interests of various community based organisations (MUD 2013 
pgs 11-12). The MUD argues that CLPPs are not being used to the best of their 
potential. CLPPs should be promoting ‘municipal autonomy and decentralisation’. In 
doing so CLPPs ‘will be rescued as instances of participation, coordination and 
evaluation of public programmes under a inclusive, responsible and plural 
process’70 (MUD 2013 pg 162). My interpretation of this statement, based on the 
data collected, is that the opposition (and its supporters) considers the processes of 
Chavismo as exclusive (pro-poor; in favour of Chavista supporters) and centralising 
(by registering and administering CCs and comunas via the national ministry and 
agencies). My data showed considerable scepticism about the nature, role and 
purpose of establishing an alternative to the existing federal government, and most 
importantly, of the potential in reducing the sovereignty and capabilities of municipal 
                                                
70 Los CLPP merecen serán [sic] rescatados y empleados como instancias de planificación, 
concertación y evaluación de los programas públicos bajo un enfoque incluyente, responsable y plural.  
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government. The communal state promoted by Chavismo was seen to be 
constructing an alternative that would put municipal governments in jeopardy71.  
 
The findings on the way CLPPs have enacted citizen participation have important 
consequences for the broader domain of the design of democratic innovations and 
democratic theory. Though CLPPs may deal with CCs’ projects, this relationship is 
not strong compared with that of CCs and comunas. The way that Chavismo has 
conceptualised ‘participation’, has evolved since CLPPs were introduced. 
Chavismo’s focus has been on creating alternative innovations and spaces for 
participation, which seek to break beyond traditional representative democratic 
mechanisms or those that are still dominated by political representatives, such as 
the CLPP. Chavismo’s communal state has created a vast divide in legislative and 
procedural processes since the CLPP was first envisaged. For scholars such as 
Romero Mendoza (2010) and González Marregot (2013) such developments in 
Venezuela are unconstitutional, and diminish the importance of the municipality. 
 
9.3.2 CC discussion 
 
CCs emerged at a time when Chavismo sought to increase both socialism and 
overcome difficulties (power differences or complete inaction) faced in mechanisms 
such as CLPPs (MINCI 2008). Acosta Rico argues that CCs form part of the 
emerging communal state structure to overcome representative democracy. It 
stems from the political tradition of socialism, which its advocates believe will 
overcome the issue of political representation’s shortcomings:  
 
The creation of new systems, ways of doing things, or mechanisms of socio-
political participation of community actors, such as CCs, provides a counter-
hegemonic concept and perspective. These [mechanisms] provide the 
possibility of deepening democracy in a concrete, pragmatic and realistic 
manner which will overcome the tired model of representative [democracy]. 
This will lead to new paths towards a participatory democracy…and new 
mechanisms of self-governing socialism.72 (Acosta Rico 2012 pg 179 
                                                
71 Chavismo’s long-term goal is to get rid of the federal state and replace it with the communal state. 
This implies new territorial spaces, not re-configurations of the existing federal state.  
72 La creación de nuevos sistemas, formas o mecanismos de participación socio-política de los 
actores comunitarios bajo una perspectiva contra-hegemónica en su concepción, tal como lo 
representan los Consejos Comunales, posibilita una profundización de lo democrático de manera 
concreta, pragmática, realista haciendo que este concepto supere el agotado modelo de la mera 
212 
 
 
Brewer-Carías (2010), one of Venezuela’s fiercest critics of Chavismo, considers 
that CCs are under direct presidential control and suffocate local governments 
because of their close links to the president. He also claims: 
 
[that Chavismo] deliberately confuses the instruments of direct democracy 
with effective political participation. That is why the citizen’s assemblies and 
the communal councils, which began to be established in 2006, have 
gradually replaced local governments, being in contrast, directed from the 
center, and without any general electoral representative origin (Brewer-
Carías pg 98-99).  
 
To put this in context, he also states choosing people from assemblies73 ‘of course, 
that is not democracy, as there can be no democracy without the election of 
representatives’ (ibid pg 67). His understanding of democracy equating 
representation is prevalent throughout his book. Although Brewer-Carías can be 
considered as one of the most critical scholars of CCs, the communal state and 
Chavismo, this reasoning is also prevalent in the MUD’s election manifesto (MUD 
2013). The opening sentence under the heading ‘basic principles’ is ‘the 
Venezuelan municipality is the primary political unit of national organization, with 
legal character, autonomy and a democratic government’74 (MUD 2013 pg 8). This 
is later followed by emphasis that the municipality represents ‘self government and 
popular sovereignty of the people’ [as opposed to communal power entities]. 
Furthermore, the manifesto criticizes Chavismo directly: 
 
The current national government has taken away municipal [economic] 
resources that belong to the people…[and] the elimination of parish councils 
[JPs] and [created] centralist control of community organization and citizen 
participation…the attack against municipal governments is an intrinsic part of 
the communal state which is characterized by its centralism and 
authoritarianism and goes against the ability for people to freely elect their 
                                                                                                                                       
representatividad y se encamine hacia senderos de una democracia participativa…un nuevo 
mecanismo de autogobierno socialista. (Acosta Rico 2012 pg 179) 
 
73 CCs’ maximum internal decision-making forum is the ‘citizen’s assembly’ (see section 2.5 for more 
detail). 
74 El Municipio venezolano es la unidad política primaria de la organización nacional, con personalidad 
jurídica, autonomía y con un gobierno democrático.  
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local authorities75. (MUD 2013 pg 8). 
 
La Silsa’s CC participants saw themselves as an integral part of the community’s 
development and planning processes. Participants described that CCs had a role of 
identifying local neighbourhood issues and had the ability to seek funding and 
implement projects. CC participants worked in conjunction with the comuna’s ST 
which provided technical support and enabled projects to secure approval, 
predominantly from the municipal government. Unlike Chacao, La Silsa’s 
participants saw Chavismo and its CCs as fundamental in meeting the community’s 
needs, goals and preferences. CCs were understood as a form of agency and 
engagement with municipal and/or national government that had not existed before; 
La Silsa’s participants saw a shift in state-civil society relations as a result of 
Chavismo from political marginalisation to one of increased inclusiveness. The roles 
of municipal and national government were undoubtedly important in creating the 
environment and conditions that led La Silsa’s participants to feel part of the 
Chavista project. CC participants argued that they saw the emerging comuna as an 
example where residents would be able to further their role in planning processes.  
 
CC participants in Chacao regarded CCs as one of several civil society 
organisations that existed in the municipality. Their liaison with the municipal 
government was positive and one in which reflected a successful state-civil society 
relationship. This was one of the traditions (starting point) from which Chacao 
participants then reasoned with the reforms and the situation they faced. The 
findings showed how CLPP and CC actors’ beliefs regarding participation were 
linked to the tradition of these good state-civil society relations. The political 
traditions and beliefs of participants were also shown to influence the way in which 
both CLPP and CC mechanisms were understood and ultimately implemented in 
practice. The dilemma(s) faced by Chacao’s CCs with Chavismo can be understood 
as one in which local residents shared a historical political rivalry against its values 
and vision. 
 
 
                                                
75 El actual gobierno nacional le ha quitado a nuestros Municipios los recursos que son de la gente… 
A ello se une la eliminación de la elección de las Juntas Parroquiales y el control centralista de la 
organización comunitaria y de la participación ciudadana… La arremetida contra el Municipio se 
inscribe dentro del proyecto del Estado Comunal caracterizado por su centralismo y autoritarismo, 
contrario al derecho de la gente a elegir libremente a sus autoridades locales.  
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The findings did not provide evidence of self-government as envisaged by the 
communal state. The role of municipal government in both municipalities was still 
extremely important, as were the powers of decision making by, those that Manin 
would term, “absolute representatives”. This shows that the established practices 
(traditions of representative democracy; of government and its bureaucracy) still 
played a key part in the implementation of planning and public policy, whether at 
neighbourhood, municipal or national level. Though certain individuals (such as La 
Silsa’s CC participants) expressed desire for alternative practices in the form of the 
communal state, these had not reached a level where existing practices and 
traditions could be superseded. The sum of ideational reasoning of these individuals 
– and others who came to similar beliefs - had not reached a tipping point to 
overcome the traditions and practices. Where institutionalists may argue that this is 
an example of ‘path dependency’, Bevir and Rhodes (2012) remind us that 
traditions and practices may exert stability over time and are the result of 
decisions/actions following actors’ ideational reasoning.  
 
What has become apparent is that in Venezuela the increasing momentum for the 
communal state has co-existed alongside, rather than dismantle the federal, 
representative state. Acosta Rico’s description of Chavismo’s 
constituent/constituted powers model shares certain elements with Hendriks ‘vital 
democracy’ which is described as “[combining] models of democracy in a way that 
is both creative and contingent and, thus, manages to unite effectiveness with 
legitimacy” (Hendriks 2010 pg 134). Hendriks argues that reformers who fail to 
address the two components of being creative and contingent will not lead to 
success. Chavismo’s constituent/constituted power model enables a form of 
democracy that Hendriks would consider a hybrid (representative and participatory 
elements). And because the hybrid is not some ideal form either, and is contingent 
to its context, Hendriks would describe this as a ‘vital democracy’.  
 
In the context of the findings, and of Hay’s model, we can understand Hendrik’s 
‘vital democracy’ as a result of the contingency of action according to CLPP and CC 
participants’ beliefs and traditions. The traditions identified in table 9.2 (political, 
governmental, state-civil society relations) have shown to mean different things to 
different actors dependent on traditions and beliefs that they previously held. The 
five dilemmas that were identified in the findings meant participants’ acted in 
accordance or in divergence from these traditions and beliefs. Democratic practices 
are very unlikely to reflect utopic ideologies or intentions precisely because actors 
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reflect ideationally within a situated context. Deviations will therefore occur from 
utopic goals and ideologies. This has been the case so far in Venezuela: CLPPs 
have not met Chavismo’s expectations; CCs have been positive in certain areas 
such as La Silsa but less so in Chacao.  
 
But the results of the research have shown that in Venezuela - like Pogrebinschi 
(2012) and Avritzer’s (2010) findings in Brazil - participatory mechanisms such as 
CCs and the CLPP are reinforcing rather than replacing the institutions of 
representative democracy, which Chavismo seeks to remove as a long term goal. At 
the time of fieldwork, the role of national and local governments and their 
associated bureaucracies were extremely important. Despite the Chavista discourse 
of creating alternatives to representative democratic structures, the representative 
structures remained (except JPs which were controversially revoked in 2010). 
Furthermore, the findings showed that where the desire for participatory democracy 
was greatest (La Silsa), was when the community had received most government 
support (national and municipal government programmes as well as a community 
specific ST). 
 
Baiocchi et al (2011 pg 1) argued that where participatory democracy was strong on 
normative, moral-philosophical grounds its empirical results and testing were weak 
and fragmented. Overall, the findings of the thesis have provided further empirical 
support to Baiocchi et al’s argument. The findings showed that tensions occur when 
citizen participation is increased within existing models, practices and structures of 
representative democracy. This also supports the concepts outlined by scholars 
who argue that different models of democracy enacted in practice will manifest as 
some form of hybrid due to myriad contextual and contingent factors (Barber 2003; 
Hendriks 2010).  
216 
 
9.4  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter provided an analysis of Hay’s (2011) interpretive institutionalist model 
drawing on the empirical findings presented in chapters 7 and 8. The concepts of 
two ontologically and epistemologically distinct theories of interpretivism and 
institutionalism were discussed in turn. It was found that there was considerably 
more overlap between the most recent literature regarding institutionalism (Hay 
2006; Lowndes and Roberts 2013) and interpretivism (Bevir and Rhodes 2010) than 
either body of theory currently recognises or acknowledges. It was found that Hay’s 
model was useful and thorough, but can be improved with an increased focus on 
traditions. The model enabled a way of understanding, and conceptualising, how 
different, contingent configurations of ‘rules in use’ versus ‘rules in form’ in practice 
may generate a dilemma. In doing so, it was identified that there was a need to 
emphasise the role of traditions because the analysis highlighted that in addition to 
‘dilemmas’ these provided an important interface between the institutional and 
ideational dimensions of the model. An example identified was the way ‘rules in use’ 
could be embodied as a tradition. The analysis also identified a way of 
conceptualising shifts between the individual and collective/ systemic level which is 
of benefit to interpretivists and institutionalists who tend to focus on the former and 
latter, respectively.  
 
Furthermore, the relationship between ‘practices’, ‘rules in use’ and ‘traditions’ ‘were 
also found to support Hay’s claim that his model enables an understanding of 
‘where ideas come from’. Therefore, Hay’s model enables ideas to emanate not 
only from the relationship between dilemmas and institutional opportunities and 
constraints, but also from a refined analysis where the relationship between 
traditions and rules in use/practices are operationalized. Because of the two links 
between the interpretive and institutionalist dimensions (dilemmas and traditions) 
identified in the findings, it is considered that this provides a level of analysis that 
‘hybrid’ scholars, interpretivists and institutionalists, should take into account.  
 
Section 9.3 sought to place the findings from chapters 7 and 8 with regard to 
democratic theory. It emphasised the polarization that exists among scholars and 
political activists with regard to representative versus participatory democracy. 
Political polarization in Venezuela has meant that participants and scholars have 
been keen to demonize (in the case of opposition scholars and certain participants) 
217 
 
further attempts to establish participatory democratic mechanisms beyond CLPPs 
and CCs, such as comunas, with the aim of constructing the ‘communal state’. In 
these cases the traditions (governmental, administrative, practices) of the 
representative state are fiercely guarded. This is at odds with communities, such as 
those in La Silsa, which are keen advocates of Chavismo and its processes. 
Findings showed that given the contingency of actors’ beliefs and traditions and the 
context within which they were situated, CLPP and CC practices did not meet the 
high standards of normative goals of Chavismo and participatory democratic 
theorists. This was found to support democratic scholars’ (Baiocchi et al 2011; 
Hendriks 2010; Pogrebinschi 2012) findings on hybridity. 
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CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSIONS 
 
10.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The thesis has established two theoretical contributions. The thesis provides a 
contribution to democratic theory by providing further insights about the challenges 
in designing, implementing and embedding mechanisms involving citizen 
participation, particularly about the tensions between representative and 
participatory forms of democracy. Supporting existing empirical studies, the thesis 
findings showed examples where democratic innovations demonstrate enhancing 
existing representative expressions of democracy rather than superseding them. 
The thesis also showed that operationalizing Hay’s (2011) interpretive institutionalist 
model in the Latin American context provided valuable analytical and theoretical 
insights. The second contribution highlights that although Hay’s interpretive 
institutionalist model is sound, placing greater emphasis on ‘traditions’ can enhance 
it. 
 
This chapter elaborates on these theoretical contributions and the empirical 
research findings. Section 10.2 provides an overview of the research. Section 10.3 
discusses the empirical findings and contributions of the research. Section 10.4 
discusses findings and contributions regarding the interpretive institutionalist model 
adopted in the thesis. Section 10.5 closes the chapter and presents potential 
avenues for future research. 
 
10.2  RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
 
Since the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998, Chavismo brought about a number of 
key political and legislative changes via a new constitution and subsequent laws. 
Many of these changes sought to increase the level of citizen involvement in public 
planning and policy making. CLPPs and CCs, two of these reforms, formed the units 
of analysis of the thesis. The thesis research aims, objectives and research 
questions (see section 5.3) sought to establish participants’ meanings and 
understandings of CLPP and CC processes, and their agency within these 
mechanisms. The research also sought to elicit what the planning processes meant 
to participants and whether they were able to achieve their respective needs and 
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preferences by participating in CLPPs and CCs.  
 
In order to address these objectives and related research questions, the thesis 
adopted an interpretive institutionalist framework. This was based on a model 
developed by Hay (2011) which was supplemented with components drawn from 
new institutionalism [NI] (Lowndes 2005; Lowndes and Roberts 2013) and Bevir and 
Rhodes’ strand of interpretivism (Bevir 1999; 2010a; Bevir and Rhodes 2003; 2006; 
2012). It was considered that NI allows for a focus on underlying rules in use that 
shape the institutional boundaries to be understood. Interpretivism enables actors’ 
ideational elements to be elicited, via the concepts of ‘dilemmas’, ‘beliefs’ and 
‘practices’, which enable the researcher to establish individuals’ reasons and 
‘narratives’ for holding the beliefs they do – and in doing so understanding why they 
act in a particular way. 
 
The research involved an extensive literature review (chapters 3-4) taking into 
account democratic, planning, NI and interpretivist theories. The review established 
that democracy has myriad meanings and permutations (Hendriks 2010). Chapter 3 
outlined that Chavismo has adopted a conceptual model involving dual, 
“constituent/popular” powers. Elected representatives - belonging to the traditional 
federal state, referred to as “constituted/public” power, community/citizen agents are 
considered “constituent/popular” power. CLPPs and CCs were advocated as 
mechanisms that would increase constituent power. Chavismo responds to a 
worldview which participatory democratic advocates consider more community 
orientated modes of deliberation, formulation and action (Bevir 2010a; de Sousa 
Santos and Avritzer 2005; Miraftab 2009; Friedmann 2011; Pateman 1970, 2012; 
Roy 2005).  
 
The literature review showed that creating spaces for citizen participation can be 
problematic. Not only do the debates regarding the virtues of representative 
democracies versus participatory democracy arise, but also the local context 
provides a contingent factor that theories are unable to foresee. Hendriks (2010) 
considers that once implemented in practice normative ideals end up being hybrids 
of one form or another. The findings, discussed in section 10.3, support Hendriks’ 
thesis. Additionally, the highly polarized and divisive nature of Venezuelan politics 
and society means that Chavismo’s participatory mechanisms have not been 
implemented with approval across all sectors of society. In many cases they have 
been resisted by middle and upper classes for a perceived infringement on pre-
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existing state-civil society and organisations  (García Guadilla 2005; 2008ab). 
 
The research was undertaken in a flexible, abductive, iterative and recursive 
manner involving prior knowledge (the literature review and theory) and data 
collected in the field. Fieldwork was undertaken between February and December 
2013. The scope of the thesis encountered certain restraints, which arose principally 
due to the complex context presented during fieldwork in Venezuela. Nonetheless, 
fieldwork was undertaken with diligence, persistence and conscientiousness. 
Although described in detail in chapter 5, the following provides a reflective 
summary. 
 
The first stage of fieldwork (February-April 2013) comprised a pilot study in Baruta, 
Caracas. This provided opportunity to adjust to the country (it was a first time visit) 
and test the various methods for data collection. Shortly after arriving in the field the 
death of President Chávez, subsequent presidential elections and transition to 
President Maduro provided an unprecedented situation. It also highlighted, and 
provided insight into, the country’s extreme political polarization. The pilot study was 
key in establishing gatekeepers for the municipalities of Chacao and Libertador 
which became the locations chosen for the case studies. These municipalities were 
identified prior to arriving in the field as part of a systematic analysis of potential 
case locations.  
 
The decision to remain in Caracas, as opposed to study other municipalities in 
Venezuela, emerged through the combination of a systematic analysis prior to 
entering the field as well as dealing with the ‘reality’ of fieldwork such as 
geographical location, transport constraints and whether CLPPs were operating at 
the time of fieldwork (see section 5.4.1). The case locations were chosen following 
an ‘iterative, abductive approach’, consistent with interpretive research (Schwartz-
Shea and Yanow 2012).  
 
The fieldwork methods adopted were also consistent with interpretive approaches to 
data generation. Fieldwork research involved 68 semi-structured interviews with 
politicians, CLPP community members, CC participants, and municipal and Caracas 
Metropolitan government officers (see Appendix 1). Participant observation of CLPP 
and CC/comuna meetings (see Appendix 2) was also undertaken. Additionally, the 
research period involved systematic review of documentation relevant to CLPPs 
and CCs, such as municipal budgets and news reports. A fieldwork diary was 
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maintained which helped make sense of observations and interpretations of 
encounters in the field. This also helped make linkages to literature reviewed. The 
over-riding concern during fieldwork was personal safety and security. Attending CC 
meetings in the evenings in La Silsa was not considered appropriate for a single 
researcher, for example. This was also in conjunction with advice and practices of 
municipal government staff.  
 
It is considered that the methodological and theoretical approach to the research 
provided an account that reflected participants’ views and understandings. It is 
widely acknowledged that ethnographic/interpretivist research involves 
‘interpretations of interpretations’ (Bevir 1999; Bevir and Rhodes 2003; Rhodes 
2011b; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012). Data analysis involved grounding the 
data by ‘making sense’ (triangulation) of the data by checking my interpretations of 
observations and interviews with documentary review. This approach is widely 
accepted by interpretive scholars (Rhodes 2011b; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 
2012). Furthermore, Hay’s (2011) model provided a theoretical lens which enabled 
the context of cases in the global South to be studied by a researcher from the 
global north, and making sense of the data in a manner that would be consistent 
with the views of those in Venezuela. This is considered an additional benefit of 
Hay’s model (see below for further discussion). 
 
10.3  RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
10.3.1 CLPPs 
 
CLPPs were the first citizen participation mechanism created by Chavismo. They 
sought to bring politicians together with members from community organisations into 
a municipal council. Using the concepts and components of the interpretive 
institutionalist framework (Bevir and Rhodes 2003; 2006; Hay 2011), it was possible 
to identify that CLPPs were conceived in different ways due to its constituent actors 
drawing from different traditions. The first tradition identified related to the way 
Chavismo linked new participatory mechanisms with the normative ideals of “21st 
Century Socialism”. Consequently, in support of Bevir and Rhodes’ interpretivism, 
participants accepted or rejected these traditions dependent on their own political 
beliefs. The second tradition found was the historical legacy and continuity of a 
representative democratic government, particularly the figures of councillors, 
mayors and their associated administrations. The third tradition related to the way in 
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which participants perceived and understood state-civil society relations as a result 
of Chavismo and its aims to reconfigure such relationships. 
 
The CLPP in Chacao was found to have conformed to the requirements of the 2010 
reform, whereas the CLPP in Libertador had not. According to the thesis framework, 
it was concluded that CLPP in Libertador operated using ‘informal rules in use’. 
Because of participants’ beliefs and traditions and the issues of conforming to the 
2010 reforms, CLPP participants identified three sets of dilemmas.  
 
The first dilemma related to the rapidly changing composition of CLPPs as a result 
of the reforms. Chavismo’s intention to further establish the ‘communal state’ 
required substitution of parish council (JP) members with ‘communal’ parish council 
(JPC) members. Chacao’s CLPP managed to comply with this requirement while 
Libertador’s did not.   
 
The second dilemma related to elections. In both CLPPs, community members 
questioned why councillors had not been re-elected instead of being granted 
extensions by the CNE. Councillors in Chacao’s CLPP questioned the way its 
community members had been elected. They considered the elections were unfairly 
advertised and had a poor turnout leading to targeted candidates being elected 
(favourable to the mayor). In Libertador, there was very little political will to 
undertake elections for the CLPP. Participants attributed Chavismo’s focus on the 
construction of other mechanisms, such as comunas, as an explanation.  
 
The third dilemma showed that there were strong tensions between politicians and 
community representatives in both CLPPs. Councillors saw and understood their 
role based on the tradition of elected representatives. And this granted councillors 
greater decision making power. Previous studies highlighted mayors and councillors 
(traditionally elected politicians) did not necessarily place as much emphasis on the 
importance of the CLPP as their community members. The findings in Chacao and 
Libertador’s CLPPs showed that this shared space was subject to dilemmas due to 
these uneven power balances in decision making, and these arose due to 
inadequately defined and enforced electoral and procedural matters. Consequently, 
CLPPs have generally failed to live up to the expectation that bringing together 
community and elected officials would create an effective mechanism for including 
community members in municipal level planning.  
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Table 10.1 provides a summary of CLPP participants’ views and understandings in 
relation to the research questions. 
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Research 
Question/ CLPP 
and member type 
Chacao Libertador 
Community member Political member Community member Political member
What is the 
meaning of 
participatory 
democracy for 
CLPP participants 
in Venezuela? 
The ability for citizen 
participation without 
ideological pre-conditions; 
liaison with municipal 
government. 
Citizens have a right to participate 
but this participation has limits; 
political representatives and 
representative democracy remain 
authoritative. 
Participatory democracy is one 
where citizens have a role in 
shaping local-national politics. 
Citizen participation can be in 
conjunction with government, or it 
can be as a long-term process in 
order to create new modes of action 
as an alternative to representative 
democracy. 
Participatory democracy remains a 
long-term goal of Chavismo. It is 
understood to be something that has 
not yet been established and is still 
emerging/ being constructed. Citizens 
lead public policy and planning; if 
government still remains they would 
have to respond to citizens' 
organisations (most likely CCs and 
comunas).  
What do CLPPs 
and their respective 
processes mean to 
participants? 
The CLPP is an extremely 
important mechanism for 
citizen engagement and 
municipal planning. It should 
have equal importance to the 
municipal government and 
Concejo Municipal (CM). 
The CLPP is a form of 
engagement and includes certain 
community organisations in 
municipal planning. But it is not as 
important as the municipal 
government or legislature  
(representative democratic 
structures). 
CLPP was a mechanism and 
process that had potential to provide 
citizen participation in municipal 
level planning. Community 
members lamented that the 
mechanism had not lived up to this 
expectation.  
The CLPP was an initial step in the 
process to establishing participatory 
democracy and citizen participation 
more widely. Its importance was 
understood to have been superseded 
by CCs and the emerging comunas. 
What do CLPP 
participants do to 
meet their 
respective 
needs/goals and 
preferences? 
Actively take part in all monthly 
plenaries and yearly 
participatory budgeting; 
undertake CLPP sub-
committee work to promote 
community projects. 
Approve municipal budget each 
year. Very little participation in, or 
engagement with, CLPP 
otherwise. 
Attend plenary meetings; make site 
visits; undertake sub-committee 
work. 
Approve municipal budget each year. 
Very little participation in, or 
engagement with, CLPP otherwise. 
How do CLPP 
participants 
understand 
planning practices 
and processes at 
the neighbourhood 
and municipal 
level? 
CLPP and its participatory 
budgeting is seen to be a 
fundamental and positive form 
of involving the community/ 
citizens in municipal level 
planning. Community 
members actively seek to 
further community's role in 
municipal level planning. 
CLPP projects can be positive but 
are not a replacement for 
municipal government and 
legislature's role in planning. 
Municipal planning should be 
undertaken by the municipal 
government and the plans and 
process scrutinized by councillors 
in the CM.  
The CLPP is seen to be 
coordinative (it checks projects are 
being implemented) and provides a 
weak form of liaison between 
citizens and municipal government. 
The CLPP is understood to have 
largely been ignored or superseded 
by the focus on the emerging 
communal state mechanisms. 
Planning is seen to be a process that is 
in evolution. It is moving away from a 
government/ technocratic led process 
to a mode of citizen-government 
synergy. Citizens who participate in the 
emergent communal state mechanisms 
shape the direction of planning and 
development. Government should 
respond to this, or provide constructive 
feedback to enable the plans to be 
implemented. 
Table 10.1 Summary of CLPP findings in relation to research questions 
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10.3.2 CCs 
 
CCs emerged in 2006 as a result of Chavismo seeking to further implement citizen 
participation and avoid the tensions that existed between politicians and community 
members, such as CLPPs. The findings showed participants’ beliefs and traditions 
significantly shaped the way they acted within their respective CCs. This in turn 
shaped how CCs operated. The findings showed the CC participants encountered 
two dilemmas: the perceived links CCs have to Chavismo, and the changes in state-
civil society relations and structure. 
 
Most CCs in Chacao were not fully operational (i.e. not meeting) or fully registered 
with Fundacomunal (national agency with remit to certify CCs) during fieldwork. 
Despite inquiry, it remained unclear whether this was failure on the part of the CCs 
to comply with the requirements, a result of bureaucratization from Fundacomunal 
and/or favouring poorer parts of the country. Participants in Chacao emphasised the 
municipality and municipal government as the most appropriate demarcation and 
governance of territory, as opposed to the emerging communal state that they 
opposed due to their beliefs and traditions.  
 
The findings demonstrated that Chacao’s CC participants resisted and denounced 
Chavismo’s ‘popular power’ structures to defend existing representative 
arrangements. The dilemma that participants were faced with was the extent to 
which they should become involved in a mechanism whose purpose was to create 
re-structuration of democratic institutions and arrangements towards a form of 
society that was contrary to their beliefs. CCs were implemented and used for a 
specific purpose: to be one of a varied range of organisations contributing to 
plurality in Chacao’s civil society, not one that sought to supersede existing 
arrangements of representative democracy that they supported.  
 
CC participants in La Silsa identified themselves as Chavistas, and were supportive 
of the communal state. The neighbourhood had been recipient of municipal and 
national government programmes. These programmes were closely linked to the 
emerging comuna. This required that CCs were fully registered. In contrast to 
Chacao, government support, especially via the comuna’s ST, ensured that a) CCs 
were being supported and given guidance, b) were encouraged to register c) were 
able to receive funding for small projects. As a result, CC participants in La Silsa 
stated the need to take part in CCs and the comuna otherwise they would not have 
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seen improved state-civil society relations or neighbourhood developments. 
Participants therefore felt compelled to register their CCs, actively take part, and 
promote the emerging comuna and Chavismo’s move towards the communal state. 
 
Table 10.2 provides a summary of the relationship between the research questions 
and the findings, according to participants’ understandings and meanings of CC and 
wider democratic processes.  
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Research 
Question/ CCs 
 
Chacao CCs La Silsa CCs 
What is the 
meaning of 
participatory 
democracy for CC 
participants in 
Venezuela? 
Although Chacao participants 
valued citizen participation, they 
did not advocate the replacement 
of existing federal structures of 
government or systems of 
representative democracy more 
widely. Participants were keen to 
defend the existing government 
and territorial demarcations and 
arrangements; they rejected 
Chavismo's intentions of 
establishing a communal state. 
Participants favoured Chavismo 
and its move towards creating 
and embedding the 'communal 
state'. Certain participants 
argued the communal state 
would lead to participatory 
democracy and replace existing 
federal government and 
representative democracy. 
Other participants saw the 
communal state as a means of 
enhancing the existing 
governmental/ representative 
arrangements by creating a 
more symbiotic relationship. 
 
What do CCs and 
their respective 
processes mean 
to participants? 
CCs were described as a means 
of liaising with municipal 
government, akin to other 
community organisations such as 
neighbourhood associations. CCs 
were also understood to be a 
mechanism closely linked to 
Chavismo - and were therefore 
mechanisms to be dealt with 
scepticism. 
CCs were a fundamental and 
innovative mechanism for 
ensuring citizen participation in 
community matters, providing a 
means of liaising with the 
municipal and national 
government, and a means for 
securing projects within their 
respective neighbourhoods. CCs 
were also a step towards 
establishing the communal 
state. 
 
What do CC 
participants do to 
meet their 
respective 
needs/goals and 
preferences? 
CCs had considerable limitations 
and scope for delivering projects 
because they were not registered 
formally, and/ or they did not meet 
frequently.  
CCs worked with La Silsa's 
comuna ST to liaise and secure 
funds with municipal (and 
national) government for 
neighbourhood projects. 
How do CC 
participants 
understand 
planning practices 
and processes at 
the 
neighbourhood 
and municipal 
level? 
Planning was predominantly a 
municipal government activity. 
Certain members with links to the 
CLPP highlighted that the CLPP 
was a mechanism for helping 
secure community projects. CCs 
provided scope for liaison and 
advocacy with municipal 
government but were generally 
not seen to be mechanisms for 
planning. 
CCs were understood to be the 
base for neighbourhood 
planning and liaising with 
government. They were also 
argued to be the only way to 
secure projects. Participants 
indicated previous 
administrations failed to 
implement projects. CCs were 
seen to be providing 
opportunities for planning, and 
meeting aspirations of 
community development. 
 
Table 10.2 Summary of CC findings in relation to research questions
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10.3.3 CLPP and CC findings and democratic theory 
 
Since 2009, Chavismo sought to advance “popular power” where citizens would be 
sovereign decision makers and could exercise self management (MINCI 2008). CCs 
and comunas were expressions and intentions of achieving these goals (MINCI 
2008; MP Comunas 2013). At the time of fieldwork, these mechanisms sat in 
parallel to the federal structure of government. Critics of Chavismo (Brewer Carías 
2010; MUD 2013) maintain that CCs have become increasingly linked to national 
government, particularly the way they are administered and funded. Critics suggest 
that CCs are tools of clientelism and subject to the political whims of Chavismo and 
prioritise areas with pro-national government affiliations.   
 
As described in chapter 3, Chavismo sought to conceptualise Manin’s (1997) 
“absolute representation” versus “self government” as “constituent power” versus 
“constituted power”. Constituent power is one that comprises citizens and their 
agency as ‘popular power’ and these are expressed in instances such as CCs and 
comunas. Constituted power is the existing traditional representative arrangements 
and institutions.  
 
Chacao’s CC participants described that participation was a way of having their 
voice heard but not necessarily to devolve decision making or powers to the CCs – 
or other community organisations – as Chavismo intended. While the community-
municipal government relationship was considered positive, the emerging 
communal state was viewed with distrust and scepticism. Participants advocated 
extending the municipal government-civil society relationship that existed in Chacao 
because they felt that it was successful. In La Silsa, on the other hand, Chavismo 
enabled a deviation from historic state-civil society relations, which was manifested 
as marginalisation, to one of inclusiveness. La Silsa’s participants increased sense 
of agency transformed their beliefs, as well as reinforced their support of 
Chavismo’s goal of moving towards more participatory forms of democracy. 
Representative government was seen to have failed areas such as La Silsa in the 
past, whereas the emerging alternative was something that they believed would 
benefit the community. Where La Silsa CC participants saw opportunity, Chacao CC 
participants saw the potential demise of the existing positive relationship between 
municipal government and the community.  
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CLPP experiences in both Chacao and Libertador showed the continued dominance 
of politicians and structures of representative democracy. This created considerable 
tensions where citizen members of the CLPP wish to express greater agency. CCs, 
on the other hand, did provide potential for communities and citizens to increase 
dialogue with municipal governments in particular. How this was understood was 
also dependent on the location: La Silsa saw it as extremely important, Chacao saw 
it as positive but no different from other ways of liaising with municipal government. 
Rather than seeking to subvert the representative democracy model, CCs in 
Chacao were understood as an additional means of supplementing it. Conversely in 
La Silsa participants were supportive of the emerging communal state structure and 
any other means of creating alternatives, so long as it meant continuing a positive 
process of community benefit which they had experienced under Chavismo. 
 
Baiocchi et al (2011 pg 1) argued that where participatory democracy was strong on 
normative, moral-philosophical grounds in theory its empirical results and testing 
was weak and fragmented. Similarly, Hendriks (2010) considered advocating a 
‘pure’ model, such as that of participatory democracy, was a normative exercise and 
that in practice the weaknesses of any pure model results in hybrid models being 
formed. Reality presents co-existing dialectical forces - that do not mix - subjected 
to contextual and contingent factors leading to practices of democracy that rarely 
reflect the theoretical, normative or those planned by reformers (Barber 2003; 
Hendriks 2010) – such as Chavismo. 
 
The analysis chapter (section 9.3) emphasised the polarization that exists among 
scholars and political activists with regards to representative versus participatory 
democracy. Political polarization in Venezuela has meant that participants and 
scholars have been keen to demonize (in the case of opposition scholars and 
certain participants) further attempts to establish participatory democratic 
mechanisms beyond CLPPs and CCs, such as comunas, and the ‘communal state’. 
In these cases, the traditions (governmental, administrative, state-civil society 
relationship) of the representative state are fiercely guarded. This is at odds with 
communities, such as those in La Silsa, that are keen advocates of Chavismo and 
its processes.  
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10.4  REFLECTION ON THE USE OF THE INTERPRETIVE 
INSTITUTIONALIST MODEL 
 
The thesis has found that the application of Hay’s (2011) interpretive institutionalist 
model was valuable in eliciting participants’ meanings in response to a fast moving 
structural and legislative landscape in Venezuela. To the knowledge of the 
researcher, Hay’s model has not been applied in studies of the Venezuelan context 
or the global south more widely. It therefore brought a new epistemological and 
ontological lens to study the Venezuelan context and units of analysis. 
 
Hay’s model sought to bring together two theories (interpretivism and 
institutionalism) that were previously considered epistemologically and ontologically 
distinct. Hay argued that understanding the institutional opportunities and 
constraints in his model provide a way of describing where actors’ dilemmas come 
from. The origin of dilemmas is something that Hay believes Bevir and Rhodes’s 
theory lacks. Consequently, Hay’s model was applied to the research, which sought 
to understand two new mechanisms for citizen participation in Venezuela - CLPPs 
and CCs, respectively. The model was appropriate because it enabled participants 
within these mechanisms to provide a narrative about how they saw and understood 
their respective roles within these new mechanisms. These narratives drew heavily 
on the ideational strand of the model (interpretive theory). The rules, scripts or 
procedures that actors carried out also informed by what Hay terms the 
‘opportunities and constraints’ within the given context (institutional dimension). 
Consequently, the findings showed that ideational and institutionalist elements were 
complementary and reinforcing, supporting Hay’s model.  
 
Most importantly, however, was that the model enabled a way of generating data in 
a fast moving context. It provided a way of understanding participants’ experiences 
in a country that has undergone considerable structural transformations since 1998. 
The model afforded explanation in this environment of institutional76 transition 
brought about by successive legislative reforms. Given that this rapidly moving 
situation may not allow for new rules and repertoires to become fully embedded, the 
model provided a framework where actors’ responses and alternative modes of 
action to those intended could be clarified. The model enabled both this fluctuating 
institutional development to be understood, as well as explaining the way actors 
                                                
76 Changing ‘rules of the game’ 
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responded and reacted. The model therefore provided a dynamic between the 
institutional and ideational dimensions, that neither interpretivism nor institutionalism 
provides alone.  
 
The thesis findings have shown that the linkages between these dimensions enable 
understanding and conceptualization of the different, contingent institutional rules 
(formal and informal) and how the actors involved within these configurations 
understand these. The model enables dilemmas to be highlighted (see sections 7.4, 
8.3.3 and 9.2 for detail). These tend to arise where flux occurs as a result of the 
transition to new modes of rules. Actors respond in favour or against the new 
dilemma. Consequently, this supports Hay’s assertion that his model provides 
explanation of where ideas that lead to dilemmas come from, something he argues 
that Bevir (1999) and Bevir and Rhodes (2003; 2006; 2010) have failed to do 
sufficiently. 
 
In applying the model to the case studies of CLPPs and CCs in Chacao and 
Libertador, five main dilemmas (discussed in 9.2.2) were found. Dilemmas were 
generated where participants’ beliefs and traditions (ideational components) were 
shaped by the institutional configurations they were presented with.  
 
Institutionalist theory has found it difficult to specify how actors’ agency shapes 
institutional contexts. Typically it is understood that the institutional context shapes 
actors’ behaviour. Hay’s model enables a two-way dynamic. By incorporating 
interpretivism, it can show that actors’ traditions and beliefs can determine how 
actors’ understand any rules or contexts they are presented with. The findings, as 
described in the previous section and chapters 7 and 8, demonstrated several 
examples of this. 
 
Through my analysis I have been able to identify that while Hay’s model is right to 
use ‘dilemma’ as an interface between the interpretive and institutional dimensions, 
I found that there is scope to give greater emphasis to ‘traditions’. My findings 
demonstrated that traditions could be both an ideational and institutionalist element. 
For example, a tradition can be the educational background of an actor which 
provides a certain vision or way of looking at the world. Or a tradition can be a set of 
rules or behaviours that belong to a group of people. Consequently, a new interface 
has been identified between the two dimensions of Hay’s model.  
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When actors faced a particular context or situation, their traditions and beliefs 
created dilemmas depending on how they saw and understood that context. We can 
understand that context to be the rules, whether formal or informal, or a tradition. 
According to Bevir and Rhodes (2010) traditions are always evolving, although they 
can show certain periods of stability. Consequently the tradition may incorporate a 
set of rules and behaviours that shape the way actors encounter new situations, 
such as those occurring in Venezuela. As such, the findings showed Hay’s model, 
enables scholars to look at the way rules and practices are created, understood, 
resisted or enacted. Drawing from the ideational dimension, explanation can be 
provided from this analysis why actors’ acted in a certain way. An institutionalist 
account does not place as much emphasis on this dimension. Conversely, a purely 
interpretivist approach would not necessarily take the different rules (institutional 
opportunities and constraints) into account.  
 
Bevir and Rhodes interpretivism has typically emphasised that the ideational 
dimension is shaped entirely by how individuals encounter and shape their world. 
My findings show that although individuals do make their own decisions it is Hay’s 
model that provides scope to conceptualise linkages between the 
individual/ideational and collective/institutional dimensions (see section 9.2.3). This 
is something that Bevir and Rhodes (2010) have been very scathing of in the past, 
but have recently conceded has scope to be developed further. Hay’s model, 
supplemented with the findings from the thesis, particularly the development of the 
concept of ‘tradition’ can provide a step towards this individual-collective link. This 
transition between the individual and collective is something that both 
institutionalism and interpretivism do not currently emphasise. Furthermore, it is 
considered that a dilemma can also provide linkages between the individual-
collective where sets of actors share very similar circumstances (such as 
community member power imbalances within the CLPP).  
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10.5  SCOPE FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Three further strands have been identified as having potential for furthering 
research regarding CLPPs and CCs. The first of these relates to adopting a 
deliberative democratic theoretical approach. The second could involve comparative 
research looking at how the experience of CLPPs and CCs relates to other 
participatory planning practices and experiences in neighbouring countries. The 
third could incorporate a discursive institutionalist (DI) approach.  
 
Scope exists to supplement the research undertaken in the thesis by utilising recent 
developments in deliberative democracy scholarship. In particular, scholars such as 
Dryzek (2010) and Niemeyer (2011) have developed theories and methodologies 
that enable study of the quality of deliberation within ‘mini-publics’ or fora involving 
citizens (such as CCs, comunas and CLPPs). They have developed means to study 
the extent, type and quality of discussions and decision-making within deliberative 
arenas. It is considered that adopting such an approach would provide additional 
insight into the way citizens deal with matters in their local areas – and see how the 
transmission of ideas occurs within participatory mechanisms. It is considered that 
CC and comuna assemblies would provide a rich environment for empirical data. 
Furthermore, exploring whether participants undergo transformations of personal 
beliefs and opinions could also be explored by tracking thoughts, feelings and 
opinions before, during and after taking part in CC or comuna processes. 
 
There is scope for comparative research, particularly with experiences in 
neighbouring Brazil and Colombia. Brazil has implemented many programmes to 
improve conditions in its favelas77 (Magalhães and di Villarosa 2012). Similarly, 
Medellín and Bogotá in Colombia have implemented comprehensive urban 
development programmes that resemble, or have inspired, similar projects in 
Venezuela (Sotomayor 2014; Dávila 2012). Given that the political background and 
contexts of each country is considerably different, there is potential to look at the 
way actors have assimilated, understood and implemented such programmes. 
Furthermore, the way citizen participation has been incorporated into these 
programmes remains under developed and provides ample opportunity for future 
                                                
77 Various examples of urban upgrading programmes (‘Favela-Bairro’; Integrated Urbanization 
Program; ‘Nova Baixada’; ‘PROAP’, for example) provide programmes which seek to tackle informal 
areas of the Latin American city. The goals of these programmes share similarities to programmes 
such as ‘Barrio Nuevo Barrio Tricolor’ in Venezuela. 
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research.  
 
Chapter 4 (see section 4.2.4) identified the potential insights of incorporating DI 
components within the thesis’ theoretical framework. The DI approach focuses on 
‘creative agents’ such as political leaders, government spokespeople, party 
activists, and spin doctors (Lowndes and Roberts 2013 pg 101). Consequently, 
following Schmidt (2008; 2011), these components could help elicit the nature of 
ideas and where these come from; it would facilitate understanding how such ideas 
are communicated, disseminated and adopted. It is considered that tracking such 
ideational communication among actors would supplement Hay’s model further and 
also be compatible with a deliberative democracy approach. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
List of Interviewees 
N.B. Interviewees that have been cited directly in the thesis have been given a 
pseudonym. These are indicated in the table using ‘name’, where appropriate. All 
other interviewees are given a general title/ description. 
 
No Code Interviewee Organisation Title Date Mins Municipality/ location 
1 B001 Sala Técnica Secretary Alcaldía de Baruta 19.02.2013 60 Baruta 
2 B002 Sala Técnica technical staff Alcaldía de Baruta 19.02.2013 25 Baruta 
3 B003 Councillor CLPP Baruta 19.02.2013 45 Baruta 
4 B004 Councillor CLPP Baruta 26.02.2013 85 Baruta 
5 B005 
CLPP community 
member; CC 
spokesperson 
CLPP Baruta, CC 
Prados del Este 05.03.2013 75 Baruta 
6 B006 CC spokesperson CC Sorokaima 11.03.2013 90 Baruta 
7 B007 CC spokesperson CC Sorokaima 11.03.2013 30 Baruta 
8 B008 CC spokesperson CC Las Minas 13.02.2013 50 Baruta 
9 B009 Vicepresident CLPP Baruta 14.03.2013 15 Baruta 
10 B010 CC spokesperson CC Caurimare 20.03.2013 30 Baruta 
11 C001 Sala Técnica Secretary Alcaldía de Chacao 21.02.2013 45 Chacao 
12 C002 Sala Técnica Coordinator Alcaldía de Chacao 21.02.2013 25 Chacao 
13 C003 Urban planner Alcaldía de Chacao 21.03.2013 25 Chacao 
14 C004 
Community 
organisations 
coordinator 
Alcaldía de Chacao 21.03.2013 30 Chacao 
15 C005 ‘David’, vicepresident CLPP Chacao 03.04.2013 30 Chacao 
16 C006 ‘Alejandra’, CC spokesperson CC Bello Campo 2 09.05.2013 90 Chacao 
18 L001 ‘Petra’, Sala Técnica Secretary 
CLPP Libertador 
 29.04.2013 75 Libertador 
19 L002 CLPP Community member (Sucre Parish) 
CLPP Libertador 
 29.04.2014 30 Libertador 
20 L003 Head of Plan Integral del Barrio Fundacaracas 08.05.2013 60 Libertador 
21 L004 Comuna coordinator Sala Técnica Comuna Cacique La Silsa 14.05.2013 30 Libertador 
22 AMC001 
Head of Urban Planning 
and 2 other urban 
Planners (3) 
El Instituto Metropolitano 
de Urbanismo Taller 
Caracas 
15.05.2013 70 
Área 
Metropolitan
a Caracas 
23 L005 Architect Sala Técnica Comuna Cacique La Silsa 04.06.2013 30 Libertador 
24 C007 CC spokesperson CC El Rosal 28.06.2013 60 Chacao 
25 C008 Community Member (sports committee) CLPP Chacao 14.06.2013 20 Chacao 
26 C009 ‘Ana María’, CC spokesperson CC Altamira 16.07.2013 75 Chacao 
27 C010 CC spokespeople (3) CC El Dorado 18.07.2013 90 Chacao 
28 C011 CC spokesperson CC Zona 3 25.07.2013 45 Chacao 
29 C012 
‘Elizabeth’, CLPP 
community member 
(environment 
committee) 
CLPP Chacao; CC 
Bosque Sur 26.07.2013 120 Chacao 
30 C013 ‘Ana’, CC spokesperson CC Zona 2 27.07.2013 45 Chacao 
31 C014 CC spokesperson CC Zona 1 27.07.2013 25 Chacao 
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No Code Interviewee Organisation Title Date Mins Municipality/ location 
32 C015 CC spokespeople (2) CC Bello Campo 1 29.07.2013 45 Chacao 
33 C016 ‘Caterina’ and ‘María José’, CC spokespeople CC El Pedregal 29.07.2013 85 Chacao 
34 C017 CC spokesperson CC Zona 6 30.07.2013 45 Chacao 
35 C018 CC spokespeople (2) CC Zona 4 13.08.2013 60 Chacao 
36 C019 CC spokesperson CC Bosque Sur 13.08.2013 65 Chacao 
37 C020 Councillor ‘Gómez’ CLPP Chacao 14.08.2013 90 Chacao 
38 C021 CLPP; CC spokesperson 
CLPP Chacao; CC 
Norse 14.08.2013 22 Chacao 
39 C022 ‘Nicolás’, CLPP community member 
CLPP Chacao; CC Los 
Palos Grandes 14.08.2013 60 Chacao 
40 C023 Councillor ‘Martínez’ CLPP Chacao 16.08.2013 75 Chacao 
41 C024 Councillor ‘Pérez’ CLPP Chacao 16.08.2013 35 Chacao 
42 C025 Councillor ‘González’ CLPP Chacao 20.08.2013 60 Chacao 
43 C026 Councillor ‘Sánchez’ CLPP Chacao 27.08.2013 95 Chacao 
44 L006 ‘Andrea’, CC spokesperson 
CC Manos de la 
revolución, La Silsa 05.09.2013 30 Libertador 
45 L007 CC spokesperson CC Bolívar Libertador, La Silsa 05.09.2013 10 Libertador 
46 L008 ‘Cristina’, CC spokesperson 
CC Nueva Generación,  
La Silsa 05.09.2013 20 Libertador 
47 L009 ‘Teresa’, CC spokesperson 
CC Unidos Venceremos, 
La Silsa 06.09.2013 40 Libertador 
48 L010 ‘Carmen’, CC spokesperson CC Tercer Plan, La Silsa 06.09.2013 30 Libertador 
49 L011 ‘Daniel’, CC spokesperson 
CC Nueva Generación,  
La Silsa 06.09.2013 40 Libertador 
50 L012 CC spokesperson CC Silsa en progreso, La Silsa 10.09.2013 45 Libertador 
51 L013 CC spokesperson CC Jose Gregorio Hernandez, La Silsa 10.09.2013 30 Libertador 
52 L014 CC spokesperson CC Carlos Esquerra, La Silsa 10.09.2013 30 Libertador 
53 L015 CC spokesperson CC Esperanza de las Tapitas, La Silsa 12.09.2013 30 Libertador 
54 L016 ‘Javier’, comuna coordinator;  Fundacaracas,  18.09.2013 30 Libertador 
55 L017 CC spokesperson CC Tercer Plan, La Silsa 18.09.2013 30 Libertador 
56 L018 Sala Técnica Architects, engineers (4) 
Sala Técnica Comuna 
Cacique La Silsa 18.09.2013 30 Libertador 
57 L019 CC spokesperson CC Esperanza la revolucion, La Silsa 18.09.2013 40 Libertador 
58 L020 
CLPP community 
member (environment 
committee) 
CLPP Libertador 19.09.2013 30 Libertador 
59 L021 
CLPP community 
member (no specified 
committee) 
CLPP Libertador 19.09.2013 40 Libertador 
60 L022 
CLPP community 
member (housing 
committee) 
CLPP Libertador 24.09.2013 25 Libertador 
61 L023 Councillor head of staff 1 
Concejo Municipal 
Libertador 09.10.2013 40 Libertador 
62 L024 Councillor head of staff 2 
Concejo Municipal 
Libertador 09.10.2013 25 Libertador 
63 L025 Councillor ‘Fernández’ CLPP Libertador 15.10.2013 55 Libertador 
64 L026 Councillor ‘García‘ CLPP Libertador 15.10.2013 90 Libertador 
65 L027 Councillor ‘López’ CLPP Libertador 15.10.2013 45 Libertador 
66 L028 Urban planner Alcaldía de Libertador 15.10.2013 60 Libertador 
67 L029 Director of Planning, Libertador Alcaldía de Libertador 15.10.2013 60 Libertador 
68 NG001 
‘Antonio’, Social 
Accountability section 
officer 
Fundacomunal 18.10.2013 60 Miranda State  
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APPENDIX 2 
CLPP Meetings 
Municipality Date Start Finish 
Chacao 05.03.2013 1500 1658 
Libertador 16.05.2013 - - 
Libertador 20.05.2013 1440 1630 
Chacao 22.05.2013 1503 1729 
Chacao 02.07.2013 1630 1800 
Libertador 17.06.2013 1430 1700 
Chacao 14.08.2013 1630 1800 
Libertador 19.09.2013 - - 
Libertador 24.09.2013 1430 1635 
Libertador 16.10.2013 1430 1620 
 
CC/ comuna meetings 
Place Date Start Finish 
La Silsa Comuna Assembly Meeting (all 
La Silsa CCs) 14.05.2013 1630 1800 
La Silsa Comuna Assembly 21.05.2013 1620 1745 
La Silsa Comuna Assembly 28.05.2013 1700 1830 
La Silsa Comuna Assembly 04.06.2013 1600 1805 
La Silsa Comuna Assembly 11.06.2013 1620 1800 
La Silsa Comuna Assembly 18.06.2013 1615 1835 
Joint CC meeting: CC El Bosque; CC El 
Rosal; CC Zona 4 and ADVs (Chacao) 18.07.2013 1930 2030 
CC El Pedregal (Chacao) 28.07.2013 1500 1700 
La Silsa Comuna Assembly 10.09.2013 1640 1835 
La Silsa Comuna Assembly 17.09.2013 1625 1810 
 
Participatory Budgeting Meetings (Chacao) 
Municipal area Date Time Place 
Zona 4; Campo Alegre, San Marino y 
Country Club 12.06.2013 7pm Plaza Gran Colombia 
Zona 3: Bello Campo, Sector La Cruz, 
Sector Popular Bello Campo 13.06.2013 7pm UEM Carlos Soublette 
Encuentro Deportivo 14.06.2013 4pm Centro Deportivo EM 
Encuentro Ambiental 15.06.2013 2pm Mercado de Chacao 
Zona 1: El Bosque 18.06.2013 7pm Parque Pedro Centendo Vallenilla 
Zona 2: Población de Chacao 20.06.2013 7pm Plaza Bolívar de Chacao 
Zona 6: Altamira, La Castellana y Bucaral 25.07.2013 7pm Parque Caballito 
Zona 8: El Rosal, El Retiro, Edo Leal 26.07.2013 7pm Parque Boyacá 
Zona 9: La Floresta, San José La Floresta, 
El Dorado 27.06.2013 7pm Parque Aruflo 
Encuentro Juvenil 28.06.2013 10am Plaza La Castellana 
Zona 7: Los Palos Grandes y Pajaritos 02.07.2013 7pm Plaza Los Palos Grandes 
Zona 5: El Pedregal, La Manguera, Barrio 
Nuevo, El Tártago 03.07.2013 7pm UE Juan de Dios Guanche 
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APPENDIX 3  PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION PROTOCOL 
During fieldwork the following protocol and table, adopted from Spradley (1980), 
provided guidance for undertaking participant observation.  
WRITING AN ETHNOGRAPHY 
 Levels of ethnographic writing (ibid pgs 162-167) 
o Level one – universal statements 
o Level two – cross-cultural descriptive statements 
o Level three – general statements about a society or cultural group 
o Level four – general statements about a specific cultural scene 
o Level five – specific statement about a cultural domain 
o Level six – specific incident statement 
Questions to guide identification of statement levels: 
  SPACE OBJECT ACT ACTIVITY EVENT TIME ACTOR GOAL FEELING 
SPACE 
Can you 
describ
e in 
detail all 
the 
places? 
What are 
all the 
ways 
spaces is 
organized 
by 
objects? 
What are 
all the 
ways 
space is 
organized 
by acts? 
What are 
all the 
ways 
space is 
organized 
by 
activities? 
What 
are all 
the 
ways 
space is 
organiz
ed by 
events? 
What 
spatial 
change
s occur 
over 
time? 
What 
are all 
the 
ways 
space is 
used by 
actors? 
What 
are all 
the 
ways 
space is 
related 
to 
goals? 
What 
places are 
associated 
with 
feelings? 
OBJECT 
Where 
are 
objects 
located
? 
Can you 
describe 
in detail 
all the 
objects? 
What are 
all the 
ways 
objects 
are used 
in acts? 
What are 
all the 
ways 
objects 
are used 
in 
activities? 
What 
are all 
the 
ways 
that 
objects 
are 
used as 
events? 
How are 
objects 
used at 
different 
times? 
What 
are all 
the 
ways 
objects 
are 
used by 
actors? 
How are 
objects 
used in 
seeking 
goals? 
What are 
all the 
ways 
objects 
evoke 
feelings? 
ACT 
Where 
do acts 
occur? 
How do 
acts in 
detail all 
the 
objects? 
Can you 
describe 
in detail 
all the 
acts? 
How are 
acts a part 
of 
activities? 
How are 
acts a 
part of 
events? 
How do 
acts 
vary 
over 
time? 
What 
are the 
ways 
acts are 
perform
ed by 
actors? 
What 
are all 
the 
ways 
acts are 
related 
to 
goals? 
What are 
all the 
ways acts 
are linked 
to 
feelings? 
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  SPACE OBJECT ACT ACTIVITY EVENT TIME ACTOR GOAL FEELING 
ACTIVIT
Y 
What 
are all 
the 
places 
activitie
s 
occur? 
What are 
all the 
ways 
activities 
incorporat
e objects? 
What are 
all the 
ways 
activities 
incorporat
e acts? 
Can you 
describe 
in detail all 
the 
activities? 
What 
are all 
the 
ways 
activitie
s are 
part of 
events? 
How do 
activitie
s vary 
at 
different 
times? 
What 
are all 
the 
ways 
activitie
s 
involve 
actors? 
What 
are all 
the 
ways 
activitie
s 
involve 
goals? 
How do 
activities 
involve 
feelings? 
EVENT 
What 
are all 
the 
places 
events 
occur? 
What are 
all the 
ways 
events 
incorporat
e objects? 
What are 
all the 
ways 
events 
incorporat
e acts? 
What are 
all the 
ways 
events 
incorporat
e 
activities? 
Can you 
describ
e in 
details 
all the 
events? 
How do 
events 
occur 
over 
time? Is 
there 
any 
sequen
cing? 
How do 
events 
involve 
the 
various 
actors? 
How are 
events 
related 
to 
goals? 
How do 
events 
involve 
feelings? 
TIME 
where 
so time 
periods 
occur? 
What are 
all the 
ways time 
affects 
objects? 
How do 
acts fall 
into time 
periods? 
How do 
activities 
fall into 
time 
periods? 
How do 
events 
fall into 
time 
periods
? 
Can you 
describ
e in 
details 
all the 
time 
periods
? 
When 
are all 
the 
times 
actors 
are "on 
stage"? 
How are 
goals 
related 
to time 
periods
? 
When are 
feelings 
evoked? 
ACTOR 
Where 
do 
actors 
place 
themsel
ves? 
What are 
all the 
ways 
actors 
use 
objects? 
What are 
all the 
ways 
actors 
use acts? 
How are 
actors 
involved in 
activities? 
How are 
actors 
involved 
in 
events? 
How do 
different 
actors 
change 
over 
time or 
at 
different 
times? 
Can you 
describ
e in 
detail all 
the 
actors? 
Which 
actors 
are 
linked to 
which 
goals? 
What are 
the 
feelings 
experience
d by 
actors? 
GOAL 
Where 
are 
goals 
sought 
and 
achieve
d? 
What are 
all the 
ways 
goals 
involve 
use of 
objects? 
What are 
all the 
ways 
goals 
involve 
acts? 
What 
activities 
are goal 
seeking or 
linked to 
goals? 
What 
are all 
the 
ways 
events 
are 
linked to 
goals? 
Which 
goals 
are 
schedul
ed for 
which 
times? 
How do 
the 
various 
goals 
affect 
the 
various 
actors? 
Can you 
describ
e in 
detail all 
the 
goals? 
What are 
all the 
ways goals 
evoke 
feelings? 
FEELING 
Where 
do the 
various 
feeling 
states 
occur? 
What 
feelings 
lead to 
the use of 
what 
objects? 
What are 
all the 
ways 
feelings 
affect 
acts?  
What are 
all the 
ways 
feelings 
affect 
activities? 
What 
are all 
the 
ways 
feelings 
affect 
events? 
How are 
feelings 
related 
to 
various 
time 
periods
? 
What 
are the 
ways 
feelings 
involve 
actors? 
What 
are the 
ways 
feelings 
influenc
e 
goals? 
Can you 
describe in 
detail all 
the 
feelings? 
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APPENDIX 4 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE  
During fieldwork the following guide was used. As indicated by the ‘semi-structured’ title, 
interviewees were asked specific questions according to their individual responses, as 
well as their specific position within their respective CC or CLPP. Although the questions 
may have differed slightly between interviews and types of participants, the general 
content followed those outlined below.  
PARTICIPANT BACKGROUND 
 Who are you? 
 How did you get involved in community matters? 
 What do you do in the CC/ CLPP? 
PARTICIPATION AND CLPP POLICY/DECISION MAKING 
 How does the CC/ CLPP work? 
 What does the CC/ CLPP mean to you? 
 How do you understand citizen participation in public matters? 
 As a citizen, what significance does being involved in the CC/ CLPP have for 
you? 
 Does your CC/ CLPP have any relations with the municipality and CC/ CLPP? 
Can you tell me how? 
 How important is the municipality and its elected members for you in policy 
making and planning processes? 
 What policies has the CC/ CLPP created? 
 How do CCs/ CLPPs influence municipal policy making and planning? 
 How willing are elected representatives and civil servants to support bottom-up 
community initiatives? 
 How do you see yourself in the CC/ CLPP? 
 What do you think you can do in the CC/ CLPP? 
 Roles are unpaid, does this matter? 
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MUNICIPAL AND NEIGHBOURHOOD NEEDS, GOALS AND PRIORITIES 
 Can you tell me how you advocate preferences in the CC/ CLPP process? Can 
you give me an example? What matters influenced such a position? Why did that 
particular course of action seem important to you? 
 Do you believe that CCs/ CLPPs have been able to achieve their community- 
needs, as a result of being involved in policy making and planning processes?  
MEANING OF PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 
 What does democracy mean to you? 
 What do you understand by the phrase ‘participatory democracy’? 
 
 
